At five in the afternoon, Cairo time (58).. The Muslim Brotherhood and America (10–11)

Coordination Meetings and an Egyptian Protest

When the Egyptian authorities announced their rejection of the format of periodic American meetings with representatives and leading figures of the Muslim Brotherhood—then legally banned in Egypt—Washington’s clarifications affirmed that it could not repeat its mistakes in Iran, and that it must engage in dialogue, listen, and develop its assessments with a group that might form a future government in a pivotal country such as Egypt.

Subsequently, meetings between the Brotherhood and the Americans became more serious, precise, and organized. The Egyptian authorities responded with close security surveillance, successive legal blows, and a series of trials that included nearly all first-tier leaders of the organization.

This atmosphere coincided with the defense of the group by certain American media outlets, which regarded dialogue with it as an option that served U.S. interests in the region, highlighting— in their view— the “moderation” of its discourse on some issues. At the same time, Hamas and its leaders continued to be classified as a terrorist organization, its leaders barred from entering the United States, in a stark contradiction that persists even after Washington’s recent decision to designate only the organization’s branches in Egypt, Jordan, and Lebanon as terrorist groups.

At that time, immediately following the attacks of September 11, the U.S. State Department adopted a memorandum calling for the opening of direct and regular political dialogue with the Brotherhood in Egypt and for not placing great weight on the Egyptian government’s warnings about it. This was consistent with statements by former American officials, including remarks attributed to Condoleezza Rice that fear of the rise of Islamist currents should not obstruct “reforms,” and observations reportedly contained in a report by Madeleine Albright after her 2005 visit to Cairo regarding the “pragmatism” of these groups and the possibility of dealing with them.

In this context, the Brotherhood’s Supreme Guide, Mahdi Akef, attempted to soften the rapidly accelerating trend toward joint dialogue with the Americans by courting President Mubarak. In a well-known statement on March 2, 2005, he affirmed that the Brotherhood would not object to the election of President Mubarak to a fifth term as president of Egypt, provided that this occurred on the basis of an agreement between him and the group.

Channels of Communication

Within an overt/implicit strategy, public opposition to U.S. policy continued to be declared, while efforts to engage in dialogue with it persisted, along with the opening of further channels of communication with Washington in secret. In late 2004, the organization’s international body held a meeting in Istanbul attended by representatives of Brotherhood wings from Egypt, Palestine, Jordan, and Algeria to discuss opening up to the U.S. administration. They approved the necessity of doing so at that moment, considering it a ticket to recognition of them as an organization that could be allowed to reach power in Arab countries without international opposition.

In light of that decision, the group exploited Dr. Abdel Moneim Aboul Fotouh’s participation in conferences outside Egypt in his capacity as Secretary-General of the Arab Doctors Union. At a conference in Istanbul at the end of April 2005 titled “NGOs and Civil Society Institutions,” he was joined on the American side by Richard Murphy (former Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs) and George Tenet (former Director of Central Intelligence). Discussions revolved around the group and the possibility of its coming to power, and how it would handle issues sensitive to America and the West. Aboul Fotouh answered all of Murphy’s questions and reassured everyone that everything being said about the group and its ideas was merely propaganda from the ruling regime in Egypt and had no basis in truth. As evidence, he cited the previous dealings of the organization’s branch in Iraq with the American administrator “Bremer” and their participation in the transitional government in full cooperation with the United States at the time.

Later, Aboul Fotouh—accompanied by Supreme Guide Mahdi Akef—met with the American John Shank in September 2004. The latter informed them that the U.S. ambassador in Cairo was prepared to receive the group’s leaders, proposing the formation of a delegation to visit the United States and meet with State Department officials.

Members of Parliament

The meetings extended to include Brotherhood members in the Egyptian parliament. Representatives of the U.S. government held meetings with Brotherhood figures and members of the People’s Assembly at the time. Among these was a meeting between Mohamed Saad al-Katatni and American representatives, including U.S. House Democratic Majority Leader Steny Hoyer, at the residence of the U.S. ambassador in Cairo on April 4, 2007, during a reception marking a congressional delegation’s visit to Egypt. This was preceded by another meeting between al-Katatni and the political counselor at the U.S. embassy in March 2007 to obtain a U.S. entry visa, during which the American diplomat informed him that he had been selected as a “liaison representative” between the group and the U.S. administration.

To be continued…

We continue tomorrow: Why did America designate only three Brotherhood branches?

Paris: 5:00 p.m. Cairo time.