The political entrenchment: Will Ennahda Movement re-intrudes on the Tunisian scene?
Two months before the local elections in Tunisia
scheduled for early May, the Islamic Renaissance movement (Ennahda Movement)
has re-emerged as a candidate for 100% of the municipal lists with 350 lists,
surpassing the Nidaa Tounes Party (Tunisia's Call), which was followed by
number of candidates.
Not only did the Nahdha movement control the
candidacies of local councils, but it nominated a Jewish Tunisian citizen in
one of its lists to assure its observers the practical application of the
concept of self-criticism in relation to the state and the government announced
at its tenth conference.
The rapid changes by the movement - included the
signing of Carthage Document, which represents the political framework, which
it brings together with its other partners in government - have made some of
them call it false changes.
Several questions looming after
the Compulsion
intention of Ennahda Movement since its takeover of the parliament's main and
special committees. It controls the committees because of the splits of Nidaa
Tounes Party in March 2017.
Perhaps the most important questions are: What does
Nahdha Movement, which has Islamic reference, want in the coming period? Is the
obvious Compulsion in its candidate in the local elections
expressing a desire for political intrusion, especially after being in the top
of the represented parties in parliament? How do the crises effect on that
dream? Is the Renaissance project still a threat to a civil state like Tunisia?
And thus cannot be reassured, even after recent reviews in which separated
between Dawah (preaching of Islam) and politics.
- Past Reality:
The political mound is a general principle used by
the political Islamism movements when they take over the power. In considering
Ennahda movement – one of the Muslim Brotherhood branches- is a
social-political group with an Islamic program rather than a religious group,
this is according to Hassan al-Banna's writings, as well as Sayyid Qutb's
writings.
Ennahda movement seeks to reap its old gains, a full
appropriating of power after the Tunisian revolution in 2011, as soon as its
acquisition
the power in that period; it removed all senior administrative cadres in the
institutions of the state.
Ennahda
movement dissolved all the political institutions that were running the affairs
of the country (the House of Representatives, the Council of Counselors, the
Constitutional and the Constitution Councils).
Before the local elections for about a year, since
the splits of the President Béji Sibsi's party, (Nidaa Tounes) in March 2017, Ennahda
has been exploiting the political conditions to overcome its dilemma in 2014
elections by reorganizing itself to sweep the political scene again and re-intrude
as in 2011.
The past reality feared by the political forces -
despite the reassurance included in the movement's statement at its tenth
conference – represented in the exploitation of its leadership to the
government; in order to give its supporters the most of the higher governmental
positions.
Ennahda’s followers were placed at the head of the
provinces and municipalities and facilitated the influx of thousands of
sympathizers within the local administrative bodies to create a network of
loyalties exploited politically.
Ennahda provided the political cover for the
emergence of terrorist groups, as it released dozens of prisoners arrested on
charges of preparing for terrorist operations in Tunisia, and turned a blind
eye to the activities of the Salafi Jihad movements without monitoring or
accountability.
-The Political penetrating:
Ennahda Movement recognizes the importance of the
upcoming municipal elections as the first local elections to be held after the
Tunisian Revolution. It also recognizes the Tunisian Constitution affirming the
importance of this election and its role in article 132.
The municipal administrations enjoy administrative
and financial autonomy according to the constitution. The upcoming municipal
elections will take part on re-structure the political scene, and the
identification of the involved parties, which participate in the upcoming
parliamentary and presidential elections.
All the previous considerations have made it run in
all electoral districts, with 350 electoral lists, becoming in the first rank
among the contenders.
The political predominance of Ennahda in the
Tunisian political life represented as follows:
1.
The predominance
of the Tunisian People's Assembly (parliament) after the re-distribution of the
offices of the legislative and special committees in April 2016.
The new balance of power after the decline
of "Nidaa Tounes" leaded to the control of the Islamic Ennahda Movement
on the presidency of three legislative committees, the industry, energy and
mineral wealth and the Commission on Agriculture and Food Security, Trade and
Related Services, in addition to the Committee on the Rules and Immunity, the
Parliamentary Laws and the Electoral Laws.
As for the special committees, Ennahda
Islamic Bloc headed three committees, as opposed to two of the President's
Party.
The movement not only dominated on
the parliament but also expanded to include the members of these committees.
It had 7 members in each committee,
including 3 vice-presidents, and it is possible to say with these divisions the
movements complete the hegemony and returning to power.
2.
The movement
decided on the municipal elections early in September 2017, before the opening
of the candidacy, and explicitly declaring no alliance with any political
party, and participating individually in municipal elections and in all
constituencies, exploiting civil parties' preoccupation with their internal
differences. "The movement chose to
run municipal elections with open lists to all Tunisians and will participate
in all constituencies," Abdel Hamid al-Jalasi, a member of the movement's
Shura Council in May 2017 said. He said this was the movement option.
3.
Preparedness and
evasion to win the will of the electorate. The movement's pre-election is to
hold municipal elections by holding its tenth congress and announcing its
separation between the political and Dawah (preaching of Islam) -In addition to
its signing of the Carthage Document, and its Executive Office invites the
government to meet with the parties and organizations which sign the document;
to study the current conditions of the country, and find the solutions and
actions necessary to interact with the social demands of the Tunisian- exploitation
and an open attempt to save its electoral popularity; as the movement lost
nearly half a million voters, between the elections of 2011 and 2014.
4.
Announcing in
its tenth conference to ease the conditions of its membership; to get out of from
the closed ideological party and the legacy of clandestine work - makes it
appear to be one of the most parties in the Tunisian arena ready for local and
municipal elections. Although the religious authority in the political work is
still continuing in the movement - It runs the municipal process ideologically,
such as the rejection of some of its local leadership of loans - it promotes
itself before the municipal elections, as it is not an Islamic movement, but a
party of Muslim Democrats.
- Serious
Developments:
Several crises have
begun to confront the movement since February 2018. It almost breaks its
political dream of controlling the municipal, parliamentary and the
presidential elections. The most important crises these may affect the results
of the municipal elections and overthrow its political project if it does not
obtain a majority Seats - in the following:
- The first crisis,
linked to what raised by the MP Munther Belhadj, on Ennahda movement reception
bank check from the account of Prince of Qatar in 2012, as compensation for the
victims of tyranny, according to Tunisian newspapers, where the charges
represented at this time a major blow to the movement, before running the
municipal elections, in addition to the movement’s silence on this issue, and
the absence of an official statement containing a response to these accusations
- the statements of Ali al-Arayed, Assistant Secretary-General of the movement,
in which he accused internal and external parties of conspiring against
Tunisia, and try to inflame the situation, disrupting the political scene and
preventing municipal elections - reflects the state of internal confusion may
be unpredictable consequences.
-
The second
crisis, is in what is known among the Tunisians as "the sedition of the
Jews", which broke out among the sons of the Ennahda Movement; as a result
of the nomination of a Jew on its local lists, Ennahda has been trying since
its tenth conference to do any acts indicating its new face, and the
credibility of its separation between Dawah and politics, its metamorphosis
from the religious ideology, and the appearance as a Liberal Party, but instead
of being helped by the move to fix the openness image, to attract new voters to
control those elections – but the movement faced an internal crisis was not
taken into account, caused a state of anger within Ranks. In addition, the
movement's candidacy for a Jew was also reflected negatively on its external
image; it received a scathing attack and accusations that it was trying to
exploit the Jews for political gain; to control the scene inside Tunisia.
-
The third crisis
was tightening the noose of the movement and accusing it of having links to
terrorist organizations and regimes. A number of politicians and experts, in
line with the decision of the European Parliament to list Tunisia on the black
list of financing terrorism and money laundering, charged Ennahda the
responsible of opening Tunisia to
terrorist organizations during the period of its rule; which led to the
movement to lose its right, to announce the real face, which tried to cover
temporarily at the tenth conference, where its head Rashid Ghannouchi vows to
Tunisians with civil war; as he considered who accusing Ennahda movement of
killing the politician Shukri Belaid with terrorism, and who criminalize the
leaders of Ennahda without judicial condemnation «advocates of exclusion»,
stressing that this matter «may lead to civil war».
-
The forth crisis
was the strong link between the movement Reform Program and the Turkish
experience, Even some "Tunisians" described the movement as
"Erdoganian". The strong relationship between the movement and
AK
Party, in addition to frequent visits between the movement's leaders and party
leaders, may lead to a possible electoral abstention from its program, which
Despite the popular and partisan rejection of Turkish President Recep Tayyip
Erdoğan's
visit to Tunisia at the end of last year, describing his role as suspect,
accusing him of supporting and financing terrorism and of sponsoring the
interests of the Muslim Brotherhood and their political project, the movement
challenged these partisan and Popular positions, and they issued a statement
which angered many, that «Erdogan's visit comes to boost cooperation between
Tunisia and Turkey relations, in the framework of the recent continue to
support the Tunisian experience».
In the end, there is a
growing concern among Tunisian circles about the progress of Ennahda in the
municipal elections and the administration of the elections by ideological participation,
to the extent that some Tunisians warn that the danger of the project of
political Islam in a civil state like Tunisia is still valid. Because of the
reviews it had undertaken at its tenth conference.
On the other side, Ennahda
is likely to realize the dangers of these crises, and to retreat from some
constituencies. It may fear the repercussions of its victory internally and
externally, reverting its own experiences or regional experiences, and
therefore the movement's fear of the change that may cost it is inevitable. As
the sweep of the municipal elections under the fear of them, the failure to
manage the country for seven years - is a political suicide because of its
inability to unify some of the municipalities in these dire economic conditions
that Tunisia is undergoing. It is in the interest of Ennahda to share power to
share success or failure.