The repercussions of the "Russian - Turkish" consensus in the Idlib

The situation in "Idlib" in the north of Syria is heading to a watershed that is not limited to the extension of the Syrian Arab Army's control over the province, but extends to contribute to shaping the future of Turkish-Russian relations, and Turkish relations with the United States and NATO.

Erdogan and  Putin, on March 5, 2020, reach a ceasefire agreement in the Idlib border areas, which came into effect.

This agreement is an extension of the Sochi Agreement signed between the two sides in September 2018 regarding reducing escalation in Idlib, and the agreement comes in light of many field developments in the region after the Syrian Arab Army took control in January 2020 over many areas that were previously subject to the influence of armed groups Supported politically, economically and militarily by Turkey.

Terms of the agreement

The agreement provides for the establishment of a safe passage of 6 km on the international road "M4", and that Turkey has the right to respond to any breach of the de-escalation agreement, as the two sides agreed on the territorial integrity of Syria, and the agreement confirms that the solution in Syria is based on political rather than military measures Under the supervision of the United Nations.

They also stressed the need for the return of the displaced, and the two sides agreed that each organization classified as a terrorist at the United Nations is a terrorist for the two countries, and the agreement also included the establishment of an aid corridor on the "M4" road under the supervision of the Turkish and Russian ministries of defense.

After signing the agreement, a Russian military delegation visited Turkey in the framework of discussing the implementation of the terms of the agreement, after the Russian Ministry of Defense revealed that there were three violations in Idlib and seven other shootings in Latakia and nine cases in Aleppo during the first day of the armistice, and then the announcement of the entry of forces Syria, two villages near Kafr Nabl, south of Idlib.

It should be noted that the current ceasefire is not the first agreement between the Russian and Turkish sides, and that these agreements always come after military operations carried out by the Syrian Arab Army forces with Russian support and gradually controlling large parts of the province, and with its recent progress in southern Idlib and western Aleppo , About half of the governorate’s area came under the control of the Syrian army, which caused an increase in the confrontation with Turkey, which demanded compliance with the Sochi Agreement with the Russian side.

Syrian and Russian successes

After the signing of the agreement, there are many repercussions that will be witnessed in the situation in Idlib and expressed by the introduction of the agreement, which confirmed Moscow and Ankara’s commitment to the sovereignty, independence, unity, and territorial integrity of Syria, which casts permanent doubts on the legitimacy of the Turkish presence, which will remain in question in Moscow and Damascus, and it is undoubtedly subject For political trade-offs between Russia and Turkey.

There are many indications that Syria has achieved many successes, the most important of which are: granting the agreement, to Russia and the Syrian forces, sufficient justifications to resume fighting extremists, as well as the lack of a mechanism that includes ceasefire control, which marks the beginning of a more expanded military operation in the near future. On the part of Damascus and its Russian ally, especially after the agreement granted Damascus the right to confront armed groups, which puts Turkey in a difficult position.

The agreement guarantees the Syrian Arab Army's control of many areas in Idlib, and for Syria, it considers the agreement a truce before resuming the battle to restore the area before heading east to restore all the lands.

Turkish retreat

The agreement between Russia and Turkey came against the backdrop of the decline in Ankara in terms of its control over the control points and some areas in Idlib, and the Turkish observation points - within the 12 monitoring points that they belong to in accordance with the Sochi Agreement - are still besieged by the Syrian Arab Army.

The agreement stipulated a joint Russian-Turkish supervision along the M4 road, with a length of 70 kilometers and a distance of six kilometers north of the roads, and the M5 road between Damascus and Aleppo was not included after the Syrian Arab Army took control of it during the recent military campaign, which means Turkey lost the supply link between them And among the armed groups and even the siege of these groups, meaning that it kept the observation points as isolated islands in the areas of Syrian government control and under the Russian umbrella.

Within the same context, this agreement expresses Turkey's acceptance of the field control achieved by the Syrian Arab Army over the areas that were previously under its control.

It should be noted that the Turkish decision to engage in a military confrontation in Idlib was driven by several pressures, the most important of which is the security risk resulting from the loss of Idlib.

Accordingly, and if the Syrian government had accepted to withdraw from the plan to restore the rest of the regions in Idlib with a broad military operation and not to stop fighting terrorism and defeat the Turkish aggression, by agreeing to Moscow's decision to conduct Turkish patrols in northwestern Syria as it is in its northeast, it obtained legitimacy Its presence in the areas it recently controlled and achieved its strategic goal of opening the arteries of the economy and established control over the Aleppo - Saraqib - Maarat al-Numan - Khan Sheikhoun - Hama road, in addition to its de facto control of the areas south of Saraqib - Ain Hawr Road.

Turkish reactions

There are many negative repercussions on Turkish influence in the Idlib region, which contributed to pushing Turkey to seek support from the United States, European Union and NATO countries, as it is betting on a more serious position from its NATO partners in order to take a step that might enable it to confront the influence The Russian Federation and the restoration of some areas that the Syrian Arab Army controlled, by investing in the issue of civilians and refugees in Idlib to pressure them and go to support its interests in Syria, through its constant threat to open borders for refugees to enter European countries.

Accordingly, it is possible for European countries to interfere in the situation in Idlib through the implementation of Security Council resolutions and the Geneva track, which Turkey can try to use in facing the Russian side.

Upon returning to the Turkish policy towards Idlib, we find that Ankara relied directly on two steps in responding to the progress of the Syrian Arab Army forces, one of which is to strengthen its military presence and provide more support to the Syrian factions, embodied in causing heavy losses to the government, and the second: intensified discussions with Russia to reach an understanding under which the system returns to before the Turkish control points.

Parallel to the previous two steps, Turkey has continued to coordinate with NATO and a number of its countries, in particular the United States, Germany, France, and Britain. In general, these steps on the part of Turkey indicate some important points, including that NATO and European countries have not provided it with the support that She wanted to achieve it through them in the face of Russian policy, and the second issue is the decline in her ability to influence the Syrian equation by its systematic loss of its spheres of influence.