Threat of low-cost terror
Othman Tezghart
For
more than 25 years, I have been cooperating with Roland Jacquard to investigate
and analyse thoroughly and exactly the alleged theory of Catastrophe, which
traumatised intelligence agencies across the world in the wake of the 9/11
attack.
Since
2003, we have co-written several books.
From the outset, we decided to swim against the tide, reinvestigating
and re-examining hypotheses and theories introduced by veterans or
self-proclaimed experts and theorists about Jihad and radical ideology.
In
the wake of the tragic attack in 2001, the Western societies were deeply worried
that a Nuclear Jihad would be the next nightmare.
It
was our book “Bin Laden and the Systematic Plan to Destroy the West”, which was
the first to sound the alarming bell that ‘suicidal bombers’ would be Jihadists’
post-9/11 weapons of mass destruction. The aftermath of 9/11 attack gave rise
to several warnings that Al-Qaeda was planning extraordinary types of
terrorism, such as the N-terror, a biological war or a chemical attack.
Nonetheless,
in the 90-page Bin Laden and the Systematic Plan to Destroy the West, the
authors extensively debated probabilities that after the 9/11 attacks,
Jihadists were embarking on the development of extraordinary types of terror—largely
different from sophisticated and military support the alleged nuclear attack
required.
Admittedly,
the devastating attacks on the twin towers in New York, which were launched by a
very small number of suicidal bombers armed with knives, had compromised
largely the security of the sole superpower in the world. The authors, nonetheless, discounted
speculations that Jihadists would seek to possess the N-weapon to pursue their
destructive attacks on the US, which they condemned for being the Great
Devil. The authors had real concerns
that the Jihadists would act differently by mobilising ‘irresistible and
unchallenged weapon’ known as suicidal bombers, who are yearning to receive the
laurels (martyrdom).
Since
then, we have not stopped sounding the wake-up call, urging agencies concerned
to help pre-empt horrible and savage massacres by the extraordinary weapon
(suicidal bombers).
Bin
Laden and the Systematic Plan to Destroy the West also debated the so-called
‘Uberisaion of Jihad’, one of the most complicated and mysterious phenomenon foreign intelligence agencies and institutions
have been facing for more than 15 years.
The alleged primitive, unsophisticated and low-cost type of terror
seemed to have managed to shake the Western societies after it compromised
their holy principle—freedom.
Regardless
of these arguments and hypotheses, the authors refused to join voices, which
began the countdown for the collapse of the empire of Jihadists. It was unfortunate that veteran experts, who
are claiming a good knowledge of Jihad and radical Islam, jumped prematurely on the conclusion by noting that the global anti-terror
war initiated by the administration of ex-US President George W. Bush, had
driven the last nail in the coffin of Jihad and its ideology. It was also
alleged that being exhausted, Jihadists had become unable any longer to rise and
hit again.
Nonetheless, in
the aftermath of the 9/11 attack, Jihadists scurried to change their skin to mislead
the global manhunt. They restructured their international networks and changed
their tactics and strategies. The chronicle of the tragic incidents that have
been taking place since then has substantiated the authors’ vision in this
respect. The terrorist attacks, which took place in Madrid in March 2004, and
in London in July the following year, signified the Jihadists’ bloodier and
more powerful comeback. The authors’ concerns were reinforced by judge
Jean-Louis Bruguiere, the leading French investigating magistrate in charge of
counterterrorism affairs.
Also in their Bin Laden and the Systematic Plan to Destroy the West,
the authors were the first to shed light on Ayman al-Zawahri’s ‘Theory of Decentralisation’,
in which he recommended the appointment of local emirs to form sub-groups
(smaller emirates). Al-Zawahri suggested that these local small groups would act
as a smokescreen, under which they could launch major attacks under the banner
of the parent Jihad movement.
Being at their
wits’ ends to explain their embarrassing conclusion, experts, who had
prophesied the death of Jihad, alleged that ‘lone wolves’ were behind the
revival of the disastrous phenomenon. According to their allegation, the lone
wolves are individuals, who, adopting the Jihad ideology, would launch
terrorist attacks unilaterally. Unfortunately, the theory of lone wolves quickly
gave in to criticism. On the one hand, he/she would hit unilaterally, a lone
wolf could belong to a family, whose members adopted the Jihadist ideology; the
lone wolf is sometimes connected—directly or indirectly—to a clandestine
network of Jihadists. On the other hand, a terrorist attack by a lone wolf
should not by any means connote signs of weakness. Rather, a lone wolf is that
suicidal bomber, who has taken the oath of loyalty to masterminds and
preachers, who are using the social networks and websites as the platforms to
communicate violent ideology and manipulate their followers. In the meantime, Jihadists managed to develop
new sources of logistic support by twinning with notorious criminals.
Undoubtedly, experts,
who are defending the theory of ‘lone
wolves’, limited perspective to the tip of the iceberg. The shortcomings in
this theory undoubtedly have serious and tremendously expensive implications
for the global anti-terror war.
Whether
intentionally or otherwise, these
experts must have committed a disastrous mistake. Their defence to their
misleading theory has distracted the attention of intelligence agencies away
from the chief reasons behind such a catastrophic phenomenon.
It is all the
more outrageous that in the wake of the attacks in Paris, Berlin, Brussels and
Barcelona, calls were raised to declare a state of emergency and impose tougher
security measures to help pre-empt new attacks. It is all the more ridiculous
that inexperienced and unqualified troops would be deployed to fight
terrorists.
For more than
15 years, we have been confident that intelligence
agencies are qualified better than any other institution to fight terrorism. We have also been warning that military
confrontations against Jihadists will not achieve success. It is all the more
curious that the louder the calls for militarising anti-terror campaign, the
bigger the number of publications, studies and research papers, which discount
the role of intelligence agencies in this respect. To achieve concrete success
in efforts being made to eliminate the threat of Jihadists, the intelligence
agencies, which have the potentials to deal with unprecedented challenges,
should be given the chief role.
The phenomenon
of Jihad and its implications should not by any means be compromised or
discounted. Jihadists are bent on developing their terror campaign across the
world. Drawing inspiration from Ayman
al-Zawahri’s book “Knights under the Banner of the Prophet”, they have
initiated Terrorising Economy. An exact
diagnosis of the phenomenon of low-cost Jihad will help overcome the related
challenges. Simplified, incorrect and sentimental theories and hypotheses
should be ignored; such a destructive phenomenon should be looked at through a
proper perspective, which could help track down Jihadists, their masterminds,
their preachers and sources of finance.
