Iraq launches fifth phase of Swords of Truth: Will the operation achieve its goals?
The Security Media Cell in the Iraqi Ministry of Interior
has announced the launch of the fifth phase of Operation Swords of Truth, with
the aim of pursuing ISIS remnants in areas of common security interest between
the center and the region.
A statement of the Security Media Cell, reported by the
Iraqi News Agency (INA), stated, “According to the directives of the
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, Prime Minister Mohammed Shia'
al-Sudani, the fifth phase of Operation Swords of Truth was launched, based on
intelligence information in Diyala, Tuz Khurmatu and Kirkuk, to pursue the
remnants of ISIS terrorist gangs in areas of common security interest between
the center and the region.”
According to the statement, the security operation involved
the army forces, the Peshmerga forces and the Popular Mobilization Forces
(PMF), with the support of the Air Force, Army Aviation, and technical
detachments from the Director of Military Intelligence, and other support and
service categories, in the presence of the Army Chief of Staff and the Deputy
Commander of Joint Operations, indicating that the security operation was
planned by the Joint Operations Command.
Ongoing operations
Iraqi military expert Alaa al-Nashu said in exclusive
statements to the Reference that the fifth phase of Operation Swords of Truth
includes a series of multiple military operations that have been going on since
2017 after the announcement of the final victory over ISIS, and during that
period of time exceeding more than five years, the Iraqi forces, with all their
divisions, have been carrying out these operations, and on the military scale,
this indicates that there are complex matters and issues that the military
commands in the sectors of operations hide from the higher commands, because it
is impossible to repeat and renew the operations that bore several names, and
if there were accurate statistics on what ISIS incurred according to the
statements of the Joint Commands of the Armed Forces, “we would find that we
are fighting large armies and not a terrorist organization run by hundreds or
thousands of terrorists.”
Nashu noted that this operation was determined to move
within the governorates of Diyala and Kirkuk and an eastern part of Salah
al-Din governorate, in which the operations commands in both governorates are
based, in addition to the support legions of the PMF and the Peshmerga forces
represented by the 731st Brigade, the 9th Brigade, and the 17th Brigade, along
with factions affiliated with the Intelligence Directorate. The brigade
commanders stated that they found equipment and machinery of the terrorist
organization, but they did not find people present in these areas. Many
questions arise here, such as why were terrorists not found in areas where
their equipment was located? And why did the terrorist organization leave this
equipment without hiding it so that these forces could be kept from knowing the
organization’s pockets?
Regional relations of ISIS
The answer, according to Nashu, is that the ISIS elements
either work within an intelligence system that is stronger than the attacking
Iraqi forces, or that the terrorist organization has influential regional
relations in the Iraqi intelligence circles and is informed in advance of these
operations.
He explained that the operation was unified between the
center and the region to address the security gaps between them, and this is
important in dividing responsibilities and duties on the one hand, as well as
strengthening the authority of the state and the law, given that all forces are
subject to supreme joint orders. This process organizes the partnerships that
bind all parties.
Nashu considered that if the timing was appropriate and
correct, the forces would have been able to arrest even one terrorist in the area of operations, but these operations and
their timing are subject to the political and media factor.
Nashu concluded his statements to the Reference by saying
that the military operation is no different from its predecessor, even if the
Peshmerga forces are involved, because it does not include its pillars in
correct and serious military contexts in necessary and urgent solutions between
the parties that need to be coordinated at a high level of responsibilities.