Iran Is Using Western Technology Against U.S. Drones
For years, Iran has been successful in smuggling drone parts
in spite of international sanctions, and now its smuggling efforts have moved
into counter-drone markets.
Iran shot down a RQ-4A Global Hawk drone last week. Several
years ago, in 2011, it demonstrated its evolving capabilities at drone
interception when it captured a RQ-170 Sentinel stealth drone. To down the
Hawk, Iran claimed to use the 3 Khordad surface-to-air missile system. Prior to
that, Iran supposedly jammed the communication links of the RQ-170 Sentinel
stealth drone, taking control of the drone inside Iranian territory, later
reverse engineering it to produce the Shahed-171 and Saeqah drones. So, on top
of drone capabilities, Iran has some counter-drone capabilities—that is the
ability to detect, identify, track and/or control unmanned aircraft. It also
boasts powerful cyber-attack capabilities that can be used to control enemy
drones. Efforts should now focus on preventing Iran from enhancing these
capabilities by countering its attempts to obtain Western counter-drone
technology.
For years, Iran has been successful in smuggling drone parts
in spite of international sanctions, and now its smuggling efforts have moved
into counter-drone markets. These markets, inclusive of North America, Europe,
the Asia-Pacific and Latin America, are expected to reach a value of USD 2.93
billion by 2025. Iran’s neighboring states are also looking to acquire counter-drone
capabilities. Turkey has at least three known products on the market, and the
United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia are looking to step in. Due to their
geographical proximity to Iran, these countries unwantedly risk operating as
transhipment hubs and staging grounds for Iranian front companies and smuggling
networks seeking to get their hands-on Western counter-drone technology.
Export control cases have long since emerged in the United
States, France and Germany where Iranian agents were caught smuggling drone
parts. The most recent case concerns an employee of Iran’s Aerospace Industries
Organization—responsible for managing Iran’s missile program. Jalal
Rohollahnejad stands accused by the United States of attempting to export
anti-drone systems to Rayan Roshd Afszar—an entity that reportedly produces
technical components for the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps’ drone program.
Before him, Iman J. L., a German national, and Davood A. stood accused of
violating Germany’s Foreign Trade Act for using deceptive means to obtain
sixty-one engines suitable for use in Iran’s Abadil drone.
There is also the risk of Iran obtaining counter-drone
technology through China who is said to pursue a “no-questions-asked” policy
regarding the export of drones to the Middle East. In February 2018, the Centre
for the Study of Drones in Bard College reported that China had eight
counter-drone products on the market, the risk being that China-based
procurement agents with profiteering intentions and a lax regulatory
environment seek to sell such strategic goods to Iran. Take the case of Emily
Liu, who sought to procure electronic components from the United States on
behalf of Iran’s Shiraz Electronic Industries, which is responsible for
producing radars, avionics and control systems—all relevant components for the
production of UAVs and counter-UAVs.
Due to the nature of counter-drone technology as a
developing technology, there’s a need for U.S firms and partners to strictly
control it. So far, suggestions for legislative proposals on counter-drone tech
have focused on placing authority in the hands of national-security and
law-enforcement agencies to make use of counter-drone capabilities. However,
legislation will also need to cover exports to foreign nations, which includes
classifying counter-drone exports as foreign military sales where the U.S.
government acts as a go-between to the vendor and customer, rather than as
direct commercial sales under which a company and another nation can negotiate
directly. In view of the spread of this technology worldwide, there is a need
for stringent legislation followed by arrests and prosecutions of anyone trying
to export this material without a license. Otherwise, Iran and its regional
proxies will likely be using Western counter-drone technology for interception
purposes in the not-too-distant future.