After Hamas cheered Taliban: Palestinian forces refuse to relate independence to Afghan experience
Since the Taliban extended its grip
on Afghanistan during the US and NATO withdrawal, a state of anticipation has
prevailed within political Islamist parties and groups in the region. Although
the pro-Brotherhood entities were quick to congratulate and cheer, Hamas had a
different reaction, as it promoted that the Afghan scenario is the most
appropriate for resolving the Palestinian issue.
Hamas-Taliban
In a phone call between Ismail
Haniyeh, head of the Hamas political bureau, and Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar,
head of the Taliban’s political bureau, the first said, “The evacuation of
America from Afghan soil is a prelude to the demise of all forces of
oppression, foremost of which is the Israeli occupation of the land of
Palestine.”
In response to Hamas’s attempts to
the polishing and propaganda attempts made by Hamas in favor of the Taliban,
the Secretary-General of the Palestinian People’s Party, Bassam al-Salhi,
refused to portray the Afghan model as the solution to what Palestine is going
through, calling on Hamas and its leaders to refrain from glorifying the Afghan
extremist movement and its ilk, and not to link the Palestinian cause to a terrorist
movement like it. He pointed to the importance of distinguishing between the
Taliban and the Palestinian national liberation movements that attract the
support of people all over the world.
Meanwhile, Suhail Shaheen, a
spokesman for the Taliban, denied any cooperation with Hamas, adding, “If Hamas
congratulates us on freedom and the end of the occupation, there is nothing
wrong, but we have no cooperation with Hamas in any area.”
More
conservative approach
Hebrew media reported that with the
Taliban's seizure of power, it would allow the transfer of Afghan army bases
and training facilities to various organizations and groups, as well as the
possibility of smuggling weapons and ammunition, largely from Afghanistan to
the Gaza Strip.
In a study entitled “A more
conservative approach: How to understand the discourse and practices of the
Taliban movement”, Dr. Ammar Ali Hassan addressed the agreement of some
Islamist currents with the goals set by the Taliban, indicating that in the end
they remain just general goals. But when looking at the methods and means of
achieving these goals, it becomes clear that the Afghan movement does not
differ from others in acting on the basis of a belief that it represents the
“true Islam” and that others do not, as is the case of the political Islamist
factions.
On this basis, the Taliban fought
many Islamist factions in the period from 1994 until it was able to enter Kabul
and declare an Islamic emirate in 1996.
Hassan pointed out that the support
of some Islamist political organizations and groups, including Hamas, for the
victory that the Taliban recently achieved in Afghanistan after 20 years does
not mean its identification with the Taliban project, nor its relinquishment to
it, its acquiescence to it, or its satisfaction with it. The Taliban still
represents, in relation to other political Islamist groups, especially the
Salafist-jihadist groups, as a disparate and even innovator group.
The study concluded that the
political Islamist groups saw what the Americans did as an eloquent message to
anti-Islamist regimes that have alliances or friendship with the United States
or were protected by it, as well as to elites that these groups describe as
Western puppets, similar to the Afghan elites that Washington did not protect
in the end. Most important of all, these groups found what the Taliban did
inspiring, with the possibility of gaining power by taking up arms.