Indonesia’s anti-terror strategy in south-eastern Asia

For four years from 2012, I had taken part in an ambitious programme launched in Jakarta by Indonesia’s National Counterterrorism Agency to help rehabilitate members of extremist groups and persuade them to relinquish violence. The programme was run by renowned thinkers, intellectuals and ex-Jihadists from different countries in the Middle East. They included Najeh Ibrahim, the co-founder and ex-leader of Jamaa Islamiya in Egypt.

This ambitious rehabilitation programme drew my attention to the role of Indonesia’s security authorities to protect young people in this Muslim country against alien cultures and ideas imported from foreign countries. The success made in this field has undoubtedly frustrated attempts sought by local Islamists to develop cooperation and collaboration with violent groups whether in neighbouring countries or in the Arab region.

The rehabilitation of members and leaders of local groups linked to Jamaa Islamiya in Indonesia was achievable after the organisers of this ambitious programme wisely followed the Egyptian experience in this respect. This should explain why these organisers keenly invited the pioneers of the Egyptian experience to lead the four-year dialogue and brainstorming discussions. However, it must be said that extremists linked to Al-Qaeda and ISIS were not approached.  

It is known that Indonesia-based Jamaa Islamiyah obtained its ideology called ‘Jamaa Islamiyah’s General Guidance’ from that doctrine, which was drawn up in jail by leaders of Egypt’s parent group after they were arrested by the Egyptian security authorities in 1985. The doctrine of Egypt’s Jamaa Islamiyah was greatly influenced by ideas and teachings formulated by late Sheikh Omar Abdel-Rahman, who was widely regarded as their spiritual leader.  Jihadists belonging to Indonesia’s Jamaa Islamiyah admired their Egyptian counterparts when they came across each other in the Afghan city of Khos during the anti-Soviet war

One of the great achievements made by the rehabilitation programme in Indonesia was the pledge made by Jamaa Islamiyah in this south-eastern Asian country to relinquish call for the establishment of Muslim state. About 2750 from 3000 participants in this programme repudiated violence. They also pledged their unwavering support to national interests instead.  In an acknowledgement of respect and good treatment he received from the security authorities, Nasser Abbas, who is one of the powerful members of Jamaa Islamiya in the country, revealed the hiding places of his former colleagues to the Indonesian security authorities. He also pledged sincere cooperation with the Indonesian government and agreed to act as its representative during a dialogue held with 300 Jihadists to persuade them to change their mind about the use of violence in society.

Also, enormous efforts over several years by Indonesia’s security authorities and intelligence agency had contributed largely to the success of the ideological and social rehabilitation programme,   

Umbrella organisation

In its first conference, the Majlis Mujahedeen in Indonesia, MMI, approved the Holy War for the establishment of the Muslim State. It was also during this conference, which was held in Yogyakarta, when MMI or Indonesian Mujahedeen Council announced its charter,in which the participants repudiated any ideology being not in conformity with Islam and its Muslim Sharia (law). Addressing the conference, Abu Bakr Bashir,  who was one of the powerful leader of Jihad in south-eastern Asia, declared that anyone who would desecrate Islam should be killed.

It was also Abu Bakr, who called in 1999 for a high-level meeting in his residence in city of Subang  Selangor, close to the Malaysian border, to garner support for the use of violence against non-Muslims, who would obstruct the establishment of the Muslim State. The meeting, which raised the banner ‘The Mujahedeen Association’ was attended by representatives of Morro Islamic Liberation Front in the Philippines, Al-Jihad group in southern Thailand, Rohingya in Myanmar and Jihadist group from Singapore. 

The participants embraced the use of force to tighten their grip on the Muslim world up to the fulfillment of the Great Dream—the establishment of the Muslim State, regionally and globally. They also decided to form that kind of network, which could have strongholds across south-eastern Asian countries.

Hierarchy of Jamaa Islamiyah

According to a suggestion put forward by Abu Bakr Bashir, the hierarchy of Jamaa Islamiyah in the region was divided to different regional sectors. Bashir was responsible to the First Regional Sector, which presumably covered eastern Malaysia and Singapore. However, he had to delegate his responsibilities to Hanbali Radwan Essamul-Din after he (Bashir) joined the Fatwa Council. Under Hanbali, Jamaa Islamiyah threw itself in the embrace of Osama Bin Laden’s Al-Qaeda.

The Second Sector was responsible for Jamaa Islamiyah’s activities in the islands of Sumatra, Java, Bali, western Nusantara and eastern Nusantara under the commandership of Abu-Fateh before he stepped down in 2001 and a Jihadist named Naim took charge.

The Third Sector was responsible for the eastern part of Malaysia, East Kalimantan, Central Suladis and Mindanao in the Philippines under the commandership of Nasser Abbas, who later rebelled against Hanbali and decided to disown his group.   

The Fourth Chapter’s activities planned in Papua and Australia were given to Bashir’s master Abdul-Rahman Ayoub. Like Nasser Abbas, Ayoub repudiated Jihad ideology after the 9/11 attack in the US. 

Disastrous division

Jamaa Islamiyah in Indonesia was initially reluctant to walk in the footsteps of Al-Qaeda’s leader Osama Bin Laden, who called for the killing of Jews and Christians. The leaders of Jamaa Islamiyah had fears that their group would  had to dedicate efforts, money and human resources to serve Bin Laden’s campaign—a situation, which would lead in the end of the day to relegate their chief goal of establishing the Muslim State in south-eastern Asia.  

However, cracks developed in the hierarchy of Indonesia’s Jamaa Islamiyah after the outbreak of communal violence in the village of Ambon in 1999. Being in a fate of rage, Hanbali ordered the commanders of the First Sector to exact revenge by launching attacks on churches across Indonesia to coincide with celebrations marking  Christmas Day in 2000.  Appealing for help from Osama Bin Laden, Hanbali pledged loyalty to Al-Qaeda.  With the help of the parent of terrorist groups across the world, Hanbali’s terrorists launched a devastating attack in Bali on October 12, 2001, in which more than 200 people were killed.  Hanbali’s counterparts in the other Three Sectors repudiated the deadly attack and confirmed to the security authorities that they knew nothing of his cooperation with Al-Qaeda, which financed the Bali attack. 

Hanbali’s cooperation with Al-Qaeda

Backed by Al-Qaeda’s financial and logistic support, Hanbali’s group launched terrorist attacks on the US and European interests in south-eastern Asia between 2000 and 2009.  Al-Qaeda’s Khaled Sheikh Mohamed was assigned to supervise Hanbali’s activities in the region. Responding to Sheikh Mohamed’s advice, they planned to suicidal bombings on the embassies of the US, Israel and Britain in Manila and Singapore. A Jihadist named Fathul-Rahman al-Ghazi from Morro Front was nominated to launch these attacks.

Hanbali strengthened his group’s cooperation with Al-Qaeda in 1997 after opening the Hudaibiyah training camp in the Philippines, which attracted Arab, Indonesian and Philippine fighters. After year,  Bin Laden announced the establishment of the World Islamic Front in Qandahar.

Following a tip-off from Indonesia’s intelligence agency, the Philippine army launched attacks on the two training camps, Hudaibiya and Abu-Bakr, which were launched in Mindanao by Morro Islamic Front.  

Shortly after MMI’s second conference in Kuala Lumpur in Malaysia, Al-Qaeda-linked Jamaa Islamiyah in Indonesia launched a terrorist attack on the residence of the Philippine ambassador in Jakarta on the first of August in 2000.  The Philippine ambassador was injured during the attack, in which a person was killed and 20 people were injured. 

Obstacles

Al-Qaeda did not initially seek to target Western interests in the Muslim country of Indonesia. Leaders of this terrorist group preferred to focus their terrorist activities in Singapore, Thailand and the Philippine. They predicted that bombings in either of these three countries would allegedly instigate big global repercussions.

Al-Qaeda also sought that the presence of separatist groups in this region, such as Moro Islamic Front in the Philippines, would offer much logistic support to its regional and global terrorist strategy.  

However, it was the religious violence that occurred in the village of Ambon, which prompted Al-Qaeda’s decision to act as the sponsor of terrorist attacks planned in Indonesia by Hanbali’s group in 1999. Al-Qaeda delegated its key strategists and leaders, such as Khaled Sheikh Mohamed, Osama Abu Zubaidah, Abu-Oubaidah and Omar al-Farouk to contact Hanbali and  examine his call for joint strategy between his group and its parent Al-Qaeda.  

The fact that Al-Qaeda’s leaders rarely visited Indonesia made it difficult for Indonesia’s Intelligence Agency to track them down and preempt activities they would be planning. For example, Khaled Sheikh Mohamed paid a brief visit to the country. The chief Jihadist and his cousin Ahmed Ramzy preferred Manila at that time as the base of Al-Qaeda’s activities in Asia.  

Al-Qaeda’s terrorist attacks in Indonesia

 Al-Qaeda voted Hanbali its strongman in Indonesia, especially after he had forged a high-level cooperation with Mohamed Atef and Khaled Shiekh Mohammed, who paid several visits to Karachi and Qandahar. Hanbali received  financial and logistic support from Al-Qaeda to launch bombings in south-eastern Asian region in 1999. 

It was in Malaysia when Hanbali discussed a series of attacks on churches in Indonesia in the wake of the religious violence against Muslims in Ambon. The meeting was attended by chief Jihadists, such as Abul-Yazid, Abu-Yasser, Imam Samudra, Fayez Bafana and Yazid Shafaah. Khaled Sheikh Mohamed delegated Essa el-Hendi, a Pakistani-born British Jihadist, to provide the final touches to the revengeful attacks against churches in seven remote cities in 2000. 

The global condemnation to these attacks encouraged Hanbali to plan more deadly ones in Indonesia. The first attack, which took place in Bali claimed the lives of more than 200 people, mostly tourists. There were also two bombings launched by 30 men deployed by Hanbali in two nightclubs in the district of Kuta.

About 10 months later in August 2003, Hanbali’s group launched a destructive attack on Marriott Hotel in Jakarta, killing 12 people and injuring 150. In a message broadcast by Doha-based Al-Jazeera, Al-Qaeda claimed its responsibility. Al-Qaeda’s spokesman described the attacks as a response to the US’s alleged hostile activities against Muslim people.

Al-Qaeda-linked Hanbali’s group unearthed

Indonesia’s anti-terror squad managed to unearth Hanbali’s group after one of his notorious Jihadists was arrested. Dani, a Malaysian nicknamed Haretha, lost his leg in May attack in 2001 on a shopping mall in Jakarta. Information he gave his interrogators led the Indonesia’s security authorities to crack down on a key hiding place in a remote area in the country. 

A massive hunt launched by the Indonesia security authorities in collaboration with their Malaysian counterparts led to the arrest of Hanbali’s most notorious aides.

Hanbali’s arrest

The massive crackdown on Hanbali and his men prompted his counterparts in different sectors to disown him, otherwise they would provoke the suspicions of the security authorities.  Also to escape the massive crackdown safely, members and leaders of these Sectors refused to provide hiding place for Hanbali and his fugitives.

In his absence and even after his arrest, Hanbali’s men launched more terrorist attacks in Indonesia including the bombing of the Australian embassy in September 2004, the second Bali bombing in October 2005 and the bombing of Ritz Carleton Hotel in July 2009. 

Prior to his arrest, Hanbali managed to obtain a fake Malaysian passport to shuttle, together with his wife, between this country and Thailand.  However, a high-level cooperation between security authorities in Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, the Philippines and the United States led to the arrest of Hanbali in Bangkok in August 2003.  Likewise, his men, including Yazid Shefaa and Zol-Kefl Marzouki, were arrested in Thailand and Singapore.

Hanbali’s group collapsed in 2009 after its fugitive members were arrested in Ache and Sumatra between 2008 and 2009. Investigations revealed that Al-Qaeda was behind the series of deadly attacks that took place in the country. The investigations also revealed that Hanbali paid several visits to Kandahar in Afghanistan to discuss these attacks with Osama Bin Laden and Khaled Sheikh Mohamed.