At five in the afternoon, Cairo time (53).. Arab National Security (8–10)

Files Not Yet Closed..

When Transnational Organizations Were Used as Instruments of Penetration..

 

Preface:

The crises of the Arab world were not, in their essence, the product of chronic weakness or structural incapacity as much as they were the result of accumulated strategic misunderstanding;

a misunderstanding of the nature of the conflict, the limits of alliances, the roles of regional and international actors, and even of the Arab self itself.

 

Over many long years, Arab states fought their battles separately,

with divergent priorities,

non-convergent visions,

and, in many instances, under the pressure of urgency rather than the logic of planning.

 

Legitimate differences became entangled with exhausting disputes,

miscalculation turned into political gaps,

and these gaps were then exploited, internally and externally, to redraw the balance of power in the region… at the Arabs’ expense.

 

This series is not written in the spirit of belated review, nor with the logic of justifying positions,

nor with the aim of scoring points in fleeting polemics.

Rather, it is written from a single central question:

How did we move from strategic misunderstanding to a moment in which rebuilding Arab power balances has become imperative?

 

Here, we attempt to dismantle what occurred:

• How did certain Arab disagreements turn into instruments of attrition?

• How were transnational organizations used as tools of penetration?

• How were the roles of regional powers misjudged—sometimes inflated, at other times underestimated?

• And how did coordination disappear at moments when convergence was a necessity rather than a choice?

 

Conversely, we pose questions about the future, not the past:

• What must not be repeated?

• What is the minimum achievable level of Arab consensus?

• And how can we move from crisis management to the construction of balances?

 

Rebuilding Arab power balances does not mean reviving old slogans or summoning illusions of comprehensive unity.

Rather, it means—simply and realistically—redefining interests, calibrating priorities, and establishing rational partnerships among major Arab states;

partnerships capable of protecting their national security, safeguarding their decision-making, and preventing others from shaping their future on their behalf.

 

This is not a testimony about the past,

but an attempt to understand it…

so that it is not reproduced.

 

From Divergence of Vision to a Crisis of Understanding:

The crises of the Arab system did not begin with a moment of direct confrontation, nor with a single erroneous decision.

They began with the slow accumulation of strategic misunderstanding, as priorities became confused, threat positions shifted, and natural differences among states turned into political gaps exploited from outside before within.

 

At major turning points, states are not measured by the slogans they possess,

but by their ability to identify the real enemy, rank risks, and build alliances on the basis of interests rather than emotions.

Here, precisely, the Arab mind stumbled.

 

Clashing Assessments:

Differences among states are not a flaw;

they are often a sign of political health.

Danger begins, however, when difference turns into misreading and mutual miscalculation—when national positions are interpreted through the lens of suspicion,

and sovereign policies are measured by non-sovereign standards.

 

At this moment, disagreement is no longer over means,

but becomes a disagreement over the diagnosis of the threat itself:

What constitutes the principal danger?

What can be contained?

And what must not be engaged with at all?

 

Here, precisely, Arab divisions began to assume a dangerously strategic character.

 

Transnational Organizations… When Some Err in Defining Them:

One of the most dangerous aspects of strategic misunderstanding was the handling of transnational organizations

not as instruments of penetration,

but as political forces that could be employed.

 

This error was not theoretical but practical—and costly.

An organization that does not recognize the state,

does not believe in borders,

and sees the homeland only as a station,

cannot be a partner in building stability.

Rather, sooner or later, it becomes an instrument of destruction—even for those who believed they were using it.

 

When Arab states differed in defining this threat—specifically the threat posed by the international organization of the Muslim Brotherhood—the dispute ceased to be moral and became eminently strategic.

 

Inflating Roles… and Ignoring Facts:

Conversely, the roles of other regional powers were misjudged—either by downplaying their danger for the sake of maneuvering,

or by inflating them out of fear.

In both cases, the realistic approach that weighs interests with a cool balance was absent.

 

Politics is not managed through reactions,

nor through temporary bets,

but through long-term readings of trajectories of influence, limits of confrontation, and the cost of concessions.

When this logic was absent,

the region turned into an open arena for redistributing roles… without Arab participation.

 

How Was Misunderstanding Exploited?

External actors did not need to impose their schemes by force;

it sufficed for them to invest in existing contradictions.

Every Arab gap was an opportunity,

every unmanaged dispute an entry point,

and every silence a space for expansion.

 

Thus, new power balances were not forged only in closed rooms,

but also in the voids the Arabs themselves left behind,

when they failed to build a minimum understanding of what was existential… and what was open to disagreement.

 

Where To?

Acknowledging strategic misunderstanding does not mean self-flagellation;

it is the first condition for course correction.

Rebuilding Arab power balances does not begin with cosmetic alliances,

nor with rhetorical summits,

but with a candid answer to a question that is both simple and complex:

What do we truly disagree over?

And what must never be subject to disagreement?

 

The Brotherhood as a Political Tool in the Hands of Some:

Among the most costly errors in the contemporary Arab experience was the dangerous conflation of political tactics with ideological structure,

between what can be temporarily employed

and what cannot be structurally controlled.

 

An ideological organization—the Muslim Brotherhood as an example—does not operate with the logic of the state,

does not move with the mindset of partnership,

and does not stop at the limits of national interests.

Rather, it proceeds from a firm conviction that it possesses an “alternative project,”

and that the state—any state—is merely a temporary phase on the path of that project.

 

From the Illusion of Containment to the Reality of Penetration:

At one point, some believed that this type of organization could be contained, domesticated,

or used as a pressure card against other adversaries.

Experience, however, proved that what appeared to be containment was, in essence, deferred penetration;

that those who thought themselves players

gradually turned into arenas of action and counter-action.

 

Entities that do not recognize the legitimacy of the nation-state, do not believe in the concept of sovereignty,

and view society merely as a reservoir for mobilization,

cannot abide by the rules of the political game,

even if they temporarily wear its mask.

 

Why Did Miscalculation Occur?

The error was not only in intentions,

but in diagnosing the nature of the organization itself.

It was treated as a normal political actor,

when in reality it is a closed doctrinal organization

that operates on the logic of obedience and submission,

and prioritizes organizational loyalty over any other affiliation.

 

Here, the rupture occurred between the security reading and the political reading:

the former perceived the structural danger,

while the latter wagered on pragmatism.

The result was that everyone paid the price of this contradiction.

 

From Tool to Burden:

Over time, the organization ceased to be a pressure card

and turned into a regional burden:

• A security burden, because it continuously generates tension.

• A political burden, because it disrupts relations among states.

• An international burden, because it is invoked as evidence of “state failure,” not of strength.

 

More dangerously,

it became a ready pretext for external intervention—

sometimes under the slogan of protecting democracy,

and at other times under the banner of combating extremism.

 

Thus, the question was no longer:

How do we use the organization?

But rather:

How do we manage the cost of its existence?

 

When Ideology Collides with the Logic of the State:

The state seeks stability,

while the ideological organization thrives on tension.

The state builds institutions,

while the organization builds parallel networks.

The state accumulates expertise,

while the organization accumulates loyalties.

 

This contradiction cannot be resolved through political settlements,

because it is not a dispute over a program,

but a struggle over reference and legitimacy.

 

The Lesson That Came Too Late:

What was slow to be realized is that the ideological organization is not used—it uses.

It is not contained—it expands.

It does not negotiate from a position of parity, but from a position of waiting.

 

When those who bet on it finally discover this,

they have already lost time, destabilized the internal front,

and opened doors that are difficult to close.

 

A Prelude to What Is More Dangerous:

If misunderstanding ideological organizations has cost the Arabs dearly,

misjudging the roles of regional powers has cost them even more—

because the error here was not only internal,

but in reading the balances of the external arena.

 

In the next installment, we move to a file no less complex:

where regional powers were misjudged…

and between underestimation and exaggeration, the Arab compass was lost.

 

We continue tomorrow..

Paris: five o’clock in the afternoon, Cairo time.