At five in the afternoon, Cairo time (59).. The Muslim Brotherhood and America (11–11)

Why were only the branches in Egypt, Jordan, and Lebanon designated… while the “U.S. branch” was left undesignated?

In March 2006, a joint study by researchers at the Carnegie Endowment and the Herbert Quandt Foundation, titled “The Grey Zones: Islamist Movements and the Democratic Process in the Arab World,” concluded that engagement with Islamic organizations—especially reformist wings—was the “constructive” option available to those who believe that promoting democracy in the Middle East serves everyone’s interests.

The researchers based their conclusion on two assumptions:

1.    Democratic/liberal transformation cannot be encouraged without the growing influence of Islamic movements in most Arab countries.

2.    Democracy assistance (training or funding for secular parties and civil society organizations) will not change this reality because of those parties’ weakness and lack of popularity on the Arab street.

At the same time, the study acknowledged the existence of “grey zones” in the thought and positions of Islamic movements that cannot be resolved soon. It argued that clarifying these ambiguities would determine whether their rise would lead to democracy or to a new form of authoritarianism. It identified six such issues: Sharia, violence, pluralism, civil and political rights, women’s rights, and religious minorities.

Critical Notes

At the time, I published a response to that study through the International Center for Studies, recording preliminary observations:

First: The study did not identify the real causes behind the rise of political Islam. It relied solely on electoral voting as a criterion, ignoring phenomena such as the silent majority, protest voting, and vote fragmentation—factors that played a role in the success of many Brotherhood candidates in Egypt in 2005.

Second: The grey zones mentioned in the study—including positions on women, peaceful transfer of power, and violence—were not discussed through the group’s official documents. Instead, the researchers relied on a form of superficial questioning to which the group responded using its well-known method of taqiyya (dissimulation).

Third: Strengthening democratic civil society should take precedence over embarking on an ill-calculated gamble of supporting a religious current merely because of promises to abandon its vision on certain contentious issues in favor of a vision it does not truly believe in.

At that time, I presented the Wasat Party model as evidence of how the group deals with those who differ with it or seek to establish parties aligned with democratic principles—even if only formally.

The Wasat Party Model

The crisis surrounding the Wasat Party—whose establishment was announced in 1996—provided a revealing model of the group’s commitment to democratic principles. The party’s founders presented a program of comprehensive review of the Brotherhood’s policies, including reassessments of its history, movement, and thought.

This included reviewing:

• The errors of the “Special Organization”
• The confrontation with Nasser
• The legitimacy of the group’s return in the 1970s
• The method of selecting the Supreme Guide
• The monopolization of decision-making by members of the Special Organization
• The squandering of Sadat’s offer to establish a political party

In the organizational review, they called for defining the organizational structure, arguing that it is impermissible to combine a preaching movement and a political party within a single organization. The former belongs to the nation and serves as an honest adviser; the latter competes with political forces.

In the intellectual review, they called for reassessing the group’s views—and those of its thinkers—on women, “ignorant” society, the use of force for change, citizenship, pluralism, the concept of authority, acceptance of the other, democracy, and Islamic reference.

The result was the expulsion of these young members, warnings against dealing with them, and the withdrawal of authorizations. Abu al-Ela Madi, the party’s founder at the time and one of the Brotherhood’s key figures in professional syndicates, summarized the crisis by saying:

We were gathering the youth… while they were recruiting them… to entrench the principle of hearing and obedience.

From this, the narrative concluded that the idea of “two currents within the group—one reformist and the other conservative—and that the United States could rely on the reformist current” is nothing more than an illusion in the minds of those who produced the study. The group’s philosophy is one: hearing and obedience; whoever objects has no place within it.

Analytical Conclusion

Why were only the branches in Egypt, Jordan, and Lebanon designated… while the “U.S. branch” was left undesignated?

If Washington placed the Brotherhood’s branches in Egypt, Jordan, and Lebanon on terrorism lists while ignoring the Brotherhood organization’s “U.S. branch,” the question cannot be understood apart from the nature of the American decision itself—a decision not always based on “texts of ideas” as much as on the organization’s “functions” within maps of conflict and interest.

First: The logic of “hot arenas”
The three branches mentioned (Egypt/Jordan/Lebanon) lie at the heart of direct contact zones with regional conflict: the files of Palestine, Gaza, borders, Jerusalem, refugees, and the political and security pressure corridors surrounding Israel. In these arenas, organizations become instruments of influence—mobilization, societal legitimacy, funding networks, and rhetoric capable of moving the street. Thus, designation becomes a political-security tool to close avenues of movement, funding, or legitimacy at specific points.

Second: U.S. domestic calculations
The “U.S. branch”—that is, networks and organizations operating within the United States—is treated differently for legal and domestic political reasons. Many operate through civil frameworks, associations, and entities bearing religious or rights-based titles. Launching a comprehensive designation battle inside the United States would create higher legal, media, and political costs and would require judicial files and evidentiary standards of greater complexity—especially when activities intersect with constitutionally protected freedoms of association and expression.

Third: The logic of “management,” not “rupture”
The history of the relationship—as presented in previous installments—indicates that Washington has often preferred managing its relationship with the Brotherhood rather than severing it, viewing it as channels through which public sentiment can be understood, anger contained, or messages conveyed. This does not imply exoneration; rather, it reflects a state’s tendency to keep a “channel” open so long as it does not become a direct threat domestically.

Fourth: The Iranian–Israeli conflict… and the Brotherhood’s place in the equation
During periods of intensified Iranian–Israeli confrontation in the Middle East, Washington’s priorities shift. What matters is limiting any network that could increase pressure on Israel, expand zones of tension around it, or create socially combustible environments in frontline states. Here, designation becomes a tool for regulating the arenas closest to the lines of fire, while internal networks—so long as they remain within the law—are left as spaces for monitoring, management, and containment rather than elimination.

The designation was not a comprehensive judgment on the idea of the “Muslim Brotherhood” as such, but rather a selective choice of specific arenas where the organization becomes a pressure instrument in a complex regional conflict—one in which the Palestinian issue intersects with Israeli calculations and with the broader confrontation involving Iran, its proxies, and its corridors of influence.

The “U.S. branch” remained undesignated because the cost of targeting it within the American domestic arena is higher, and because Washington has historically maintained spaces for engagement, monitoring, and containment, so long as it has not become a direct threat and so long as the possibilities for utilizing the organization remain.

Paris: Five p.m., Cairo time.