Somali Ports between UAE’s development and Qatar’s greed
Somalia has the largest coastline in Africa, locating on the Red Sea
and Pacific Ocean. It is estimated about 3,000 km in length. However, the
economic and humanitarian situations along the coastline have been wrapped in
misery due to political vacuum, garbage, poaching, and piracy that threatens
the international maritime navigation.
Somalia has four main ports not subject to the Federal government
administration.
1- Mogadishu Port:
It is the largest and the most famous port in the country. The port
stopped operation after the downfall of the central government in 1991 and
re-operated during the presence of the UN peacekeeping forces. However, It shut
down again after the withdrawal of the peacekeepers. When the Islamic Court
Unions controlled over the country in 2006, the port re-opened and was managed
by Turkish company of Al-Bayrak. i
2- Berbera port:
It is located in Somaliland, which announced its independence in 1991.
The port, which was established in 1968, is one of the most important strategic
locations as it can control any air or naval military exercise in Yemen.
Through Berbera port, Livestock is being exported to the Middle East and Gulf
States, and fuel is being imported to Somalia.
Somali government has previously asked to use Egyptian and Saudi ports
to exports its livestock as breakaway Somaliland is not internationally
recognized.[i]
3- Bosaso Port:
The port is located eastern Somalia. It was established in 1980s as a
result of a Italy-brokered deal conducted by the Somali Salvation Democratic
Front and Said Berri’s regime. The port falls under the administration of the
autonomous city of Puntland, and recently has economically revived under this
administration.[ii]
4- Kismayo Port:
The 52-year-old port is located on the Pacific Ocean near agricultural
cities and falls under the administration of autonomous region of Jubaland. It
has been used for exporting the Somali local productions of fruits and for importing
agricultural equipment. The port suffers deterioration as 80 percent of works
shut down due to the lack of maintenance.[iii]
UAE role in development of Somali ports
The UAE's development strategy
is based on several basic dimensions, humanitarianly, securely, and
economically.
First, the UAE has adopted a strategy to improve the efficiency of
the Somali ports via using its experience of reforming and restoration, and via
offering employment opportunities among the Somali people to protect them from
joining the armed groups.
The Gulf State has signed a number of agreements with the Somali
government to expand and develop all ports. In 2013, one of such agreements was
inked with Puntland[iv].
In 2017, DP World obtained the concession to manage and develop Berbera port
for 30 years at a cost of $442 million in investment; as per the contract, DP
World will improve the port infrastructure, especially the road connecting the city
of Berbera with the Ethiopian border to facilitate goods shipment.
Second, the UAE strengthened security and intelligence relations with
the Somali government by providing joint training programs with the Somalia’s
Anti-Terrorism Police Unit and the National Intelligence and Security Service
in 2015. Also, the Armed Forces of the UAE trained several units of the
Somali Armed Forces. The oil-rich country has also supplied Jubaland
administration with a number of mine-resistant vehicles, RG-31 armored personnel
carriers, Reva Mk. III armored vehicles, water carrier trucks, police
motorcycles for the Department of Homeland Security and the police.[v]
Third, The UAE has backed Somali government in the international
disputes. The UAE paid the defense fees of the Somali party in the
international dispute over the coast of Kismayo, which borders of Kenya.[vi]
Qatar’s sabotage role in Somali Ports
Qatar is extending its influence in the Middle East via empowering
extremists and terrorists, and adopting Iran's policies in the region,
particularly Somalia. Doha was using its investments in Eretria to send money
to Al-Shabab militant group in Somalia. Qatar also was accused of inciting
members of the Islamic Courts in Berbera to stage protests against the UAE’s
contract to develop the port.
A day after a new agreement was signed among the DP World, the
Somaliland and Ethiopia to improve Berbera port, Qatar issued a statement
calling for terminating the agreement.[vii]
Doha also was accused of financial supporting to Somali militants along
the borders with Ethiopia.
In conclusion, the deteriorating situation of Somali ports could make
Qatar to wield more influence through the extremists to threaten the Arab and
Gulf security. Arab countries, especially the neighbors of the Horn of Africa,
have to formulate a clear foreign policy to secure its common interests towards
the Horn of Africa. Furthermore, Arab assistance should not limit to only
humanitarian and financial aid.
Arabs should take a vivid strategy to protect the regional national
security, amid the efforts of Qatar and Iran to extend their influence
towards Yemen, and amid of Israel's strengthening relations with the East
African countries in general and the Horn of Africa.
[i]
Berbera port development deal signed by Ethiopia and Somaliland – Al-Sharq
Awsat https://aawsat.com/home/article/1191106/%25C2%25AB%25D9%2585%25D9%2588%25D8%25A7%25D9%2586%25D8%25A6-%25D8%25AF%25D8%25A8%25D9%258A%25C2%25BB-%25D8%25AA%25D9%2588%25D9%2582%25D8%25B9-%25D8%25A7%25D8%25AA%25D9%2581%25D8%25A7%25D9%2582%25D8%25A7%25D9%258B-%25D9%2585%25D8%25B9-%25D8%25A5%25D8%25AB%25D9%258A%25D9%2588%25D8%25A8%25D9%258A%25D8%25A7-%25D9%2588%25D8%25A3%25D8%25B1%25D8%25B6-%25D8%25A7%25D9%2584%25D8%25B5%25D9%2588%25D9%2585%25D8%25A7%25D9%2584-%25D9%2584%25D8%25AA%25D8%25B7%25D9%2588%25D9%258A%25D8%25B1-%25C2%25AB%25D9%2585%25D9%258A%25D9%2586%25D8%25A7%25D8%25A1-%25D8%25A8%25D8%25B1%25D8%25A8%25D8%25B1%25D8%25A9%25C2%25BB
[ii]
Somali Today (http://somaliatoday.net/%25D8%25AA%25D9%2588%25D9%2582%25D9%258A%25D8%25B9-%25D8%25A7%25D8%25AA%25D9%2581%25D8%25A7%25D9%2582-%25D9%2585%25D9%258A%25D9%2586%25D8%25A7%25D8%25A1-%25D8%25A8%25D9%2588%25D8%25B5%25D8%25A7%25D8%25B5%25D9%2588-%25D9%2585%25D8%25B9-%25D8%25B4%25D8%25B1%25D9%2583%25D8%25A9-%25D8%25A5%25D9%2585%25D8%25A7%25D8%25B1%25D8%25A7/)
[iii]
Mogadishu Center for Research and Study (http://mogadishucenter.com/2015/09/%25D9%2585%25D8%25A7-%25D8%25B0%25D8%25A7-%25D8%25AA%25D8%25B9%25D8%25B1%25D9%2581-%25D8%25B9%25D9%2586-%25D8%25A7%25D9%2584%25D8%25A3%25D9%2587%25D9%2585%25D9%258A%25D8%25A9-%25D8%25A7%25D9%2584%25D8%25A7%25D8%25B3%25D8%25AA%25D8%25B1%25D8%25A7%25D8%25AA%25D9%258A%25D8%25AC%25D9%258A%25D8%25A9-%25D9%2584%25D9%2585%25D9%258A/)
[iv]
Somali Times (http://www.somalitimes.net/2017/04/07/%25D8%25B4%25D8%25B1%25D9%2583%25D8%25A9-%25D8%25A5%25D9%2585%25D8%25A7%25D8%25B1%25D8%25A7%25D8%25AA%25D9%258A%25D8%25A9-%25D8%25AA%25D9%2588%25D9%2582%25D8%25B9-%25D8%25A7%25D8%25AA%25D9%2581%25D8%25A7%25D9%2582%25D9%258A%25D8%25A9-%25D9%2585%25D8%25B9-%25D9%2588%25D9%2584%25D8%25A7%25D9%258A%25D8%25A9-%25D8%25A8%25D9%2588/)
[v]
UAE eyes west of Suez by Washington Institution (http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/ar/policy-analysis/view/west-of-suez-for-the-united-arab-emirates
[vi]
Mogadishu Center for Research and Study (http://mogadishucenter.com/2017/08/%25D8%25A7%25D9%2584%25D8%25A5%25D9%2585%25D8%25A7%25D8%25B1%25D8%25A7%25D8%25AA-%25D9%2588%25D8%25AA%25D8%25B1%25D9%2583%25D9%258A%25D8%25A7-%25D8%25AA%25D8%25AA%25D9%2586%25D8%25A7%25D9%2581%25D8%25B3%25D8%25A7%25D9%2586-%25D9%2581%25D9%258A-%25D8%25A7%25D9%2584%25D8%25B5%25D9%2588%25D9%2585%25D8%25A7%25D9%2584/)
[vii]
Al-Sharq (https://www.al-sharq.com/article/03/03/2018/%25D8%25A7%25D9%2584%25D8%25B5%25D9%2588%25D9%2585%25D8%25A7%25D9%2584-%25D8%25AA%25D9%2586%25D9%2587%25D9%258A-%25D8%25B3%25D9%258A%25D8%25B7%25D8%25B1%25D8%25A9-%25D9%2585%25D9%2588%25D8%25A7%25D9%2586%25D8%25A6-%25D8%25AF%25D8%25A8%25D9%258A-%25D8%25B9%25D9%2584%25D9%2589-%25D8%25A8%25D8%25B1%25D8%25A8%25D8%25B1%25D8%25A9)