Masked men, murder and mass displacement: how terror came to Burkina Faso
The road south towards Kaya is no longer safe, but
thousands take it every day. They come on foot, piled on to scooters or next to
donkeys straining at their carts. They testify to atrocities by masked men that
are never claimed and whose motives remain unexplained. Women and children are
everywhere. The men are looking for work, in hiding, or dead.
A landlocked nation of 19 million people in the
heart of west Africa, Burkina Faso was celebrated only a few years ago as a
stable, vibrant young democracy. Now it is being eaten away at its eastern and
northern fringes.
Armed groups, including some aligned with al-Qaida
and Islamic State, are waging a campaign of indiscriminate killing that has
driven soldiers, teachers, health workers and other symbols of the state from
vast swathes of the country’s borders.
“We are at a point now where the very existence of
the country is at stake,” says Zéphirin Diabré, the leader of the opposition
party Union for Progress and Reform.
“Officially, there is no location that has fallen to
the terrorists,” says Jacob Yarabatioula, a sociologist at the University of
Ouagadougou researching the violence. “But in reality, there are places at the
extreme borders with Mali where you have no signs of the administration. No
police, no gendarmerie, no defence forces, no schools. Those places are in a
sense controlled by the terrorists.”
In the past year, attacks on civilians have surged,
triggering a tenfold increase in displaced people, whose numbers rival those of
Syrians from Idlib and Myanmar’s Rohingya. According to official records,
nearly 800,000 Burkinabè people had fled their homes as of 29 February. But not
all are being registered, and aid groups say the real number is far greater.
“If you look at the speed of arrivals and the lack
of access for aid agencies and authorities to vast areas, there is no way the
official figures are consistent,” says Tom Peyre-Costa from the Norwegian
Refugee Council. “It’s highly probable that the figures are much, much higher.”
Kaya, about a two-hour drive from the capital, Ouagadougou,
is overwhelmed by the new arrivals. Outside one government office, more than
100 women gather in the red dirt jostling for bags of maize. “My family are
sleeping on the ground over there,” says Aissetta Diaten, 56, pointing to a
patch beneath a tree.
The deadliest attacks – 35 people killed in a
village in December, a church attack in February that left 24 dead, 43
villagers murdered last weekend – are usually publicised. But with more than
100 incidents recorded in February alone, according to one estimate, most of
the violence experienced by the women lining up for food has gone unrecorded.
“They kidnapped my son three months ago,” says one,
who asks to be identified as Mamdata. “The men in the village ran before us,
and we left later. I don’t even know where my husband is.”
The fog extends to the perpetrators: the gunmen
rarely identify themselves or claim their attacks later. Most are thought to be
jihadists, including some affiliated with al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb and
the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS), who have spilled over or
returned from neighbouring Mali, where they have been among the myriad actors
involved in an eight-year insurgency.
Several victims of attacks in different areas say
the gunmen who arrived in their villages – always masked, sometimes wearing
ammunition belts across their bodies – herded people into a local mosque to
deliver coarse sermons about veiling women or cuffing pants above the ankle.
“They said
they were fighting for Islam and that everyone should follow Islam,” Shamim
Suleyman, in his 80s, recalls of the men who arrived in his village near the
northern town of Tongomayel. “And we said, ‘Look, we’re here in the mosque. We
pray, we’re Muslims’. But if someone is carrying a gun and telling you these
things, you can’t argue.”
After gunmen shot Aruna, 27, during an attack on the
village of Rofènéga in January, one of them asked if he could recite the
shahadah, the Islamic profession of faith. “I could, I did,” he says,
unbuttoning his shirt to reveal the scar tissue below his shoulder. “They took
my phone and said I could leave.”
Just how connected these groups are to Isis or
al-Qaida’s leadership is unclear. Some might brand themselves as affiliates,
receiving bomb-making help or funds, “but on the ground, west African groups do
what they want and take advice as it makes sense”, says Judd Devermont, the
director of the Africa Program at the Centre for Strategic and International
Studies.
Both the US military and local analysts have noted
that groups aligned to Isis and al-Qaida appear to have launched joint attacks
in Burkina Faso and elsewhere in the Sahel – even though the two terrorist
organisations are bitter rivals in the Middle East.
What is playing out in Burkina Faso and other
pockets of the Sahel is more complex than a jihadist insurgency, analysts in
the capital say. “At first it looked like terrorism,” Yarabatioula says. “But
when we scratched the surface we noticed there were criminals involved too.”
As the state presence has diminished, especially in
remote areas, local militias, highway robbers and smuggling gangs have
proliferated. Some work with the jihadis and others fight them. When attacks
occur, it is not always clear if they are motivated by an extremist
interpretation of Islam, a local dispute or to win turf.
“This is
really a fight for a corridor,” says Yarabatioula. “These groups want to free a
corridor to be able to smuggle drugs, cigarettes, and so on, going from Togo to
Niger to Mali. And they are trying to create another corridor from western
Burkina to the Ivory Coast.”
“All these
different groups are interested in the state going away,” says Mahamadou
Sawadogo, a security researcher. “If there is no state, it’s good for all of
them. That’s the link between them.”
The success of the armed groups is not just down to
an under-resourced Burkinabè army – now being supported by French troops. They are
also expertly playing on discontent in rural areas, especially among the ethnic
minority Fulani group, who often complain of discrimination and neglect by the
central government.
Many remote communities seethe at their lack of
access to state resources, or when mines are granted to multinational companies
and traditional hunting ranges are sold off as private estates, says Sawadogo.
“The terrorist groups come and say, we will give you
all that the state takes from you. They take control of the hunting ranges and
tell people: take it, it’s for you. They take control of the local mines and
tell them: use it, it’s yours. So why wouldn’t they succeed?”
In contrast, the army’s efforts to beat back the
militants have been marred by accusations of widespread human right abuses.
“We’ve documented that 60 people were executed without trial last year,” says
Aly Sanou, the secretary general of the Burkinabè Movement for Human and
People’s Rights, a watchdog group based in Ouagadougou.
“The population are not collaborating with the
security forces, because in order to collaborate you need to trust them. Those
from the Fulani ethnic group feel stigmatised, and this has allowed the
terrorist groups to widen their recruitment base by recruiting more Fulanis.”
The number of people registered as displaced is
expected to exceed 900,000 by next month, with no end in sight. Aid agencies
say at least $300m (£244m) in funding will be required to feed and shelter the
fleeing population. Reaching those left behind in areas where government
control has faltered is currently impossible, says Peyre-Costa. Nobody knows
who to ask for safe passage.
“In most humanitarian crises, we can negotiate
access to be able to reach everyone in need,” he says. “But in the case of
Burkina Faso, we don’t know who’s actually in control.”