THE PRACTICABILITY OF ALGERIAN ANTI-TERRORIST STRATEGY AT PRESENT
The application
of the above-mentioned law was a part of a two-phased strategy to end violence.
In first phase, the state carried out a relentless anti-terrorist campaign,
whereas the second phase consisted in reconciling and integrating terrorist
organizations that accepted to turn in their weapons, as this was the most
important precondition for reconciliation. The strategy also implied banning
terrorist organizations from political activity.
Now, the
question is: Is this strategy still feasible? Can it be applied in Arab and Muslim
states now facing an escalating wave of international terrorism? Can the
elements of the supranational terrorist groups, so different in origins, in
recruitment methods and in financial forums from the local armed movements that
involved themselves in the civil strife in Algeria, be reinegrated?
The most
important precondition stipulated in the Algerian Anti-Terrorist Strategy,
namely, that which stressed the need for terrorists to turn in weapons and
leave their hideouts in the mountains before going into negotiations with the
state, may be the most important reason why this strategy is not applicable in
any of the countries facing terrorism in the last five years. It is almost
certain that the current terror organizations will not accept to cough up their
arms. Meanwhile, states financing these groups and providing them with weapons
and equipment will prevent domestic
terror groups, in particular, from accepting this condition, which was the
back-bone of the second phase in the Algerian Strategy.
The central
question in this study is : What are the limits within which the Algerian Anti-Terrorist
Strategy may be applied in countries now facing terrorist activities? Before
coming to this question, we would like to make clear that the main source for the
call to apply the Algerian Strategy, or untested versions thereof, like the
theory of the political solution to terrorism, promoted by some western media
that, is an argument based on faulty thinking, advocating the application of the Algerian Strategy.
Proponents of this argument consider that combating terror in Egypt, Libya and
some other Arab countries needs political intervention.(1)
To demonstrate
how superficial this point of view is, suffice it to say, nowhere in the world
has it been shown that political solutions have ever worked with terrorist
organizations, from al-Qaeda to Daesh(ISIS). Moreover, political intervention
took place in Algeria, only after a military confrontation by security forces
and the army against terror organizations. In addition to this, amnesty applied
only to organizations that handed over their weapons and that accepted the
opportunity to reintegrate into the state. That is to say, that the Algerian
experience brought together, both the soft and the hard approaches to
terrorism, gradually and not in one go.(2)
In spite of the
fact that the Algerian Strategy helped put an end to bloody violence
perpetuated by terror organizations, and reintegrate around 15 thousand jihadists
into community, this experience cannot be emulated by all countries now
facing terrorist movements. Some of the components of this strategy are
inapplicable in some of these countries, owing to the fact that the
contexts of terrorism, emerging after 2013 are different and that the current supranational
terrorist phenomenon is more complex. The fact that domestic terror groups are
now linked to organizations transcending national borders, as in the case of
coordination between Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and Daesh, for instance,
invalidateslimits the general applicability of the Algerian Strategy as a tool
to combat terrorism in many countries. This kind of outreach, enjoyed by
terrorist group at present, also invalidates the process of taking specimen
copies of the Algerian experience, simply because each country has its own characteristics,
its own challenges.
Accordingly,
combating terrorism, now active in some of the Arab and Muslim countries, makes
it mandatory to apply that part of the Algerian Strategy related to the hard
approach, while the part related to the soft approach, including social and
political reintegration, should be delayed for an unspecified period of time. There
are two reasons for this; first, the refusal by terrorist organizations, using
all sorts of weapons, to abstain from violence; second, the absence of one of
the main reasons for the success of the Algerian Strategy, namely, the
intervention by groups of Political Islam that interveved, to bring about an
end to violence and to support the state in the confrontation with violent
organizations.
Certain groups
in the Islamist movement, like HAMS (Mouvement de la société pour la paix) and
al-Nahda went into partnership with the state, helping make terrorist
organizations hand over their weapons and reintegrate into the community(3).
This is not the case now, as many of the groups of Political Islam, like the
Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and groups of Plitical Islam in Libya, have
resorted to armed violence, instructing their followers to engage in an armed
struggle against the state.
We are trying,
in this study, to shed light on the paradox in the call to apply an antiterrorist
strategy from the 1990s to the terrorism of to-day. To do this, we will spell
out the main components of the Algerian reconciliation process, the main
reasons why local terrorist organizations in Algeria accepted the conditions
put forward by the state and the driving force behind this acceptance and the
main characteristics of the change that the terrorist organizations, in the
countries that are now being urged by some western pundits to follow the
Algerian example or matched samples thereof, have undergone, and the prospects
of success and failure of the application of such an example.
Within
this framework, we will try to answer the following main questions:
-What are the
main characteristics of the 1990s antiterrorist combat experience in Algeria?
- What are the reasons why Algeria's experience
in peace, reconciliation and amnesty may not be generalized to countries now
facing terrorism? Is feasible for a new version of this experience to be
generalized?
-What are the
limitations imposed by the realities of Arab and Muslim environments on the
application of the Algerian model and where in the Arab and Muslim world can domestic
circumstances be conducive to a successful application of that model?
Accordingly,
the paper is devided into three sections: in Section One, we deal with the antiterrorist
strategy in Algeria in 1990s; in Section Two, we explicate the main reasons why
the application of this strategy cannot be generalized; and in Section Three we
assess the applicability of the Algerian model in some countries affected by
terrorism since 2013.
Section
One-Algerian Anti-Terrorist Strategy:
To explicate
the content of the strategy that was applied by Algerian President Abdelaziz
Bouteflika to abate armed violence and reintegrate Islamic movements into the
community, after having militarily attritted those movements in confrontations
with the Algerian Army and Security Forces, we have to discuss the mechanisms
that were used to regain security and clarify the content of the strategy and
the different stages of its execution.
First,
context and content of the Algerian strategy :
Under Liamine Zeroual,
who was appointed as president of the Algerian Republic by the High Security
Council in January 1994, animosity of the Algerian Islamic movements towards
the state reached its highest point. Acts of political violence erupted at a
time of socio-economic difficulties. Violence escalated to a point where mass
massacres became part of the daily life in various provinces in Algeria.
What made
things worse was the failure of the committee for "National Entente"
set up in June 1994 ,when the authorities laid their hands on a letter sent by
Ali Benhadj, one of the founders of the banned FIS (Islamic Salvation Front),
to the Emir(leader) of al-Jama'ah al-Islamiyah al-Musallaha (Armed Islamic
Group),
Cherif Gousmi,
aka Abu Abdallah Ahmed, who was killed later, in a confrontation with the
security forces, urging Gousmi to carry on with the armed violence and
informing him that Benhadj would join al-Jama'ah al-Islamiyah al-Musallaha, as
soon as he would be released from prison.(4)
With the
failure of the efforts to launch a National Dialogue, the resignation of
Liamine Zeroual and the declaration made by armed groups that they rejected
reconciliation, the security situation in Algeria became much worse, with
massacres taking place everywhere, every day.
In 1999,
Algeria took its first step on the road to peace and reconciliation by approving
and putting into effect The Civil Harmony Law (Loi sur la concorde civile). In
the year 2005-2006, Algeria reached the end of this line, by approving and
putting into effect the Charter for Peace and National Reconciliation that put
an end to the madness of sanguinary violence it had gone through.(5)
The Civil
Harmony Law, that represented the first component of the flexible side of the
Algerian Strategy, stipulated that members of any armed group who give in to
authorities within six months, as of May 13,1999, who have not committed or
participated in a criminal act that led to the murder, the total or permanent
disability or the rape of a person, who have not used explosives in attacks
targeting public places or places frequented by the public, would be granted an
exemption from prosecution. On the other hand, those who committed or
participated in such criminal offences would benefit from a mitigation of
sentences imposed on them. Sentences may be mitigated, even further, in case a
terrorist reported to the competent authorities of their own voilition within
three months. This law excluded capital punishment and life imprisonment for
members of armed groups who would surrender to authorities within a period of
six months, regardless of the crimes they had committed.(6)
Among the most
important aticles of this law is article 41 that said that "The above-mentioned provisions are not, unless
the need should so arise, applicable to persons who have belonged to
organisations, and who have consciously, and of their own volition, decided to
halt acts of violence and placed themselves entirely at the disposal of the
State." This article provided the legal basis for the
general amnesty to all members of the armed groups, in January 2000, three
months before the end of the period of enactment of the The Civil Harmony Act
ended.(7)
The second part
of the flexible side of the strategy consisted in the Charter for Peace and
National Reconciliation, which represented the most important among the
dynamics employed by President Bouteflika to make armed groups renounce
violence and reintegrate into commnnity, all the more so, because it followed
the release from prison of the leaders of FIS, after having finished their
sentences. The strategy behind the Charter for Peace and National Reconciliation
is based on endorsing political and peaceful solutions and on the treatment of
various issues bypassed by the Civil Harmony Law and by the Presidential
Amnesty, that followed it.(8) Prominent among the issues treated by the National
Reconciliation Dynamic and the Peace Charter are the problems posed by armed
individuals and Disparus (missing persons) whose families staged an
overwhelming wave of protests, in that period. The National Reconciliation
Dynamic also dealt with the situation of terrorists who were either dead or in
prison and with the issue of those engaged in supporting terrorism. Following
his election in 2004, President
Bouteflika put reconciliation at the center of his program, introducing the
idea of comprehensive reconciliation.(9)
Second:
stages and results of strategy execution:
Concerning the
flexible part of the Algerian approach, which is the part that follows the
resilient confrontation between the Algerian Army and Security Forces, on one
side, and terrorist groups on the other, President Bouteflika pursued a strategy
based on successive stages and gradual execution. His point of departure was
the Civil Harmony Act and the Special Presidential Amnesty. And the end of his
line was the Charter for Peace and Nationa Reconciliation. Through this
dynamic, President Bouteflika managed to mobilize behind him all the conservative
and Islamic powers and currents that had been, previously, rejecting the idea
of dialogue and non-violence. The president gave a palpable form to the idea of
reconciliation by issueing the Civil Hamony Act as a legal framework for a
political treatment of violence, paving the way for amnesty for those members
of armed groups that accepted the end of violence of their own volition.(10)
The Civil
Harmony Act, the execution of which represented the first step on the road to
end violence and achieve reconciliation, gave a conditional offer of amnesty to
extremist Islamists ready to stand before a court of justice and renounce a
resumption of violence before January 13, 2000. Three days before the period
set by the Civil Harmony Act elapsed, Bouteflika decreed his Presidential Amnesty,
with the specific purpose of extending reconciliation to a certain group of
armed jihadists, namely, those who agreed to turn in weapons and break up their
armed gangs. This edict benefited members of Islamic Salvation Army(AIS) and
Islamic League for Da'wa and Jihad (LIDD) and many orhers, as it provided them
with amnesty without prosecution.(11)
Therefore, we
may consider the decision to decree the Civil Harmony Act, at that time, and to
carry out its articles without delay, the starting point of President
Bouteflika's line of reconciliation as it played a role in reintegrating around
5500 members belonging to armed groups, like AIS and LIDD, who had a history of
violence, sabotage and terrorism and who chose to renounce violence in the
period between May, 1999 and January 2000.(12)
Although the
Civil Harmony Act could not deal a deathblow to the menace of armed terrorism,
and in spite of the fact that it only helped achieve partial success of the
policy of hamony and dialogue, the Algerian President repeatedly asserted,
throughout the years of his first and second tenures, that thanks to this Act
the Algerian state was able to seize six thousand articles of military hardware
and resume a state of security, even if partially. This was achieved through an
understanding with AIS that resulted in many of the members of the armed group
leaving their hideouts in the mountains and returning to their villages and
towns. The President kept reminding his people that the Civil Harmony Act made
it possible to foil the Satanic attempts to pull the Algerian state to pieces
and helped save Algerian lives and regain national security.
Therefore,
national reconciliation led to a situation where different Islamic movements
adopted different attitudes towards the state and different ways of dealing
with the regime of President Abdelaziz Bouteflika. Armed organizations, like the
Armed Islamic Group, Armed Islamic Movement (MAIA) and Islamic Salvation Army, were
subjected to dissensions as some of its militants accepted the idea of reform
and became known as Tayyar Islahi "Reformists", whereas others agreed
to renounce violence without approving the purport of the reconciliation
strategy, those came to be known as Istisaliyyin (Eleminationists). Both
currents had, politically, no common grounds with the regime. Although the
group led by the Afghan veteran, Emir of AIS, Madani Merzaq, accepted
reconciliation, in principle, they stayed away from politics. Meanwhile, the
Islamic groups that collaborated politically with the regime and even became
its partners were the Islamic groups whose parties were not disbanded.(13)
Section
Two: the reasons why the Algerian Strategy is not applicable at present:
The Algerian
experience is one of a kind in the Arab World; only in Algeria has there been a
successful reconciliation between those who waged a war against the state and
the state, after all the killing, the sabotage and the spread of terror. In
this section, we will spell out the reasons behind this success and the
possibilities, if there are any, of emulating it in other parts of the Arab and
Islamic world, and why this is not viable at the moment.
First,
the reasons behind the success of the Algerian Strategy in the 1990s:
Violence
erupted in Algeria when the armed Islamic groups responded to the cancellation
of the results of the first round of the legislative elections in 1991,by
resorting to armed struggle, claiming that this was the only way to establish
an Islamic State in Algeria. The success of the Algerian state in eliminating
this violence may be traced down to a number of factors. Some of these factors
are there for any one to see, having been made clear by the state and by its
institutions, and some are to be deduced by looking into the historical facts.
In order that
terrorism may be eliminated, the Algerian Strategy went along two successive
and complementary phases, enhancing and emphasizing the qualities of each
other: First, the hard approach, consisting in a resilient confrontation by the
Algerian Army and Security Forces against the armed organizations, with the aim
of gradually surrounding these groups and forcing most of their elements to
flee from urban centers to the mountains.(14) Second, the soft approach, which
offered a gradual and conditional reintegration into community of the Islamic
groups, after disarraying these groups and forcing them to abate their
violence. The hard approach made it impossible for the armed Islamic groups to
close their ranks, keeping cooperation among the groups at a minimum. In other
words, the Algerian state's confrontation with the extremists was based on two
main pillars; first, a
decisive and crushing suppression of terrorism at home, following a period of
relative tolerance; second, intensification of specious and evasive
negotiations with the aim of obstructing all forms of international support of
Islamists.
To elaborate on
what we have just said, we may indicate the factors that led to the success of
the Algerian Strategy as follows:
1-The parochial
character of the Algerian terrorism in 1990s, as it was limlted to the
home-grown armed groups. Among the most
prominent armed groups that had collapsed before President Abdelaziz
Boutaflika's rise to power was the Armed Islamic Movement, led by Abdel Qader
Shiboty, whose death in late 1993 led to the collapse of the movement and the
Movement for an Islamic State, led by Said Makhlufy, the founder of the
Salvation Front who left the party in 1991, whereas the movement itself
disappeared after his death in 1997. The
other armed groups whose influence continued to be felt throughout the successive
tenures of President Bouteflika, some of which carried on with the fight
against the regime and kept rejecting political interaction, were the Islmaic
Armed Group, founded in 1992 by Mansour Meliani and Muhammad Allal, which
evolved after these two leaders had been neutralized, though the movement
stayed active until 2004; and the Islamic Salvation Army, founded by elemnts of
the FIS in 1994 and led by Madani Merzaq and Ahmed bin Aicha and disbanded in
2000.
2-The political
mediator, represented by Algerian groups of political Islam at that time, and
their ability to relay the government's points of view to the armed groups. On
the other side, Moderate Islamic groups rejected violence and allied themselves
to the state. HAMS and al-Nahda supported President Bouteflika in his three
electoral campaigns.
3-The absence
of madia forums for terrorism, a factor that enabled the state to contain the
phenomenon and prevent it from spreading, at home, and from networking with
supranational terrorist organizations, as was the case in the Arab Region after
2013.
4-The fact that
both the beleaguered armed groups and the state were inclined to reconciliate.
In addition to this, the armed groups recognized the legality of the state and
its institutions and accepted the conditional reconciliation. Therefore, it is
safe to say that some of the organizations that had been engaged in an armed
rebellion since 1992, accepted the reconciliation with the regime without
accepting a partnership with that regime, whereas other organizations kept
calling for what they called a "holy" combat against the state. Other
organizations just disintegrated, following the release of their leaders from
prison.
5- Domestic and
international attitude towards reconciliation. The Algerian people was adamant
in its support for any conciliatory initiative. Because of the tragic events of
what came to be known as the Grand Fitna, and as far as the Natinal Harmony act
and the National Reconciliation were concerned, Algerian political parties
where all of the opinion that reconciliation is what the Algerian nation is
asking for and that the parties rejecting reconciliation are a minority that
cannot stand up to the constitutional powers enjoyed by the president.
The
international attitude towards the reconciliation was restricted to Human
Rights organizations whose main concern was the fear that the families of the
victims of terrorism may be denied their rights. They were also wary of the
problems that may result if and when the numerous social groups that had been
hit hard by a national tragedy were ignored.(14)
Second,
impediments to a generalization of the Algerian experience, at present:
Due to the
peculiarities of the social fabrics, traditions and practices of the different
Muslim and Arab countries, now facing terrorist organizations, both domestic and
supranational, it may be infeasible to export the Algerian experience to these
countries. Some of the main factors that may impede the generalization of the
Algerian experience are:
a- The
supranational character of the terrorist activities now faced by the countries
in our region, in terms of outreach and sources of finance. This is different
from what was going on in Algeria when the Strategy was put into effect. Now
terrorism is taking various international forms, due to multi-source financing
and to the collaboration of international intelligence services providing
terrorist actors with information that facilitates their actions.
b- Terrorist
actions now go according to an international pattern, completely different from
the one that emerged in 1990s in Algeria. Since 2014, terrorist actions have
adopted the international pattern of shocking suddenness and speed and of
setting up ambushes and minefields, especially in mountainous and rural areas,
to hunt down security and army personnel.(15)
c- Terrorist
organizations, at present, refuse to give up armed struggle, an attitude which
contrasts with that of Algerian terrorist groups that turned in their weapons
before going into the process of reconciliation. This means that the governments,
now engaged in the war against terrorism are not in a position to consider
carrying out the second phase of the Algerian Strategy, as all the terrorist
orgnizations are now participating in a fight against the military and the
security forces, as well as against civilians.
d- The absence of
a political go-between, due to the fact that the groups of Political Islam have
gone into partnership with terrorists.(16)This is why it is not viable to try
to reach an understanding with the Islamic groups, whether or not, they have
been involved in violent action, since 2013.
e- Rejection of
reconciliation by the masses, as the majority of Arab and Muslim peoples, based
on the rules of constitutions and legal codes, do not want a compromise with
terrorists. They want their governments to put in a strong effort in the
confrontation against terrorists.
f- The eascalating
campaign by biased media, siding with extremism, terrorism and chaos, creating
a context completely different from that in which the Algerian Strategy was put
into effect in 1990s, bearing in mind that the Algerian space had been closed,
throughout the crisis. Now, Al Jazeera satellite channel and satellite channels
run by the Muslim Brothrhood, available from Turkey, are dangerous forums
working to extend and not to contain terrorism.(17)
g- The prejudiced
use, or rather abuse, of the values of Human Rights and the concept of freedom,
in a way that tries to limit the ability of concerned governments to respond to
the terrorist menace. Add to this the mistaken Western view of a political
solution to the problem of terrorism, as an alternative to the hard approach.
This view helps facilitate the movement of terrorists and offers them with the
opportunity to extend their reach. As a result, every possibility to carry out
the Algerian Strategy has been excluded, because the success of that strategy
was, mainly, an outcome of the absence of international support.(18)
Section Three: the limits
of applicability (situations where the Strategy may be
closer to applicability):
Due to being unable to thouroughly understand the
domestic issues in the countries where terrorists are wreaking havoc in
collaboration with groups of Political Islam that choose to resort to violence
and with supranational jihadist groups, many western commentators are
advocating a political deal with terrorists, that is an application of the
second phase of the Algerian Anti-terrorist Strategy. The truth of the matter
is that applying the second phase of the Strategy, representing harmony and
reconciliation, in both Egypt and Libya is impossible. Yet, the Algerian
Strategy is applicable in Mali.
First, contrasting
environments (Egypt and Libya):
The serious developments that the Muslim Brotherhood
in Egypt underwent speak to the failure of the Algerian Strategy in Egypt,
mainly because Egyptian MB is networking with international terrorist
organizations, like Daesh and al-Qaeda. Add to this, that what happened in
Algeria in 1990s was different from what happened in Egypt after the June 30,
2013 Revolution. This implies that the ways to deal with terrorism in the two
countries should be different. By comparing the situation prior to the Harmony
and Reconciliation Act to what happened in Egypt over five years of sanguinary
violence committed by MB, it becomes clear that the Algerian Strategy is
inapplicable in Egypt.(19)The relationship linking Egyptian MB to Daesh and the
support afforded by MB to the criminal actions committed by Ansar Bait
al-Maqdis (Supporters of Jerusalem), and being an operational and formal ally
of the said group, in addition to the persistenet rejection, by this group and
the groups collaborating with it, of the very idea of giving up armed
confrontation and their determination to carry on with all forms of violence,
all these factors remove the basic condition on which the second phase of the
Anti-Terrorist Algerian Strategy was formulated in 1990s.
Most important and most incomprehensible to those who
call for an application of the Algerian Strategy, with its two phases, in Egypt
is that Egyptian MB abstains from the renunciation of violence. Its armed ancillary organizations, like HASM (Ḥarakat Sāwa'd Miṣr/Egyptian Arms Movement) and Liwa al-Thawra (Banner of the
Revolution) continue their fight against the Egyptian state. Over and above, they
do not recognize the state as a legal entity. All this indicates the need to
face the violence of Egyptian MB and its ancillaries by force. Add to this,
that the current geostrategic context in the Middle East makes it mandatory for
Egypt to limit its confrontation with terrorism to security measures only, as
the geographic position of the country makes it a target all the time,
especially in light of the deteriorating chaotic situation in neighboring
Libya.(20)
As for the applicability of the Algerian model in
Libya, we must remember that Algeria and Libya are two different countries,
socially and politically. The absence of a strong national army in the Days of
Qaddafi and the fact that this was substituted by armed battalions supervised
by his own sons, in addition to a policy that decided to deploy Revolutionary
Committees and Revolutionary guards as a substitute for the state police, resulted in
the removal, in Libya, of the basic condition that made the Algerian experience
in combating terrorism a successful one.
That condition was the existence of strong security institutions capable
of carrying out the Algerian Strategy, with its two phases. Algeria in 1990s
had an army, free of all tribal and familial forms of allegiance. Meanwhile,
there is no such thing as Libyan Army, at present, regardless of all claims to
the contrary, in the media. The Libyan society is completely disjointed. Each
group in that society is trying to avoid being overpowered by other groups.
Moreover, the support given by armed groups to the Libyan Army prolongs the
battle against terrorism, and so, the hard phase becomes longer. What makes
this more dangerous is that the militias supporting the army do this with an
eye on factional gains and with support from external forces.(21)
What we have just mentioned, concerning the lack of a
strong army accepted by all Libyans as their national army, the fact that the
armed militias, including Salafi elements, make factional gains from their support
of the army, as some of the reasons why terrorists do not want to turn in their
weapons, though this is a precondition for negatiations, reconciliation and
stability, all this removes factors conducive to the application of the
Algerian Anti –Terrorist Strategy in Libya.
Second, the succsses of
the Strategy in some African cases(the case of Mali):
There is no such thing, at present, as a model or a
pattern, applicable in every country fighting against terrorism. But the
Algerian experience is a good point of departure for the development of new
initiatives to combat extremism, especially in light of the results achieved in
Mali, by copying that experience. What
made that possible was that the situation in Mali in early 2012 - although the
northern part of the country was dominated, at that time, by groups related to
al-Qaeda- was similar to the situation in Algeria in 1990s. Add to this, that
the military operations of the French forces in January 2013, that forced most
of the terrorist elements to flee to the mountains, were reminiscent of the
hard phase of the Algerian Anti-Terrorist Strategy of the 1990s. This may lead
us to say that Mali is the only country where the Algerian anti-terrorist
experience may be emulated. This was asserted by President of Mali Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta at the end of
2017, when he launched a project for reconciliation and general amnesty, copied
in its entirety, from the Algerian experience. The project provided for amnesty
and reconciliation with" all those who engaged in armed rebellion with the
condition that their hands be free from blood", this meant taking
exception to the armed groups in Northern Mali.
What was said by the president of Mali implies copying
the Algerian experience, as reconciliation in Mali, based upon a bill for
"National Consensus" also
imposes " exceptional measures to stop prosecution or offer amnesty
for some of the groups engaged in the armed rebellion of 2012". This went hand
in hand with a program for the reintegration into community of all those who hand
over their weapons, and pledge, in public, to renounce violence.(22)
In conclusion, we can assert that the Algerian
experience cannot be generalized at present. Not all the components of the
Algerian Strategy are applicable everywhere. The main reason for this is that
the contexts within which terrorism emerged, since 2013, have been different
from the situation in Algeria in 1990s.
1-'Sinae 2018, Foreign Media Coverage: MB
Prevaricatins and the Realities on the Ground" A report by Egyptian
Information Service, February 22,2018,( http://sis.gov.eg/Story/159942?lang=ar)
2- Nabeel Bouibia,
الآليات السياسية لاسترجاع الأمن في الجزائرخلال فترة حكم بوتفليقة،
مجلة علوم إنسانية، السنة السادسة، العدد 41، ربيع 2009.
3-A Hassan Berka,
"أبعاد
الأزمة الجزائرية ..المنطلقات والانعكاسات والنتائج، ط1، شركة دار الأمة للطباعة
والترجمة والنشر والتوزيع، الجزائر، 2007.
4-Adem Gobbi,
آدم قبي،" ظاهرة العنف السياسي في الجزائر 1988-1999، (رسالة
مقدمة لنيل
درجة الدكتوراه، قسم العلوم السياسية، جامعة الجزائر،2003)ص ص 80.
5-Ibid
6- Mahieddine Amimour
"الجزائر..
دولة المصالحة ومصالحة الدولة، الحدث العربي والدولي، العدد 51، أبريل 2006، ص 25.
7-Ibid
8- Khaled Hamadi Al-Shayeb
" الرئيس بوتفليقة وحصيلته"، الجزائر: دار الحكمة، 2004، ص
ص 63-69.
9- Nabeel Bouibia,ibid.
10-Abulfadl
Alesnawi
"
التفاعل بين النظام السياسي والحركات الإسلامية في الجزائر في الفترة من
(1999-2013)، رسالة ماجستير، (جامعة الدول العربية، معد البحوث والدراسات العربية،
قسم العلوم السياسية، 2014) ص 94.
11-Ibid.
12-Abdulkader
Emam
"الجزائر..
مسعى المصالحة الوطنية بين الإملاءات والاشتراطات المضادة"، الشرق الأوسط،
عدد 9533، يناير 2005
13- Djouh Gerbal
"استراتيجية دمج الحركة الإسلامية
وإحكام إغلاق نظام التمثيل السياسي..الحالة الجزائرية"، أوراق المتابعة
السياسية، مبادرة الإصلاح العربي، العدد 37، فبراير 2010، ص 6.
14- Abulfadl
Alesnawi,Ibid.
15-Dr. Fatin Yussef al-Ma'adidi
الحركة الإسلامية في الجزائر، مركز صناعة الفكر للدراسات والأبحاث،
مؤسسة الانتشار العربي، بيروت، لبنان، الطبعة الأولى، ص 112.
16-Mohamed Boudiaf,
مستقبل النظام السياسي الجزائري، رسالة دكتوراة، (جامعة الجزائر: كلية
الإعلام والعلوم السياسية)، 2008، ص 178.
17-CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND DIPLOMATIC ,STUDIES, LONDON
(http://www.csds-center.com/archives/8072)
تقدير موقف،« واقع الإرهاب في تونس»، مارس 2018
18-Mohamed Boudiaf, Ibid.
19-Mariam Adli,
"ممارسات
الإعلام العربي تدعم الإرهاب.. وتعمق ثقافة الغنف"، جريدة وطني المصرية، مايو
2014.
20-'Sinae 2018,
Foreign Media Coverage: MB Prevaricatins and the Realities on the Ground"
A report by Egyptian Information Service, February 22,2018,( http://sis.gov.eg/Story/159942?lang=ar
21-Dhiya'a
Rashwan,
«مصر والجزائر: المقارنة المغلوطة»، جريدة
المصري اليوم، مايو 2015.
22- Dhiya'a Rashwan
«مهمة
ضرورية في دراسة الحركات الإسلامية»، جريدة المصري اليوم، يونيو 2016.
23-An interview with Kamel Abdullah, a researcher in the
Political and Strategic Center Studies, Al ahram, Cairo, March, 2018.
23-Ahmed
Aziz,
"مالي
على خطى جارتها الجزائر في المصالحة"، الأناضول، في 26 يناير 2018،( (http://bit.ly/2FlV4Dk
