The Swedish far right is back
Trying to define a nation’s self-image is always an
interesting exercise, especially if one tries to boil it down to a single word.
What would that be for Britain? Independence, perhaps.
For Sweden, there can only be one word: goodness. We
aren’t looking quite as good as we would like to right now, though. Neo-Nazis
march through the streets, not many but highly visible, trying to influence the
political scene through threats and violence.
In recent years Roma, black people, Muslims, and
pupils and teachers in a school, have all been targeted by killers driven by
extreme rightwing ideology in a country where the Swedish Democrats,
(Sverigedemokraterna) strongly influenced by the idea of keeping different
cultures apart – as well as the idea of ethnicity as the basis for nationhood –
are the third largest party.
And a survey
published earlier this month shows that Sweden has one of the worst attitudes
to immigration in Europe.
Yet we Swedes like to think of ourselves as good
people. We like to believe that our politics are good for the rest of the
world, and that if only the world acknowledged this rather obvious fact it
would most certainly become a better place.
After all,
goodness is a pretty positive thing. Except in recent years it has become clear
that the idea of the “good Swedes” has actually enabled the rise of rightwing
populists.
I first noticed the tendency in 2011, when I
published a nonfiction book about a Jewish boy sent to Sweden from Vienna in
1939 to escape Nazi persecution. When meeting my readers I often got the same
reaction: “I don’t recognise my country. Is this really Sweden?” they asked, on
hearing that after Kristallnacht, Sweden demanded that the Nazis stamp the
letter J in red ink on the passports of German Jews to make it easier for the
Swedish authorities to turn them away at the border.
Or the fact
that in 1939, a rumour that the medical board was inviting Jewish doctors to
Sweden triggered mass protests at its top universities, with students demanding
a stop to the “Jewish invasion” in order to “save the race” (and the jobs).
My readers seemed unaware of the full extent of
Swedish complicity with Nazi Germany during the war. This is one reason that I
have returned to the subject in my latest book – revealing how, from July 1940
to November 1941, a total of 686,000 German soldiers travelled by train through
Sweden to occupied Norway, and how, in spite of the best efforts of the Allies,
Sweden had covertly continued to export ball-bearings to Nazi Germany, making
an important contribution to rearmament.
Our historical narrative of goodness doesn’t deal
with these things. Instead, it begins in October 1943, when more than 7,000
Danish Jews were taken to Sweden in fishing boats (the boat owners were
handsomely paid in many cases) in order to escape deportation. It includes the
Swedish diplomat Raoul Wallenberg, who, in 1944, saved Hungarian Jews in
Budapest from being deported – although the initiative and the funding was in
fact American.
And we are proud of the fact that in 1945, we sent
buses to pick up concentration camp survivors, except what is repeatedly
described as a Swedish initiative was actually a joint Nordic action intended
to repatriate imprisoned Scandinavians.
So why the great Swedish belief in our own altruism?
It’s fair to say that after the war there was an undefinable, often denied,
sense of guilt trickling through society. When Denmark and Norway were
occupied, Sweden was not.
When the rest of Europe was reduced to ruins, Sweden
steamed ahead in the construction of a welfare society. And – most important of
all – when Denmark and Norway had their postwar legal and moral purges dealing
with collaborators and local Nazis, Sweden did nothing of the kind.
No self-examination
or moral debate took place. Those who had sympathised with Hitler simply went
silent, and continued their lives as if nothing had happened.
In Sweden and elsewhere after 1945, it was assumed
that the ideologies behind the war – Nazism and hatred of Jews – disappeared as
a consequence of the Nazi defeat.
New moral ideas were expressed in the Nuremberg Code
on medical experimentation and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
But even as the slogan of “Never Again” became
ubiquitous, it is under-acknowledged that ideologies of hatred were also
growing, and in many cases becoming more complex and internationalised.
One man was particularly instrumental in the
survival of Nazi ideologies: the Swedish fascist leader Per Engdahl – who
counted the Ikea founder, Ingvar Kamprad, as a friend and fan. Engdahl
initiated a secret intellectual network, with the aim of retaining and
reconstructing Nazi ideology.
Within it, the denial of the Holocaust was nurtured,
the Wehrmacht was whitewashed, and the word “race” was exchanged for the word
“culture”. The concept of ethnopluralism was created – an idea of separate,
independent cultures living side by side but not mixing in order to avoid
extinction. His postwar actions remain key to the rise of the far right today.
In 1951, Engdahl founded the European Social
Movement, also known as the Malmö Movement, after his hometown of Malmö, where
about 40 Nazi and fascist groups in Europe connected. Among them were Oswald
Mosley’s Union Movement and German old-school Nazis as well as MSI (the heirs
of Mussolini’s forbidden party) and the successors to the Hungarian Arrow Cross
party. They all shared a vision of a new “restored” Europe, a white bastion
with neither “foreign elements” nor democracy.
The movement started a magazine called Nation
Europa, which in 1952 British intelligence described as “having all the
appearances of being the most dangerous piece of neofascist propaganda put out
since the war”.
It wasn’t until 1979 that Engdahl seized his moment
to take his ideals mainstream in Sweden, with a call to arms in his fascist
paper Vägen Framåt (The Way Ahead) and the launch of Keep Sweden Swedish (BSS),
in collaboration with the Nazi party Nordiska Rikspartiet.
Modelled on the British National Front, BSS acted as
a launchpad for extreme rightwing groups. In 1988 some members broke away to
form the Swedish Democrats, whose leadership consisted of a Swedish SS veteran,
people from Engdahl’s movement, and postwar Nazis. Since then, the leadership
has changed, and so has the rhetoric and party image, but the concept of
ethnopluralism is still detectable. And in the 2018 parliament election, 17.5%
of Swedish voters chose them.
Arguably the Swedish need to believe that all Swedes
are good has made the rise of the far right possible. Instead of examining
itself during the postwar years, Sweden chose to focus on the good deeds done
during the war, turning a blind eye to the residual Nazi sympathisers within
the country (especially within the well-educated middle class and the upper
class) and widespread antisemitic sentiments in Swedish prewar society. One
Swedish newspaper response to an outbreak of worldwide Nazi graffiti in 1960
epitomised this smugness: “Racial hatred has never rooted itself in our
country. That is why we are happier than others.”
The concept of Swedish goodness denied the existence
of antisemitism, racism, Islamophobia and even sexism. It also precluded
introspection. And, of course, as the most recent elections showed, it was all
a bit too good to be true. Only when Sweden stops being blind to its Nazi past
will it be able to confront the threat posed by the rise of the far right
today.