Issued by CEMO Center - Paris
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The political entrenchment: Will Ennahda Movement re-intrudes on the Tunisian scene?

Wednesday 04/April/2018 - 07:14 PM
The Reference
Abul-Fadl Al-Isnawi
طباعة

Two months before the local elections in Tunisia scheduled for early May, the Islamic Renaissance movement (Ennahda Movement) has re-emerged as a candidate for 100% of the municipal lists with 350 lists, surpassing the Nidaa Tounes Party (Tunisia's Call), which was followed by number of candidates.

Not only did the Nahdha movement control the candidacies of local councils, but it nominated a Jewish Tunisian citizen in one of its lists to assure its observers the practical application of the concept of self-criticism in relation to the state and the government announced at its tenth conference.

The rapid changes by the movement - included the signing of Carthage Document, which represents the political framework, which it brings together with its other partners in government - have made some of them call it false changes.

Several questions looming after the Compulsion intention of Ennahda Movement since its takeover of the parliament's main and special committees. It controls the committees because of the splits of Nidaa Tounes Party in March 2017.

Perhaps the most important questions are: What does Nahdha Movement, which has Islamic reference, want in the coming period? Is the obvious Compulsion in its candidate in the local elections expressing a desire for political intrusion, especially after being in the top of the represented parties in parliament? How do the crises effect on that dream? Is the Renaissance project still a threat to a civil state like Tunisia? And thus cannot be reassured, even after recent reviews in which separated between Dawah (preaching of Islam) and politics.

- Past Reality:

The political mound is a general principle used by the political Islamism movements when they take over the power. In considering Ennahda movement – one of the Muslim Brotherhood branches- is a social-political group with an Islamic program rather than a religious group, this is according to Hassan al-Banna's writings, as well as Sayyid Qutb's writings.  

Ennahda movement seeks to reap its old gains, a full appropriating of power after the Tunisian revolution in 2011, as soon as its acquisition the power in that period; it removed all senior administrative cadres in the institutions of the state.

 Ennahda movement dissolved all the political institutions that were running the affairs of the country (the House of Representatives, the Council of Counselors, the Constitutional and the Constitution Councils).

Before the local elections for about a year, since the splits of the President Béji Sibsi's party, (Nidaa Tounes) in March 2017, Ennahda has been exploiting the political conditions to overcome its dilemma in 2014 elections by reorganizing itself to sweep the political scene again and re-intrude as in 2011.  

The past reality feared by the political forces - despite the reassurance included in the movement's statement at its tenth conference – represented in the exploitation of its leadership to the government; in order to give its supporters the most of the higher governmental positions.

Ennahda’s followers were placed at the head of the provinces and municipalities and facilitated the influx of thousands of sympathizers within the local administrative bodies to create a network of loyalties exploited politically.  

Ennahda provided the political cover for the emergence of terrorist groups, as it released dozens of prisoners arrested on charges of preparing for terrorist operations in Tunisia, and turned a blind eye to the activities of the Salafi Jihad movements without monitoring or accountability.  

-The Political penetrating:   

Ennahda Movement recognizes the importance of the upcoming municipal elections as the first local elections to be held after the Tunisian Revolution. It also recognizes the Tunisian Constitution affirming the importance of this election and its role in article 132.

The municipal administrations enjoy administrative and financial autonomy according to the constitution. The upcoming municipal elections will take part on re-structure the political scene, and the identification of the involved parties, which participate in the upcoming parliamentary and presidential elections.  

All the previous considerations have made it run in all electoral districts, with 350 electoral lists, becoming in the first rank among the contenders.

The political predominance of Ennahda in the Tunisian political life represented as follows:

1.    The predominance of the Tunisian People's Assembly (parliament) after the re-distribution of the offices of the legislative and special committees in April 2016.

The new balance of power after the decline of "Nidaa Tounes" leaded to the control of the Islamic Ennahda Movement on the presidency of three legislative committees, the industry, energy and mineral wealth and the Commission on Agriculture and Food Security, Trade and Related Services, in addition to the Committee on the Rules and Immunity, the Parliamentary Laws and the Electoral Laws.  

As for the special committees, Ennahda Islamic Bloc headed three committees, as opposed to two of the President's Party.

The movement not only dominated on the parliament but also expanded to include the members of these committees.

It had 7 members in each committee, including 3 vice-presidents, and it is possible to say with these divisions the movements complete the hegemony and returning to power.

2.    The movement decided on the municipal elections early in September 2017, before the opening of the candidacy, and explicitly declaring no alliance with any political party, and participating individually in municipal elections and in all constituencies, exploiting civil parties' preoccupation with their internal differences.  "The movement chose to run municipal elections with open lists to all Tunisians and will participate in all constituencies," Abdel Hamid al-Jalasi, a member of the movement's Shura Council in May 2017 said. He said this was the movement option.

3.    Preparedness and evasion to win the will of the electorate. The movement's pre-election is to hold municipal elections by holding its tenth congress and announcing its separation between the political and Dawah (preaching of Islam) -In addition to its signing of the Carthage Document, and its Executive Office invites the government to meet with the parties and organizations which sign the document; to study the current conditions of the country, and find the solutions and actions necessary to interact with the social demands of the Tunisian- exploitation and an open attempt to save its electoral popularity; as the movement lost nearly half a million voters, between the elections of 2011 and 2014.

4.    Announcing in its tenth conference to ease the conditions of its membership; to get out of from the closed ideological party and the legacy of clandestine work - makes it appear to be one of the most parties in the Tunisian arena ready for local and municipal elections. Although the religious authority in the political work is still continuing in the movement - It runs the municipal process ideologically, such as the rejection of some of its local leadership of loans - it promotes itself before the municipal elections, as it is not an Islamic movement, but a party of Muslim Democrats.

- Serious Developments:

Several crises have begun to confront the movement since February 2018. It almost breaks its political dream of controlling the municipal, parliamentary and the presidential elections. The most important crises these may affect the results of the municipal elections and overthrow its political project if it does not obtain a majority Seats - in the following:

- The first crisis, linked to what raised by the MP Munther Belhadj, on Ennahda movement reception bank check from the account of Prince of Qatar in 2012, as compensation for the victims of tyranny, according to Tunisian newspapers, where the charges represented at this time a major blow to the movement, before running the municipal elections, in addition to the movement’s silence on this issue, and the absence of an official statement containing a response to these accusations - the statements of Ali al-Arayed, Assistant Secretary-General of the movement, in which he accused internal and external parties of conspiring against Tunisia, and try to inflame the situation, disrupting the political scene and preventing municipal elections - reflects the state of internal confusion may be unpredictable consequences.

-          The second crisis, is in what is known among the Tunisians as "the sedition of the Jews", which broke out among the sons of the Ennahda Movement; as a result of the nomination of a Jew on its local lists, Ennahda has been trying since its tenth conference to do any acts indicating its new face, and the credibility of its separation between Dawah and politics, its metamorphosis from the religious ideology, and the appearance as a Liberal Party, but instead of being helped by the move to fix the openness image, to attract new voters to control those elections – but the movement faced an internal crisis was not taken into account, caused a state of anger within Ranks. In addition, the movement's candidacy for a Jew was also reflected negatively on its external image; it received a scathing attack and accusations that it was trying to exploit the Jews for political gain; to control the scene inside Tunisia.

-          The third crisis was tightening the noose of the movement and accusing it of having links to terrorist organizations and regimes. A number of politicians and experts, in line with the decision of the European Parliament to list Tunisia on the black list of financing terrorism and money laundering, charged Ennahda the responsible of  opening Tunisia to terrorist organizations during the period of its rule; which led to the movement to lose its right, to announce the real face, which tried to cover temporarily at the tenth conference, where its head Rashid Ghannouchi vows to Tunisians with civil war; as he considered who accusing Ennahda movement of killing the politician Shukri Belaid with terrorism, and who criminalize the leaders of Ennahda without judicial condemnation «advocates of exclusion», stressing that this matter «may lead to civil war».

-          The forth crisis was the strong link between the movement Reform Program and the Turkish experience, Even some "Tunisians" described the movement as "Erdoganian". The strong relationship between the movement and AK Party, in addition to frequent visits between the movement's leaders and party leaders, may lead to a possible electoral abstention from its program, which Despite the popular and partisan rejection of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's visit to Tunisia at the end of last year, describing his role as suspect, accusing him of supporting and financing terrorism and of sponsoring the interests of the Muslim Brotherhood and their political project, the movement challenged these partisan and Popular positions, and they issued a statement which angered many, that «Erdogan's visit comes to boost cooperation between Tunisia and Turkey relations, in the framework of the recent continue to support the Tunisian experience».

In the end, there is a growing concern among Tunisian circles about the progress of Ennahda in the municipal elections and the administration of the elections by ideological participation, to the extent that some Tunisians warn that the danger of the project of political Islam in a civil state like Tunisia is still valid. Because of the reviews it had undertaken at its tenth conference.

On the other side, Ennahda is likely to realize the dangers of these crises, and to retreat from some constituencies. It may fear the repercussions of its victory internally and externally, reverting its own experiences or regional experiences, and therefore the movement's fear of the change that may cost it is inevitable. As the sweep of the municipal elections under the fear of them, the failure to manage the country for seven years - is a political suicide because of its inability to unify some of the municipalities in these dire economic conditions that Tunisia is undergoing. It is in the interest of Ennahda to share power to share success or failure.

 

 

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