Why does Tahrir al-Sham seek to get rid of al-Qaeda's legacy?

For more than three years, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) has been trying to disavow the legacy of al-Qaeda, which represents the first ideological reference in which the movement’s leaders originated before announcing its separation in 2016. Today, HTS is trying to gain new ground as a political faction amid current developments, after it presented itself years ago as a political faction.

HTS transformations

HTS, which was known earlier as al-Nusra Front, began as a branch of the Islamic State in Iraq affiliated with al-Qaeda in 2011 until it separated from the organization in 2013 and declared allegiance directly to Ayman al-Zawahiri, the leader of al-Qaeda at the time. But in 2016, in light of the height of armed activity in Syria, leader Abu Mohammad al-Julani announced the complete separation from al-Qaeda, then renamed the al-Nusra Front the Fatah al-Sham Front, and several months later announced the merger with other armed entities in Syria under the name Hayat Tahrir al-Sham.

These defections and mergers were accompanied by other shifts in the movement’s ideas in terms of ideology and organization, and it tightened its control over a large area of Syrian territory, where it began to deal on the grounds that it has legitimacy in ruling these areas that it seized and entered into fierce competition with other armed factions. It took control of the Idlib region and began to control the main Bab al-Hawa crossing and enter into negotiations with the Turkish side.

National liberation

In 2020, HTS began seeking to appear in a new guise, suggesting that it had turned into a national liberation movement instead of being an armed faction bearing the authority of al-Qaeda. Julani delivered a speech titled “War and Stability” in January 2020 in which he confirmed that HTS was heading towards a new geopolitical change, saying, “We have outgrown the idea of overthrowing the regime. It is now a battle for liberation and independence from the Russian and Iranian occupation... This Russian and Iranian occupation targets our religion, our land, and our resources. Based on that, we must draw up our plans, concepts, and visions for the battle of the next struggle.”

More transformations

It seems that the transformations of HTS have no limits, as it makes many concessions every day. It adopted a model through which it tries to prove that it is a local Syrian revolutionary movement, not affiliated with foreign or local jihadist organizations, and does not pose a threat to Western countries, especially the United States.

With the successive changes surrounding the Syrian issue, Julani began sensing these transformations early on and proceeded towards presenting a new phase of concessions that violated the basic rules upon which HTS was established, presenting itself in a more liberal image instead of the jihadist backgrounds on which it was established and calling for the acceptance of pluralism and the dissemination of religious tolerance. HTS also accepted the holding of a mass in August 2020 during the celebration of St. Anna’s Day in one of the closed churches in the village of Al-Yacoubiyahin the western countryside of Idlib, and its media outlets celebrated this event.

Syrian media outlets also published excerpts from a speech delivered by Julani recently at a religious gathering, in which he said, “We do not want society to become hypocritical in that its members pray when they see us but cut off from it as soon as we leave.”

Goals and aspirations

Through these recently accelerated ideological shifts, the movement is looking forward to catching up with the changes taking place in the regional and local arena in light of the approaching reintegration of the Syrian regime into Arab society once again during the Arab Summit meetings that were held in the Saudi city of Jeddah on May 19.

Julani seeks for HTS to be considered a political faction that can compete in the future to reach power, drawing inspiration from the current political situation of the Taliban movement, which seized power in Afghanistan during August 2021 and formed the government, which was preceded by the movement offering to sit at the international negotiating tables, as happened in the Doha negotiations, which was the most prominent factor in what happened next in Afghanistan.

It is clear that Julani seeks more than just being the leader of a movement or party and dreams of being a head of state in the future through his concessions and new alliances.