The danger that lurks in southern Libya

Intro

Although Daesh has been out of the northern Libyan city of Sirte for a year now, it still constitutes a danger to neighboring states.

Soon after it was kicked out of Sirte, Daesh tried to regroup in southern Libya (1). This raises questions on the future strategies of the terrorist organization, especially after overrunning the main road between Sirte, the southwestern city of Sabha, Jufra District near the Egyptian border and Ubari near Libya's border with Tunisia.

Daesh received a painful blow by its defeat against the Al-Bunyan al-Marsous troops (2). The whereabouts of Daesh elements after their defeat in Sirte were always unknown.

Daesh used conflicts between the three governments that rule in Libya (4) and rampant rifts in the country in forming a new organization in the Libyan western desert. The new organization is called the "Desert Army".

Soon after the formation of the new army, Daesh Syria and Iraq sent recruits to help it perforate the whole of Libya and establish centers to receive fighters coming to Daesh Libya from every part of the world.

Reports about the future prospects of Daesh following its defeat in Syria abound. Some of these reports predicted the total eradication of the organization after it lost all the territories it used to control (5). Other reports expected the escape of organization members to other countries, especially those which have security loopholes (6), such as Afghanistan, Libya and Somalia, where they can build their own state. A third group of reports focused on the period during which the organization kept a low profile to reorganize itself and search for new funding sources, especially after it built a sizeable popularity base in Europe and in the Arab region (7).

Libya's neighboring countries: Egypt, Algeria and Tunisia, are vital Middle East spots. The same countries share the same challenges and problems. These problems include extremist organizations, human trafficking and illegal immigration to Europe. Libya is only 300 kilometers away from Italy.

The Desert Army, which is made up of the second generation of Daesh militants, poses huge dangers to Libya. It threatens the country's oil wells in the Oil Crescent region which overlooks the Libyan coast. Daesh also threatens Libya's neighboring states. Libya's unrest also has negative effects on its neighboring countries. In the case of Egypt, this unrest caused thousands of Egyptian workers to return to their country from Libya. Tunisian workers also returned to their country from Libya (8).

We will focus in this study on the emergence of the Desert Army, the threats it poses to Libya's neighboring countries, future scenarios, and the mechanisms needed for fighting it.

First, nature of southern Libya

Libya is a fertile soil for terrorist organizations. Southern Libya is especially an appropriate place for Daesh to regroup after the loss of the territories it controlled in Syria and Iraq and its defeat in Sirte.

Southern Libya is characterized by the following:

-         Weak security control and absence of state institutions

-         Distance from eastern Libya where the Libyan Army is concentrated and western Libya where the Misurata troops are deployed

-         Recurrent armed confrontations between tribes and African mercenaries

-         Arid mountainous geography (9)

Second, birth of Desert Army

The Desert Army appeared in southern Libya's desert. It was led by Libyan jihadist al-Mahdi Salem Danqu, who is known by the name "Abu Barakat". The new organization attracted those escaping the battlefields in Syria, Iraq and Sirte. It also attracted African mercenaries.

The Pentagon estimated the number of fighters within the army at 500. Nonetheless, this number is on the rise thanks to the ability of the organization to attract new fighters from neighboring countries and also those returning from Syria and Iraq (10). In February 2018, some estimates put the number of organization fighters at between 5,000 and 7,000 (11).

Daesh is concentrated in the following four regions:

First, Kufra in the southeastern part of Libya near the border with Egypt

Second, Wadi Zamzam which is located 100 kilometers east of Misurata and 40 kilometers from the Libyan coast

Third, Uweinat Region in southwestern Libya

Fourth, Sabha in central Libya (12)

The Desert Army can only be found in areas not controlled by Libya's security establishment, specifically places not controlled by either the National Libyan Army or the Fayez al-Sarraj-led National Accord Government.

The army released a video (13) in which it showed its masked fighters holding security posts and moving with their vehicles in Abu Qurayn, a village between Misurata, Sirte and Jufra (14).

The army is also capable of infiltrating areas in southern Libya on the borders between Libya, Chad and Sudan because of the lack of control by the three states on these areas.

Divisions between the National Libyan Army, which is led by Khalifa Haftar, and the Fayez al-Sarraj government push Libya into more deterioration at the security and social levels. This deterioration opens the door for the presence of armed militias. Libya's social and economic deterioration also makes violence and looting viable options for citizens.

The army uses the lack of enough security in areas on Libya's borders with other countries to push into these neighboring countries and draw in recruits (16).

Third, Desert Army's financing

The army gets funding through a number of ways. Some of these ways are new and specific to Libya's geographical location. Qatar has been active helping Daesh members escaping the war in Syria and Iraq to move to Libya which turned out to be a safe refuge for these members (17).

Qatar especially backs Daesh because it is hostile to the National Libyan Army which is led by Haftar. In doing this, Doha tries to sabotage any peaceful settlement to the Libyan crisis and cause problems to the Libyan Army in the areas it controls, especially Ajdabiya in northern Libya, in eastern Libya and in the areas where the oil wells are concentrated (18).

In 2012 and 2013, the Libyans accused Qatar of transferring arms and fighters from Syria to Libya. It now tries to help Daesh fighters leave Syria and Iraq to Libya, especially after the defeats they sustained in the two countries (19).

The trafficking in persons, especially Africans who want to immigrate to Europe via the Libyan coast, is also an important source of funding for Daesh. Ransoms are also another source of funding for the organization (20).

Al-Qaeda was instrumental in the formation of the Desert Army (21).

Fourth, Desert Army's strategy

The presence of the Desert Army in Libya's southern desert aims to achieve the following goals:

-         Use the geography of the area in regrouping itself and expanding its influence to other areas on the way of establishing its state in a naturally protected setting

-         Create a secure stronghold that help the organization rebuild its powerbase before moving onto other areas that will be included in Daesh's future state

-         Use weak security presence in the area to push into neighboring states, Chad, Algeria, Niger, Egypt and Tunisia where it can find recruits

-         Redeployment in southern Libya can help the organization find new funding sources through the smuggling of goods and oil (22)

Daesh concentration areas in Libya

Source: Italian newspaper La Stampa

Fifth, threats posed by the Desert Army

-         Oil is the main source of funding for Daesh, which is why the organization always tries to control oilfields. In Syria and Iraq, the organization worked to control the oilfields. Sirte and Darnah in Libya are also rich with oil which was why Daesh tried to control them. Daesh also tried to control the Oil Crescent region in southern Libya (23). United Nations Secretary-General Antonio Guterres warned in February 2018 against planned Daesh attacks in the Oil Crescent region, in the area around Jufra and in southern Libya (24).

-         Daesh also threatens Libya's neighboring states. Shared borders between Libya and these states turned into a hot terrorist spot following the downfall of the Muammar Gaddafi regime in Libya in 2011. Daesh may coordinate with al-Murabiton Army, which is led by Hesham Ashmawy (25), to stage attacks against or inside Egypt. Continued unrest in Libya may open the door for foreign military presence in Libya. This can constitute a strategic threat to Egypt (27).

-         Proximity between Libya and Europe allows Daesh to threaten the continent as a whole. This proximity can encourage Daesh to send militants to Europe to stage attacks there. Libya has also turned into an important transit point for illegal immigrants to the European continent. Increased Daesh presence and violence in Libya will increase immigration to Europe.

Sixth, future scenarios for Desert Army

First, continuity and expansion:

The Desert Army can expand in southern Libya aided by a number of factors. These factors include the following:

-         Mountainous nature of the area

-         Flow of fighters from Syria and Iraq

-         Rifts and conflicts between Libya's political powers and militaries

-         Soft borders in southern Libya

-         Ineffective security strategies

-         Presence of public support in southern Libya

-         Regional rivalries

Second, shrinking:

-         If Libya's neighboring countries realize the dangers entailed in the presence of the Desert Army in southern Libya, they can coordinate military action with Haftar to secure their own borders and tighten the noose around the army.

-         American troops within the United States Africa Command can cooperate with troops at the French base in Niger to comb areas in southwestern Libya.

-         The arid nature of southern Libya can also cause the army's defeat and make it difficult for it to receive supplies.

-         Kufra is sparsely populated. It is 450 kilometers away from the Egyptian border. This distance makes it difficult for Daesh to stage attacks inside Egypt, especially with the Egyptian military preparations on the border.

Third, international political alliances and the future of the organization

The Middle East region is replete with political differences. These differences increased following the eruption of the crisis over Qatar's financing of terrorism. There are now two main camps in the region: first, the camp containing Egypt, the Gulf states, except for Qatar, and eastern Libya. Second, the second camp contains Qatar and Turkey.

It is highly likely that Qatar and Turkey can support terrorist organizations in Libya to put pressure on Egypt and pose threats to its western border with Libya. It is important to note that both states also offer support to the Muslim Brotherhood movement and other pro-Doha Islamist movements.

Confrontation mechanisms

Cooperation and the exchange of expertize between countries is important in the battle against terrorist organizations. This battle must be an all-out one that includes cultural and social dimensions, along with the military and security ones (29).

The organizations can be fought through the following methods:

Libya's neighboring states

-         Egypt, Tunisia and Algeria need to cooperate to counter the security challenges coming from Libya. Egypt has succeeded in winning a number of states to its side in this regard, including the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, France and finally the United States.

-         The same countries need to share intelligence on Daesh which controls large swaths of Libya.

-         Egypt launched Operation Sinai in February 2018 with the aim of eradicating terrorists nationwide. The operation forced terrorists to seek hiding because of their inability to face the Egyptian army.

-         Neighboring states need to tighten control on their borders with Libya together with the launch of Operation Desert Anger by the Libyan army. The Libyan army also needs to have an air cover in cooperation with the French base in Mali.

-         Coordination with southern Libya's tribes can play a vital role in tightening the noose around Daesh.

-         Libya's three neighboring countries must put together enough troops on their borders with Libya to guard these borders (30).

-         Enforcing the resolution of the Sahel and Sahara Organization for forming a military force of 5,000 troops to counter terrorism in the Sahel and Sahara region.

United Nations

Libya will continue to be an incubator for terrorist organization so long as there is a lack of agreement among main players both inside and outside it. This is why the United Nations needs to reconsider the Skhirat Agreement to include the Libyan army in it in coordination with local and regional players on the Libyan stage.

Optimism prevailed following the defeat of Daesh in Sirte. The organization is, however, still present and poses danger to Libya and neighboring counties, using political divisions in Libya and the lack of agreement in and on it. This underscores the need for action to prevent Daesh from expanding and causing intense danger to Libya and its neighbors.

Military action alone will not be enough to finish off this organization. Finishing Daesh off needs a comprehensive social, economic, political and cultural strategy.

(1)     An area southwestern Libya that is mainly desert

(2)     A pro-National Accord Government force that led the operation for the liberation of Sirte

(3)     Abdul Sattar Heteita: This was how Daesh grew in Libya, despite strikes – al-Ayam magazine

(4)     Three governments vie for control in Libya: one in eastern Libya and two in capital Tripoli.

(5)     Youssef Mekki, "Terrorism and the Post-Daesh Defeat Phase", al-Siyassa al-Dawliya magazine, April 12, 2017

(6)     A weak state is the least capable of carrying out its duties, according to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.

(7)      Ali Bakr: "Possible Consequences of Daesh's Defeat in Mosul", al-Siyassa al-Dawliya magazine, July 27, 2017

(8)     Emily Estelle: "A Strategy for Success in Libya", the American Enterprise Institute, November 2017

(9)     Daesh's Birth and Development, Rafiq al-Hariri Middle East Center, June 2017

(10)       Giorgio Cafeiro: Analysis: Why ISIS continues to be a dangerous force in Libya, al-Arabiya net

(11)       Previous reference, al-Habib al-Aswad

(12)       Giordano Stabile, La Nouva mappa delle cellule dell' Isis luggite dall' assedio di Sirte, lastampa Mondo, gironle, Puvlicato il 05/08/2017 (http://www.lastampa.it/2017/08/05/esteri/la-nuova-mappa-delle-cellule-dellisis-fuggite-dallassedio-di-sirte-yNrAMuFZxPZJVZ1kAQmEqO/pagina.html.)

(13)       Daesh announces its new Libya stronghold (https://www.alarabiya.net/ar/north-africa/2017/08/28/%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%81%D9%8A%D8%AF%D9%8A%D9%88-)

(14)       Ali Bakr: "Significance of Daesh's turn to Libya's south", al-Siyassa al-Dawliya magazine, October 2017

(15)       A Libyan army officer who reneged at the end of the 1980s and then travelled to the US where he stayed until the 2011 revolution in the North African state

(16)       Abdul Sattar Heteita: "Moves by Daesh to make largest redeployment in southern Libya", al-Sharq al-Awsat magazine, September 18, 2017

(17)       Qatar transfers Daesh militants from Syria to Libya, Deutsche Welle

(18)       Report of the committee of experts on Libya

(19)       Abul Fadl al-Esnawi in an interview with al-Siyassa al-Dawliya (http://www.siyassa.org.eg/News/14159.aspx)

(20)       Munia Ghanmi: Desert Army: Daesh redeploys in southern Libya (https://www.alarabiya.net/ar/north-africa/2018/03/05/%D8%A8%D8%B9%D8%AF-%D8%B3%D8%B1%D8%AA-%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%B4-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AC%D9%86%D9%88%D8%A8-)

(21)       Adam Nathan: ISIL regrouping in southern Libya with support of al-Qaeda and preparing further attacks, Telegraph (https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/03/01/isil-regrouping-southern-libya-support-al-qaeda-preparing-attacks/)

(22)       Previous reference, Ali Bakr

(23)       Abdel Baset Ghabara: "Daesh Libya: Strategy of Survival and Return" (http://www.afrigatenews.net/content/%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%B4-%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%A7-)

(24)       Jamal Jawhar: "Daesh Libya's Strategy (https://aawsat.com/home/article/1171656/%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AA%D9%8A%D8%AC%D9%8A%D8%A9-%C2%AB%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%B4-)

(25)       He is the founder of al-Murabiton Army.

(26)       Daesh claims responsibility for killing of Minya's Christians (http://www.almasryalyoum.com/news/details/1140221)

(27)       Mohamed Omar: "Failure of Libyan state and future of political settlement", al-Badil Center for Planning and Studies, May 2017

(28)       Mohamed Omar: "Future of Daesh between temporary recession and rivalry among powers", Arab Democratic Center, May 2016

(29)       Mohamed Abdel Hadi: "Countering terrorism in Gulf States", Arab Center for Research and Studies, December 2017

(30)       Abdel Baset Ghabara: "Terrorism forces Libya's neighboring states to increase coordination, Africa News site, December 22, 2017

(31)       An economic grouping for easing trade among states