The Future of Islamist Parties in Algeria
On November 24, 2017, the Islamist movement in
Algeria suffered a defeat in the country’s election, reflecting and demonstrating
a sharp decline in the popularity of Islamism. The Islamist coalition –
composed of three parties: Front for Justice and Development, Islamic
Renaissance Movement (Ennahda), and National Construction Movement – only won
eight municipalities out of a total of 1,541. The candidates of these parties
did not win membership in any of the forty-eight provincial assemblies of
Algeria.
By contrast, the two ruling parties – represented by
the National Liberation Front (FLN) and the National Rally for Democracy (RND)
(headed by current Prime Minister Ahmed Ouyahia) – were able to win most seats
and municipal councils, with FLN winning 603 municipalities and RND winning 451
municipalities, as reported by Minister of the Interior and Local Governments,
Noureddine Bedoui.
The poor showing of the Islamists is not only
connected to last November’s elections but is also the latest episode in a
sequence that began years ago. The results of the parliamentary elections of
May 2017 were a major disappointment for the Islamist movement, with the
Islamist parties combined only able to win forty-eight out of 462 seats, while
the majority, as usual, gave the ruling parties a comfortable majority of about
261 seats.
Although some Islamist leaders – such as the
Movement of Society Peace (MSP) head, Abdel Magid Menasra – have blamed their
repeated failures on fraud and have questioned the fairness of the electoral
process, other leaders within the same movement have now acknowledged fiasco,
most notably former Ennahda leader, Dr. Fateh Rebiai. On his Facebook page, Dr.
Rebiai advised Islamists, on the eve of the election results, saying, “I hope
that Islamists remove the term ‘election fraud’ from the dictionary of their
rhetoric and reflect carefully on the reasons for failure.” Dr. Rebiai explains
that the Islamist movement must be characterized by political realism and must
listen to “critical voices, not turning a deaf ear to them, as has often
happened, which has led to mass resignations in silence.” He advised Islamist
leaders of the need for a serious and sincere outlook on the causes of the
setbacks.
There are several structural and intellectual
reasons that have contributed to the weakening and decline of the Algerian
branch of Islamism. Among them is the inability of this movement to expand
within the popular classes because parties selectively recruit from among the
educated milieu and, in particular, university students. Likewise, the culture
of the inspired leader in this movement has prevented the emergence of new
leaders within its circles, especially among young members, whose presence in
leadership positions is still very modest.
Young people in particular, since they are more open
and accepting of democratic practices, must be given space rather than be
exploited as a mere fuel for electoral propaganda.
Another cause of Islamist setback is that religious
and ideological rhetoric has dominated the movement’s political discourse,
while it offers no practical solutions to the problems plaguing Algerian
society. Furthermore, the Islamist coalition’s fragmentation in recent years
has sent a negative message about its direction to Algerians. For example, MSP
split into three parties, while Ennahda fragmented into several.
Although Islamists generally reject democratic
practices for ideological considerations, regional and national circumstances
and challenges require them to move beyond their authoritarian model toward
secular parties governed by democratically elected institutions. The experience
of Tunisia’s Ennahda is a role model, with the decision of its leader, Rached
Ghannouchi, to separate its Islamic mission from political and party activity
and to transition to a secular party. Ghannouchi’s decision was not a
coincidence but was reached through intellectual and ideological accumulation
spanning two decades.
In addition, there has been a trend within Islamists
to renounce and distance themselves from politics. During recent years, the
ultra-conservative Salafi movement has emerged powerfully in Algeria. This
movement prohibits most of its sheikhs from participating in elections and
deems contesting the ruler to be religiously impermissible. These Salafists
justify their position by what happened in the Arab Spring countries, and place
responsibility for the violence in these countries on the Muslim Brotherhood,
accusing them of paying protestors to revolt and fight against the rulers. The
Salafi stance has greatly impacted broad sectors of Algerians.
In order for Islamists to have more influence in
Algeria, parties must shake off the grip of religious leaders and transform
into political rather than religious institutions – and do so in more than just
name only. To achieve this, decision-making authority in these parties must be
made subject to elected institutions, not influenced by the dominance of the
inspired leader or the founding sheikh.
There are other reasons contributing to the weakness
of the Islamist movement. These include declining public confidence in the
benefit of the electoral process because of repeated manipulation of results;
bewildering election rules that are tailored to regime-aligned and loyalist
parties; and dominance of political money and corrupt money in the political
scene.
If political Islam does not re-examine current
policies, its future in Algeria will be doomed to disappear. The severe
attrition in the Islamist movement’s base has grown impatient with and lost
confidence in the benefit of political action in its current form. As a result,
a large proportion of Islamists have preferred to refrain from politics and not
to participate in any elections. The silent boycotting majority now includes
wide cross-sections of Islamists, young people, and those who have lost
confidence in the political process – that is to say, the ruling party that
wins every election. This is confirmed by the numbers in the last election, where
the proportion of boycotters exceeded 55 percent.
Correspondingly, many of the supporters of Islamist
parties have joined the ruling parties directly or have established new
parties, such as the former MSP leader, Amar Ghoul, who split off from his party
and founded a new party called Rally of Algerian Hope, which became a strong
supporter of President Bouteflika.
Moreover, Islamist supporters reject any clash with
the regime, and the declining popularity of these parties poses no consequences
for the relationship of their members with jihadist organizations. The
experience of the armed Islamist violence of the Islamic Salvation Front
against Algerians during the 1990s and against Arab peoples now, such as in
Egypt and Syria, only increases this conviction.
In order for Islamist movement to succeed, there
must be a change in the structure and focus of political parties. The new,
secular discourse must then be directed to addressing Algerians and convincing
them that Islamist parties are putting forward solutions to the economic and
societal problems that threaten Algeria’s security and stability. If Islamist
parties do not initiate deep reconsideration of their policies and their
immediate and strategic options, the latest election results will be the
beginning of the end, as predicted by the former Minister of Health and current
leader of the Algerian Popular Movement party, Amara Benyounes.