At five in the afternoon, Cairo time (71).. Islam and Freedom of Opinion and Expression (10)

The City-State… Pluralism Without Coercion?

When Islam moved from the phase of preaching to the phase of statehood,
the greatest challenge was:
How can a community of diverse beliefs be governed
without difference turning into conflict,
and without force being used to impose faith?

The practical answer came in the State of Medina—
not as an imagined ideal model,
but as a real experiment that confronted genuine diversity
and managed its complexities helpfully without religious coercion.

Medina… A Plural, Not Monolithic, Society:

From the very first moment,
Medina was not a single religious community,
but a mosaic of:
Muslims,
Jews,
Polytheists,
and tribes of multiple affiliations.

This reality was not handled through exclusion
nor through oppression,
but by organizing relations among those who differed.

Here emerged the Document of Medina
as a political contract,
not a doctrinal declaration.

Contract Before Creed:

The Document of Medina did not impose a religion,
nor abolish any creed,
nor require faith as a condition for political belonging.

What it required was clearer:
• Commitment to the public order,
• Respect for peace,
• Joint defense of the city.

As for belief,
it remained a personal matter,
in which there was no room for coercion.

This distinction
between the religious and the political spheres
was ahead of its time.

Freedom of Belief… A Practice, Not a Slogan:

In the State of Medina,
there were no recorded cases of mass coercion into Islam,
no inquisitions as occurred in Europe,
and no forced imposition of rituals.

People lived according to their beliefs
and dealt with one another under a shared law
without being asked to change what they believed.

This alone
is sufficient to refute the idea
that a religious state is inherently oppressive toward dissenters.

When Does Disagreement Turn Into Conflict?

Disagreement in itself was not dangerous,
but treason,
aggression,
and the breach of covenants
were red lines.

Punishment, when it occurred, regarding some Jewish tribes—Banu al-Nadir and Banu Qurayza—
was not because of belief,
but because of violating public order
or threatening the shared peace.

This is a fundamental distinction
that has often been obscured
in later interpretations.

So what happened during the Battle of the Confederates (al-Khandaq)
in 5 AH? Quraysh allied with several Arab tribes in an attempt to invade Medina.

The situation was existential: either the fall of the nascent state or its survival.

Banu Qurayza were inside the city, and according to the “Constitution of Medina” they were obliged to remain neutral and participate in joint defense.

The Turning Point

Sources—including Abd al-Muta‘al al-Sa‘idi—state that they:
• Broke the covenant
• Opened channels of communication with the Confederates
• Which would—had the attack succeeded—have enabled a strike against the Muslims from within

After the Confederates withdrew, the Muslims besieged Banu Qurayza, and the latter requested arbitration.

They asked that judgment be passed by Sa‘d ibn Mu‘adh, their former ally and leader of the Aws.

He ruled as follows:
• Execution of the fighters
• Enslavement of the women and children
• Division of the property

This was a harsh judgment by today’s standards, but—in the context of the seventh century—it was regarded as punishment for high treason under conditions of existential war.

How Did al-Sa‘idi Interpret the Event?

Al-Sa‘idi rejected portraying the incident as:
• A religious war against the Jews

He saw it as:
• A political/military event linked to military treason during a siege
• A judgment issued through tribal arbitration according to the norms of the time
• Not a direct initial decision by the Prophet, peace and blessings be upon him

He also tended to emphasize that:
• The Qur’anic text did not establish a general rule against the Jews
• Rather, it dealt with a specific incident within its circumstances

Another Reading of the Incident:

Ahmad Subhi Mansour, proceeding from a purely Qur’anic methodology, argues that:

1.    The Qur’an is the only reliable source.

2.    The Qur’an does not mention a mass killing of Banu Qurayza.

3.    The verse in Surat al-Ahzab states:
“And He brought down those of the People of the Book who supported them from their strongholds and cast terror into their hearts—some you killed and some you took captive.”

He interprets this as follows:
• “Some you killed” occurred in the context of combat, not mass execution.
• He rejects reports that cite large numbers of male casualties as later historical exaggerations.
• He believes many details of the story were shaped later in the climate of Umayyad-Abbasid political conflict.

According to this view:
There is no explicit Qur’anic evidence of an organized mass massacre carried out by direct order of the Prophet, peace and blessings be upon him—bearing in mind that we are speaking of an act of high treason which, had it succeeded, would have ended the existence of this religion and all its adherents at once, perpetrated by a group bound to the Muslims by a covenant stipulating joint defense, not betrayal from within or alliance with the enemy.

.

Why Present This Model?

Because it demonstrates that religious coexistence
is possible without relinquishing faith
and without suppressing others.

It also shows that conflating religion and state
is not an inevitable destiny,
but a political choice
made later.

What Does This Mean Today?

It means that the state
can be religiously neutral
without being hostile to religion.

It means that protecting belief
is not achieved by coercing people,
but by guaranteeing their freedom to choose.

And above all, it means that the experience of Medina
was not a temporary exception,
but the foundation of a principle
that remains valid:

Pluralism is not managed by force, but by contract.

In the next episode,
we will move from the model of the state
to the problem of history,
and ask:

From text to state… when did the crisis of freedom begin?

To be continued…

Cairo: Five o’clock in the evening, local time of al-Mahrousa.