The Black Corridor: The New Map of Terror in the African Sahel

The Sahel region of Africa is no longer a geographical margin on the map of the continent—it has become the very heart of the security equation in Africa and the world.

From Mali to Burkina Faso and on to Niger stretches the “belt of fire” that Western analyses now call “the Black Corridor”—the dark strip that is redrawing the borders of terrorism and international influence on the continent.

 

Within less than a decade, these three countries have shifted from being Western partners in counterterrorism to open arenas for extremist groups, foremost among them Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and its strongest arm in the region: Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM).

 

This transformation did not occur overnight. It resulted from a chain of coups, shifting power policies, international withdrawals, and internal divisions that left a political and security vacuum—one swiftly filled by armed organizations.

 

When French and UN forces retreated from Mali, extremist groups rushed to fill the gap, as the central state appeared unable to assert its authority and national armies were exhausted by endless wars with no clear end.

 

Today, the map of the Sahel is being redrawn—from northern Mali to the borders of Burkina Faso and Niger—where the contours of a “cross-border emirate of terror” are forming before the world’s eyes, led by JNIM, Al-Qaeda’s most powerful branch in Africa.

 

According to Le Monde, the withdrawal of international forces from Mali “unleashed an unprecedented wave of attacks,” while BBC Africa reports that armed groups now move across the tri-border areas with unmatched freedom, exploiting weak state presence, vast desert expanses, and the collapse of local intelligence systems.

The Washington Post describes the situation as “a silent slide into the abyss,” warning that what was once the “protective belt” of West Africa has now become its “soft underbelly” before the advance of terrorism.

 

On the ground, black flags alternate in control over entire regions—sometimes under Al-Qaeda through JNIM, sometimes under the “Islamic State in the Greater Sahara,” alongside local militias loyal to whoever pays or supplies weapons.

 

Reports by Africa Intelligence and Crisis Group indicate that the number of terrorist attacks in Burkina Faso alone has increased more than fivefold in three years, while the central government has lost control of about 45% of its territory, mostly in the north and east.

 

From Mali: The Beginning

 

In the heart of the Sahara, the first spark was lit.

Since jihadist groups seized northern Mali in 2012, the country has suffered chronic fragmentation despite repeated international interventions.

 

The fall of Mali was not sudden—it crowned years of political and military exhaustion.

A state once seen, until 2012, as one of West Africa’s most stable regimes, became within a decade an open theater for proxy wars, with UN troops, Russian mercenaries, and local jihadists alternating control in a highly complex mix.

 

Le Monde notes that the decisive turning point came with the mid-2024 withdrawal of the UN’s MINUSMA mission, when Malian army positions in the north collapsed within weeks, leaving major cities in the hands of JNIM, which filled the void with astonishing speed.

 

According to Africa Intelligence, the group seized key routes between Gao, Ménaka, and Timbuktu, imposed “transit taxes” on locals, and established Sharia courts to settle disputes—a scene reminiscent of the Taliban’s rule in Kabul before its first fall.

 

JNIM swiftly occupied strategic cities such as Gao, Ménaka, and Timbuktu, setting up checkpoints and tax centers and enforcing what it calls “Sharia,” in an almost full replication of the Taliban model in Afghanistan—but with African features.

 

The Malian army, drained by years of fighting, retreated to the vicinity of the capital Bamako, while JNIM expanded north, center, and east.

Reports by Crisis Group and The Economist indicate that more than 60% of Mali’s territory is now outside government control.

 

The French military operation Barkhane, launched in 2014, failed to eliminate terrorism and ended with Paris’s withdrawal in 2023 under public pressure and rising anti-Western sentiment.

That withdrawal marked a decisive shift: Russian Wagner forces replaced the French but soon found themselves in limited engagements that changed nothing in the state of collapse.

 

According to Reuters, 2024 alone saw more than 2,500 terrorist attacks in Mali—mainly in Mopti, Gao, and Timbuktu. ACLED data confirm that these groups do more than fight: they govern civilians, collect taxes, and control trade and gold routes.

 

In Bamako, the government of Colonel Assimi Goïta promotes a narrative of “liberation from colonialism,” yet it faces an undeniable reality:

The state is crumbling at the edges, and tribal and ethnic loyalties have replaced national allegiance.

 

Reuters notes that the Malian army now depends almost entirely on Wagner for protection of the regime rather than actual combat, while jihadists make tangible advances, recruiting thousands of unemployed youths under slogans of “justice and equality.”

 

Crisis Group reports that these groups operate not only with religious ideology but with pragmatic governance, forging deals with village chiefs and traders, imposing “taxes for protection,” and presenting themselves as substitutes for an absent state.

 

According to The Conversation Africa, the group has succeeded in “turning popular anger over corruption and discrimination into armed ideological loyalty”—a far more dangerous evolution.

 

During the latter half of 2024, JNIM fighters crossed into Burkina Faso and Niger, welcomed by pre-established sleeper cells.

BBC Africa describes this as a “soft transfer of influence,” achieved not by invasions but by gradual infiltration and purchase of local loyalties—creating a regional network that functions without a single command center.

 

By late 2024, Mali had ceased to be merely a failed state; it became the prototype of a new jihadist governance model—more structured and less chaotic than before.

The Washington Post warns that “the group has learned from ISIS’s mistakes in Iraq and Syria, now preferring incremental control to open confrontation with the international community.”

 

Analysts cited by Africa Report now speak of a “post-Mali map” stretching from northern Burkina Faso to Tillabéri in Niger—where Al-Qaeda and ISIS’s most dangerous cells operate across an area larger than France.

With Western forces withdrawing in succession, observers predict that within two years the Sahel could transform into an African version of the “Jihadist Crescent” that once stretched from Afghanistan through Syria and Iraq.

 

Burkina Faso: From Capital to Burning Peripheries

 

In Burkina Faso’s southwest, tragedy repeats itself in more complex form.

Since the 2022 coup, the security system has collapsed and armed groups have expanded deep into the country at an unprecedented pace.

 

Le Monde Afrique calls this “the slow collapse of an entire state before the eyes of the world.”

BBC Africa reports that terrorist attacks have multiplied fivefold in just three years, making Burkina Faso the bloodiest hotspot in the Sahel.

Crisis Group estimates that nearly 45% of its land is outside central control, with armed groups dominating the north, east, and west and using border zones with Mali and Niger as main operational bases.

 

Le Monde describes the situation as “a slow-motion disintegration,” with the capital surrounded on three sides and dozens of villages cut off from all supply and communication routes.

Reuters reports that the number of internally displaced persons has exceeded 2.3 million—among the world’s highest.

 

JNIM follows a “gradual infiltration” strategy—building presence in villages and tribal communities by providing substitutes for state services: security, customary justice, food aid—in exchange for loyalty and obedience.

ISIS in the Greater Sahara, concentrated in the east, seeks to control vital routes with Niger and Mali. The two groups, while competing for influence and resources, share the goal of toppling the state and establishing a “Greater Sahel Emirate.”

 

Africa Intelligence notes that since late 2024, the two organizations have informally divided zones of influence to avoid internal conflict and focus on fighting the Burkinabe army.

 

In response, the government of Captain Ibrahim Traoré has rallied under the slogan of “popular resistance,” recruiting over 50,000 armed volunteers known as “Homeland Defense Forces.”

Yet Reuters observes that most lack training and adequate arms, becoming easy targets—and some later joined jihadist groups after being abandoned without pay or support.

 

The Economist warns that Burkina Faso’s total collapse would open a gateway for terrorism to spread into West Africa’s coastal states—Ivory Coast, Ghana, Togo, and Benin—marking the first expansion from desert to rainforest.

 

Niger: On the Brink of Collapse

 

If Mali has fallen and Burkina Faso is collapsing, Niger now stands on the edge.

Of the three burning states, Niger is the most geopolitically sensitive—both the Sahel’s gateway to North Africa and its last defensive line against jihadist reach to the Mediterranean.

 

Since the July 2023 coup, the impoverished nation has faced a political and security vacuum drawing fire from all directions.

The Economist notes that Niger had been the West’s last effective ally in the Sahel until President Mohamed Bazoum was deposed, ushering in isolation and exposure.

 

With French forces expelled and intelligence cooperation with the U.S. suspended, Russian influence—via Wagner’s rebranded “Africa Corps”—entered gradually under the banner of “supporting security and stability,” while armed groups expanded freely.

 

The Washington Post states that “a coup born in the name of security has birthed greater chaos.”

Reuters adds that the political vacuum in Niamey has become fertile ground for terrorist expansion, especially after Western withdrawals, making the tri-border zone the continent’s most dangerous.

 

Crisis Group reports that JNIM and ISIS-Sahel rapidly extended control over Tillabéri, Tahoua, and Ménaka, while Boko Haram increased attacks along the Chadian border.

Reuters (September 2025) notes a 70% rise in attacks within one year, killing over 1,200 people—soldiers and civilians alike.

Internally displaced persons now number roughly 750,000, mostly from the western regions plagued by ISIS activity.

 

Le Monde Afrique describes Niger’s situation as “erosion of the state from the peripheries toward the center,” warning that continuing ethnic divisions between Tuareg and Fulani could bring total collapse within two years unless political balance is restored.

 

The Black Corridor: From Chaos to Repositioning

 

The vacuum left by French withdrawal has not yet been filled by Russia—but by terrorist groups themselves.

The border zone between Tillabéri and Ménaka now serves as a free corridor between Mali and Niger, while fighters from Burkina Faso have moved southwest into Niger.

BBC Monitoring confirms that armed groups use this area as a “secure triangle” for exchanging weapons, fighters, and funds.

 

ACLED data show that over 60% of Sahel attacks in 2025 occurred within the narrow strip linking Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso—an area barely 15% of the region’s total size.

Western media now call it the “Black Corridor”—the expected epicenter of Africa’s next conflict.

Stretching from northeastern Mali through western Burkina Faso to southwestern Niger, it is the most dangerous terrorist corridor on Earth today.

 

According to International Crisis Group (October 2025), this corridor has evolved from a zone of insecurity into an alternative governance system imposed by JNIM and ISIS-Sahel.

In remote villages, these groups now dispense “local justice,” collect taxes, regulate markets, and prevent livestock theft in exchange for allegiance—replicating northern Mali’s 2012 model before the declaration of “Azawad Emirate.”

 

Le Monde Afrique notes: “The Sahel’s militants are no longer mere rebels; they have become de facto authorities governing daily life across vast territories, functioning as a full shadow state.”

The Guardian calls this shift “the management of chaos,” whereby these groups evolve from assailants to administrators.

ACLED estimates that over 40% of border-zone residents in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger now live entirely outside central government control.

 

Both The Guardian and Crisis Group analyses converge on one conclusion: JNIM has built a “shadow governance network” managing resources, markets, taxation, and courts—making it more than an armed movement; it is a parallel state gaining strength with every official withdrawal.

 

Reuters estimates annual revenues from gold trade alone exceed $150 million, funding arms purchases and recruitment.

The Washington Post notes that Al-Qaeda and ISIS have redistributed roles to avoid direct confrontation: Al-Qaeda dominates populated areas while ISIS controls desert routes.

Africa Intelligence concludes this is not merely terrorist expansion but a “global repositioning of Al-Qaeda and ISIS in the heart of Africa” after their Middle Eastern decline.

 

With its geography bridging the Mediterranean and the continental interior, its wealth of resources, and weak governments, the “Black Corridor” is becoming a strategic launchpad for a new, decentralized “caliphate.”

The Economist Intelligence Unit warns that total collapse of Burkina Faso or Niger would transform the Sahel into an “African Afghanistan,” threatening both North and West Africa while opening space for Russian, Iranian, and Israeli influence amid Western retreat.

 

As repeatedly warned in the Other Bank program on Cairo News Channel, the French withdrawal from the Sahel signaled the start of successive collapses unless regional powers act urgently.

What happened in Mali was not just political failure—it proved that institutional vacuums breed armed, organized, and enduring alternatives.

 

Niger and Burkina Faso now stand at a historic crossroads:

either mass local and regional mobilization to restore control—or surrendering the arena to emerging “parallel powers” with greater endurance and influence.

 

Hence, the documentation, analysis, and warning efforts by media outlets such as ours—and by The Other Bank program—are not a luxury but a regional duty, raising alarms that must be heeded now.

 

After reviewing all analyses, the conclusion is clear:

The total collapse of Niger would open the road for terrorist groups toward Algeria and Libya in the north, Nigeria in the west, and Chad in the east—toward the very heart of the continent.

It would also undermine any future Western presence in the region and grant Russia, Iran, and Israel open influence in a zone no longer governed by global balance.

 

As The Other Bank has often emphasized: what is unfolding in Niger, Burkina Faso, and Mali is not mere domestic upheaval but a redrawing of Africa’s power map—through terrorism instead of armies.

 

The Sahel’s militant groups now move freely across three countries, empowered by arms, gold, and fuel smuggling networks.

The international community fails to grasp that these groups no longer need a declared capital—they have turned the entire map into an open field for a silent, de facto caliphate.

 

Who Is Next to Fall?

 

Based on current indicators—JNIM’s tactics, Niger’s border weakness, Burkina Faso’s economic fragility, and Mali’s precedent—Burkina Faso and Niger are effectively competing for the title of “next state to collapse.”

Yet the indicators point more strongly to Niger.

 

Forecast summary:

 

Short-term (1–3 years): Niger — structural vulnerabilities (open borders, declining foreign partners, inward-focused regime survival) make it the likeliest candidate for broad militant dominance.

 

Medium-term (3–5 years): Burkina Faso — gradual “functional fragmentation” and erosion of central authority will replicate Mali-like enclaves without an immediate national collapse.

 

This does not imply an instant fall of capitals, but a progressive division of governance between armed actors and weakened state institutions.

 

Thus the new African tragedy is summed up in one equation:

Weak states, strong groups, and an international silence watching from afar, as the Sahara becomes a laboratory for reinventing terrorism in a new form.

 

Prepared and analyzed by: Dalia Abdel Rahim

Editor-in-Chief, Al-Bawaba News