Daesh's 'caliphate' turning into a good recruitment tool

As an issue, the caliphate is central to Daesh's thinking and its theoreticians' writing and to the thinking of extremists affiliated to the so-called "Islamist movements".

Daesh used the caliphate as a concept to justify its actions, many of which were more brutal than anything humanity had seen before. This radical organization uses the same concept to draw in recruits, especially those who have the seeds of extremism in them and those who are by nature ready to resort to violence in order to establish the presumed caliphate.

In a June 2014 statement, in which Daesh declared Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi the caliph of the presumed Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, the organization asked Muslims to feel proud then that they were part of a caliphate that would give them their lost dignity and honor back.

The concept of the caliphate served the Daesh project best. The organization, which overran vast territories in both Iraq and Syria, also tried to capture other territories outside these two states, using an attractive discourse. It addressed various groups of people around the world, especially Arab and Western youth, with the aim of drawing them into its own ranks. In addressing these people, the organization claimed that Iraq and Syria were the lands of jihad and the epicenter of the future Islamic caliphate.

This study will focus on Daesh's use of the concept of the caliphate in drawing in recruits. It will discuss this issue through the following points:

First, Daesh's vision of how the caliphate should be

Daesh's structure took on the shape of a pyramid with the caliph at its top. The structure contained several institutions and security and military agencies. Daesh used these institutions in achieving its goal of founding the presumed caliphate.

1 – Caliph

He is chosen in the light of regulations contained in Islamic law. A caliph has to have knowledge and hail from the tribe of Quraish. He must be obeyed once he is selected for the job by the Consultative Council and decision-making entities inside the organization.

2 – Consultative Council

This is by far the most important agency inside the organization. It has unlimited power, including decision-making, the formulation of public policies and also the sacking of the caliph. The council also offers advice to the caliph at times of war and peace, but this advice is not binding to the caliph. It can also nominate the emirs of the different provinces and the members of other councils within the state.

3 – Decision-makers

These are the people who have sound views and wisdom. They have the ability to choose the person most fit for leadership. This group of people includes a wide range of Daesh notables who swear allegiance to the caliph. They preside over the juridical authority that publishes books, letters and phrases the letters of the caliph. The members of this group also oversee the work of the media machine of the organization and the central bank.

4 – Councils

There are three main councils. The Military Council is the most important of these three councils, given the military nature of the organization. The commander of the Military Council always occupies the position of the vice-caliph. The Military Council is also made up of the emirs of the different provinces. Each province is made up of three brigades, each of which is divided into a number of battalions. The Security Council is less important than the Military Council. It doubles as the interior ministry and the intelligence agency. It is responsible for the personal security of the caliph. The third council is the Administrative Council. It is responsible for the local administration of the state.

Second, discourse and recruitment  

In July 2014, Abu Mohamed al-Adnani, the official spokesman of the Islamic State, delivered a speech that was titled "God's promise". In his speech, Adnani declared the revival of the Islamic caliphate.

The Islamic State, he said, decided to establish the Islamic caliphate and appointed Abdullah Ibrahim bin Awad bin Ibrahim bin Ali bin Mohamed al-Badri al-Hashimi al-Hussein who was born in Samarra as its caliph.

Daesh's discourse sought to go hand in hand with this statement later on. This discourse was mainly based on denigrating the beliefs of the others and claiming political and religious victimhood. The same discourse twisted religious texts to have the necessary religious backing. It also depended on the interpretations and views of Islamic theoreticians known for their hawkish positions, especially when it comes to issues like jihad and war.

By adopting this discourse, Daesh addressed Muslims and non-Muslims around the world. It also sought to masquerade as a defender of the rights of Muslims and the weak, either in Syria against the brutality of the Syrian regime or in Iraq against the oppression the country's Shiites subjects its Sunnis to. In so doing, the organization sought to attract the largest number possible of recruits from all parts of the world.

Third, Daesh's peculiar caliphate

The caliphate Daesh sought to found and recruit youth in had the following peculiarities:

1 – Virtual

In its most part, the caliphate Daesh sought to found was based in the virtual world of social media. This is why some people tend to call it an imagined caliphate. The mechanisms the organization depended on to bring about this caliphate were also a bit imagined. The caliphate had nothing to do with reality. It was present only in the minds of those dreaming of it. This was why Daesh depended on modern communication tools to convince youth to travel from every part of the world to either Syria or Iraq, the lands of the presumed caliphate.

Daesh launched the magazine Dabiq, the first official magazine of the organization. The magazine was published in Arabic and English. Copies of the magazine were distributed in areas controlled by the organization. The online version of the magazine was published in 12 languages. The people editing the magazine focused on talking about the objectives of Daesh as an organization and the benefits of founding the caliphate. Daesh also used visual and audio media to serve its own objectives.

Daesh established media institutions to push its media abilities forward. It founded the Agnad studio where most Daesh's songs were recorded. It founded al-Etisam channel which was broadcast from Syria and Iraq and al-Furqan channel which was founded with technical support from al-Qaeda. The organization also established al-Hayat channel which conducted interviews with the leaders of the organization. There was also a host of other channels that targeted audiences in the US and the West. These channels sought to draw in the largest number of recruits to the presumed caliphate.   

2 – Easy to move

The collapse of terrorist projects always opens the door for the emergence of other radical projects. This has been the case in this region since the downfall of the Ottoman caliphate. When it removed the border between Iraq and Syria, Daesh did not only want to expand its presumed caliphate, but also wanted this caliphate to be present in different geographical areas. Daesh fighters sometimes leave the territories they control without fighting and then head to other areas least expected by their enemies. This showed that the same fighters do not cling too much to land. The organization used even to advise its sympathizers who could not travel to either Syria or Iraq to stay in their countries where they turn into time bombs. The presence of these sympathizers in their countries opened the door for the emergence of lone wolves. The wolves are youth who swore allegiance to the presumed Daesh caliph.

3 – Opportunist

The Daesh caliphate was opportunist in the most part. The caliphate hypothesis was based on a rewriting of a fabricated history of Muslims. Daesh leaders used this fabricated version of the history of Islam to get to the minds of its backers and also get financial support. The same opportunist nature of the caliphate also shaped the list of the enemies of this caliphate. The striking thing, though, was that Daesh had never carried out any attacks against Israel. The theoreticians of the organization considered Israel a "far enemy".

4 – False

Daesh used false facts to promote its aspired caliphate. Baghdadi's photo at al-Nouri mosque in Mosul came at the center of the organization's false propaganda in this regard. Cell phones in the whole city were taken off their networks for more than one hour as Baghdadi delivered his sermon at the mosque. Baghdadi arrived to the mosque in a huge procession. This situation aimed to deliver a message to youth everywhere in the world, especially those who sought to live in a utopia in the presumed land of the caliphate.

5 – Brutal

Daesh carried out a series of brutal operations with the aim of instilling terror in the hearts of its opponents. This brutality was probably liked by a large number of the backers of the organization, especially in Europe where some people were full of vengeful feelings. Daesh snapped the slaughter of two Japanese hostages on camera. It also made a video of the burning to death of Jordanian pilot Moaz al-Kasasbeh.

6 – Interest-based

The Daesh caliphate turned into what looked like a business enterprise. Daesh's brutal actions served the interests of companies and institutions planning to take part of the cake of the reconstruction of the areas destroyed by the organization.

7 – Goal-oriented

The Daesh caliphate contributed effectively to demonizing the Islamic religion in the minds of a large number of Western citizens. This demonization gave Western governments good excuses for their new foreign policies. It also proved true previously envisaged theories about the clash of civilizations and cultures.

Conclusion

There is an urgent need for a modern discourse to address youth, one that counters the effects of the vengeful discourse of terrorist organizations like Daesh. The new discourse must lay stress on the importance of coexistence and tolerance. Daesh's collapse does not mean that radicalism and extremism are on the way out.   

Dr Mubarak Ahmed is an expert on comparative politics.