Fertile environment for terrorism in Iraq points to second coming of ISIS
Former Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi announced in
October 2017 the defeat of ISIS in Iraq, the liberation of lands from ISIS
control, and the pursuit of the group’s remaining elements against the backdrop
of the campaign launched by Iraqi forces, backed by the international coalition
forces, to combat terrorism in Iraq. However, there is a growing expectation
recently that the organization has resumed its activity, especially after the
outbreak of the Iraqi uprising in October 2019, as well as the inability of
political forces to achieve the people’s economic and social demands or to end
the deep-rooted state of sectarianism that contributes to deepening the divide
between the various components of society, as the Iraqi government has become a
major tool to support Iranian influence in Iraq since the fall of Saddam
Hussein's regime after the US invasion. Additionally, the outbreak of
confrontations between the United States and Iran in Iraq following the killing
of Quds Force commander Qassem Soleimani on January 3 has worsened the
situation in the country. These factors have formed a fertile environment for
the possible return of the terrorist organization to the Iraqi scene after a
temporary period of latency.
Multiple indications
There are various
indications that reflect the trend of ISIS seeking to restore its activity in
Iraq.
1- Scattered
operations: ISIS’s scattered operations recently reflect the organization’s
effort to return to the Iraqi scene. Most prominent were those operations carried
out during the Iraqi demonstrations that erupted in a number of Iraqi squares
and streets to demand the overthrow of the current political elite. In early
February, the organization launched two attacks in the provinces of Diyala and
Salahuddin, killing four members of the Iranian-backed Popular Mobilization
Forces (PMF).
2- Sub-organizations
following in ISIS’s footsteps: Since the defeat of ISIS and the
announcement of the end of its alleged caliphate in Iraq and Syria, the
organization's militants began forming small sub-organizations in the regions
where they remained. For example, the White Flags group appeared in Iraq in
September 2017. Brigadier General Yahya Rasul, spokesman for the Joint
Operations Command in Iraq, stated in February 2018 that the White Flags is
mainly made up of ISIS elements who fled battles launched by the Iraqi army.
The group cuts off roads and smuggles weapons and oil.
3- International
warnings against ISIS’s return: US Major General Alexus Grynkewich, deputy
commander of the international coalition fighting ISIS in Iraq and Syria,
warned at the end of January of the possibility of ISIS returning, despite
having been weakened, if US forces withdrew from Iraq. In the same context, UN
Undersecretary for Counter-Terrorism Vladimir Voronkov announced in early
February that ISIS currently has between 20,000 and 27,000 foreign fighters in
Syria and Iraq, and they represent a threat.
4- Expectations
of new terrorist operations: The Washington Post warned at the end of
December 2019 that ISIS is seeking to reassert its presence in the areas it
lost in Syria and Iraq. The newspaper quoted US and Kurdish officials as saying
that hundreds and possibly thousands of ISIS operatives made their way to area
with low population density, extending along the disputed borders between the
Kurdistan Region and Iraq, where there is the largest number of ISIS fighters
gathered since they lost control of their last strongholds in Iraq.
Various factors
According to observers,
there are various factors that make the environment suitable for the
organization to possibly regain strength in Iraq.
1- Political
division in Iraq: The political division in Iraq since the outbreak of the
uprising constitutes an environment conducive to the return of ISIS, especially
since Iraqi political forces are unable to end the state of political division.
Most notably was the recent failure of Prime Minister Mohammed Allawi to form
the new government after former Prime Minister Adel Abdul Mahdi resigned as one
of the demands of the Iraqi demonstrators.
2- Sectarianism
and Iranian penetration: Deep-rooted sectarianism is one of the main
sources of the political and security instability in Iraq. This sectarianism is
employed by Iran, which seeks to install the pillars of its project in the
countries of the region by exporting its revolution as an international
Islamist model led by Iran’s Supreme Leader, as well as to attract non-Iranian
Shiites. This has happened in Syria, Iraq, Lebanon and Yemen, in what has
become known as the Shiite Crescent. This is the most important variable
responsible for the state of chaos in Iraq, as the recruitment of terrorist
organizations has contributed to the power struggles and the domination of the
political decisions in Iraq. At the forefront of these organizations is the
mainly Shiite PMF.
3- International
and regional conflict in Iraq: The killing of Qassem Soleimani in a US
operation represented the embodiment of the international and regional conflict
in Iraq, especially since the operation came in the context of the conflict
between the United States and Iran. On January 5, the Iraqi parliament
requested the Iraqi government cancel the request for assistance submitted to
it by the international coalition fighting ISIS due to the end of military
operations in Iraq. The parliament also asked the Iraqi government to work to
end the presence of any foreign forces on Iraqi territory and to prohibit them
from using Iraqi land, water and air for any reason. In contrast to the
previous perception supported by Iran, there is a different view that the
American withdrawal may contribute to aggravating security and help ISIS
return. Former Iraqi Prime Minister Iyad Allawi, head of the Iraqi National
Accord party, warned on January 15 against a repeat of the Syrian scenario in
Iraq in the event of the withdrawal of foreign forces assisting Iraqi forces
confront ISIS.
The bottom line is that
the political and security instability in Iraq, the chaos of the regional and
international competition between Iran and the United States, and the
continuation of popular demonstrations after Mohammed Allawi failed to form a
new government will all be catalysts for the possible return of ISIS to the
Iraqi scene. This will in turn affect the future of nascent democracy and the
peaceful transfer of power in the country.