Controversy of Hezbollah’s military integration in Syria (2-3)

In the first part of this study, we discussed how the Lebanese Hezbollah became an integral part of the armed Syrian conflict since 2011. We also referred to the integration of the party into the Syrian war. It was motivated by doctrinal reasons for supporting the Syrian regime, to supply him with the Iranian weapon, which is transferred via Syria. Not to mention the military privileges granted by the Syrian regime by providing its border training camps to Hezbollah to develop the military capabilities of its elements.

In the second part of the study we will discuss the repercussions of Hezbollah participation in the Syrian war. Hezbollah involved in this war despite its full awareness of growing the jihadist Salafist in Lebanon as an expected reaction to his sectarian speech in Syria.

Indeed, The Sunnis go to Syria, to fight Hezbollah elements by joining the ranks of the Syrian armed opposition, the party fears of returning the Sunnis fighters to Lebanon with the possibility of setting up armed militias.  

We can measure the impact of the Syrian war on Hezbollah, through a number of indicators:

First: the Military Equipment

The change in Hezbollah’s military and missile capabilities after its military intervention in Syria; theoretically means that the military integration of Hezbollah in Syria has affected negatively its military strength.

Particularly, the reality may be different as we realize that Hezbollah is a military militia that relies primarily on missile capabilities to pose a threat to its military adversaries. In other words, the party’s losses with respect to its military equipment were very limited because it did not have any tanks, armored vehicles, or troop carriers before the Syrian war, which means that the party managed to adapt the Syrian war in favor of the establishment of a unit of tanks and armored vehicles.

Hezbollah exploited the chaos of the Syrian war to develop its missile arsenal, which is the main focus of its military power. The party sought to acquire heavy weapons to achieve a military victory against the Syrian opposition in some cities.

The heavy weapons have an important role in the party’s military strength in southern Lebanon against Israel, in case the latter tries to achieve any ground invasion. Hezbollah also smuggled an air defense systems known as SA 17, Russian anti-aircraft missile systems.

Hezbollah also has access to Russian missile systems known as B800 or Yakhont, its range is 300 kilometers, which means increasing the military's ability to neutralize any threats.

In order to enhance its missile capability, Hezbollah has been working to smuggle long-range missiles to enable it to deepen its threat to Israel in any future war. The New York Times reported that Hezbollah managed to smuggle a number of long-range Scud missiles and short-range C-type missiles, as well as medium-range Iranian light rockets and anti-aircraft Fajr rockets.

In a report in July 2017, the “Intelligence Online” newspaper reported that Hezbollah had built two underground factories to build rockets, to produce Al-Fateh 110 rockets (which could carry half a ton of explosives or warheads) with a range of 190 miles.

Second: Human Structure

There are no specific figures on the number of Hezbollah fighters in Syria. However, some estimates suggest that the party involved elements in the Syrian fighting between 6000 and 8,000 fighters.  Nearly 2000 members have been killed and 5000 wounded.

In order to overcome the lack of fighters, Hezbollah had to abandon the “closed recruitment policy” to adopt volunteer fighters in its ranks. It also adopted the recruitment to fill the deficit policy aimed primarily at increasing the paid fighters.

The above mentioned policy reveals the awareness of the party the size of the large losses. Hezbollah deliberately recruit the Palestinian fighters because of their street fighting experience as an active player in the 1975-1990 Lebanese civil war.

It is important to note here that Hezbollah has lost many of its prominent military leaders, most notably Samir Kuntar (killed in late 2015), Hasan Ali Jafal, commander of the elite forces (killed in September 2015 in Zabadani), and Mustafa Badr al-Din, (killed in May 2015).