Syrian Earthquake Cannot Be Used as a Free Pass for Assad, Warns Expert

The diplomatic momentum created by the earthquake will make it difficult for the US to maintain the status quo approach towards Syria, the author argues. While the influx of refugees into Europe has abated and the threat of terrorism has been contained, the situation for Syrian civilians is still disastrous. The author emphasizes that every effort should be made to help the Syrian people affected by the earthquake, whether in government or opposition-held territories.

However, the author cautions against welcoming Assad back into the international community, stating that rewarding impunity will only breed future instability. Assad is positioning himself as a solution to the wicked problems he has created, and the author notes that this is a dangerous strategy to pursue. She points out that Assad's grip over the territory under his control looked untenable before the earthquake, with the economy collapsing, day-long power cuts, and Iran doubling the price of its oil supplies to Syria and demanding prior payment. But now, Assad looks set to benefit directly from international aid destined to Syrians.

Repeated investigations have shown that regime officials, including some under sanctions, siphon off aid, and the government skims funds by manipulating the exchange rate. Assad is expected to demand a reward for his minor concession of allowing aid to enter rebel-held north-western Syria through more than one border crossing for three months. The author warns that the US should not simply cede the ground and must hold Assad accountable for his actions.

The author also provides historical context, referencing the situation in Lebanon after the Gulf War. In 1990, when George HW Bush built his coalition against Saddam Hussein to liberate Kuwait, Syria got on board, eager for Arab participation. The unspoken, unwritten quid pro quo was that Hafez al-Assad would gain full control of nearby Lebanon. After Kuwait was liberated, Bush declared a new world order, and the US extracted further concessions from Damascus, such as help with the release of American hostages still held in Lebanon. At the time, it looked like a good deal, but the Lebanese paid the price, living under a 15-year Syrian occupation that entrenched corruption, sectarianism, and the stranglehold of Hizbollah.

The author concludes by stating that the price to be exacted from Assad should be high, verifiable, and any concessions to him reversible. Syrians should neither be forgotten nor offered as a sacrifice in hasty compromises because the region and the West have been worn out by his intransigence. The UAE and Jordan are among those arguing that ostracising Assad for 12 years has led nowhere. While they are not entirely wrong, the author warns that there is no return to the way things were, with more than half a million dead, millions displaced and fleeing abroad, and thousands still missing in Assad's dungeons.