Iran’s modus operandi in supporting non-state actors

Iran tends to intervene in national contexts characterized by two features: insta-bility and the presence of dissatisfied actors.

Typically, first, it seeks to take advan-tage of instability. As in Iraq since  or in Lebanon since, Iran tries to penetrate states where central authority is weak. It then tries to exploit divided elites by supporting like-minded factions.

 It will often try to do so outside, but parallel to, state structures, as in Lebanon, where it supports Hezbollah, and in Iraq, where it supports Shi’i militias. Hezbollah and Iraqi Shi’i militias are not fully under the state’s authority, and therefore undermine it.

At the same time, they participate in many of the state’s activities, for example by sitting in parlia-ment, and even oppose other actors seeking to overthrow the state. Within unstable or fragmented states, Iran often seeks to develop partner-ships with dissatisfied groups.

These are elements that reject or oppose, through violent or non-violent means, the dominant domestic political order in their country or the US-dominated regional order, or both. They are dissatisfied for a variety of reasons, but essentially because they perceive—often rightly—that the constituents they represent are marginalized by a dominant group.

In Lebanon, for example, Hezbollah was born in the to better represent the interests of the Shi’is, who had long been marginalized by the country’s Christian and Sunni elite. Dissatisfied groups also often oppose regimes supported by the United States or its regional allies, and repudiate foreign interference in their countries.

As will be discussed below, this is the case of the Houthis in Yemen. Such positions are often popular, giving these groups a certain level of support. By extension, Iran gains in soft power by aligning itself with them, allowing it to position itself as the champion of the oppressed and marginalized.

Contrary to a widespread misperception, Iran does not choose its partners on the basis of a common adherence to Shi’i Islam.

To enjoy Iranian support, actors must oppose the status quo, defined by the regional order dominated by the United States and its local partners, especially Israel and Saudi Arabia; they do not necessarily have to be Shi’i. That is why Hamas and Islamic Jihad—Sunni nationalist groups opposed to Israel—have been Iran’s partners in the Palestinian occupied territories.

 Iran even provides limited support to the Taliban, an extreme Sunni group in Afghanistan with which it has been in conflict in the past, as will be discussed below.

A common opposition to the regional status quo is also the main factor shaping Iran’s close relationship with its only state ally in the Middle East, Syria, where the Assad regime is dominated by Alawites, a distant shoot of Shi’i Islam, but also includes other minorities and some Sunnis.

Iran pursues a range of objectives in choosing to support non-state actors. First, it seeks to gain access to geographic areas that it can use as launching pads to project its influence, to confront its main regional rivals, Israel and Saudi Arabia, and to oppose the regional US presence.

 In particular, Iran has improved its deter-rent capability by forging ties with groups that could act against the United States or its regional interests, or against Israel, in the event of a confrontation.

 A range of militant groups in Iraq, in particular, along with Hezbollah in Lebanon and Islamic Jihad in the Palestinian occupied territories, could retaliate following an attack on Iran by Israel or America; this possibility severely constrains the latters’ margin of manoeuvre, and while it does not rule out an attack by either on Iran, it increases the costs of doing so.

Iran’s ties to non-state actors in a country also allow it to position itself as an indispensable player with a say in major decisions. To this end, it often hedges its bets by developing ties to many actors, providing them with shifting combina-tions of political, military and financial support.

It tries to identify future winners, supporting a range of small groups with the expectation that at least some of them will eventually emerge as important players.

When Iran believes that a partner is distancing itself, it may support the formation of splinter groups, encourag-ing more like-minded factions to split from the main group and form their own movements.

Such smaller new groups are more dependent on Iran for external support, and therefore more likely to act according to Iranian interests. When Muqtada al-Sadr in Iraq became an increasingly dicult partner, for example, Iran started supporting breakaway factions from his movement.

Two of them, Asa’ib Ahl ul-Haqq and Kata’ib Hezbollah, emerged as particularly important, both for Iran’s ability to shape Iraqi politics and as key actors in their own right in Iraq. Both are smaller, and therefore more manageable, than the unwieldy Sadrist move-ment, and more dependent on Iran.  

By its support, Iran seeks to position itself as the arbiter of the political process in the target country. This has been particularly evident in Iraq, where it has regularly performed a mediatory role in recent years.