Turkey eyes more opportunities in the Middle East as Qatar’s isolation ends
As Qatar sees the end
of its nearly four-year-long isolation by its Gulf neighbours, Turkey is
considering the opportunities created by the thawing diplomatic relations.
On Monday evening,
Saudi Arabia announced it would reopen its airspace and land border with Qatar
ahead of a Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) summit meeting in the Saudi city of
Al-Ula the following day. Embracing Qatar’s emir on the runway was Crown Prince
Mohammed bin Salman, who was widely blamed for instigating the campaign to
isolate Doha. Later that day, a communiqué was released by the GCC that
underlined a commitment to “confront common challenges”.
Shortly after Riyadh
ended its restrictions against Qatar, Turkey’s Foreign Ministry released a
statement in support of the decision. It went on to praise the mediation
efforts by international actors, particularly Kuwait, for working to end the
dispute between the Gulf nations and expressed hope that the embargo would come
to a complete end.
“Our hope is that this
conflict will be resolved comprehensively and permanently on the basis of
mutual respect for the sovereignty of the countries and that other
sanctions against the
people of Qatar will be
lifted as soon as possible,” read the ministry’s press release on Monday.
For Turkey, Qatar’s
return to the GCC fold in many ways is a victory. After the embargo was
launched in June 2017, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan declared his
support for Doha and the Turkish parliament fast-tracked a deployment of troops
to a base in Qatar. Removing this base was one of 13 demands from Saudi Arabia
and its Arab allies that Qatar refused to comply with.
Even before the
embargo, Qatar and Turkey found common ground in their support for political
Islamist groups tied to the Muslim Brotherhood, as well as a deeper partnership
on security, diplomacy and trade. Now that Doha has emerged intact, it enables
Ankara to more freely chart a fresh diplomatic course in the Middle East.
In the last month, it
has been reported that Turkey was seeking to rebuild relations that frayed in
recent years including with Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Israel.
After nearly coming
to blows over the summer in Libya, Turkey and Egypt have been assisting the
diplomatic process play out between the opposite sides they support in the
war-torn nation. Last week, Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu said that Turkey
maintained intelligence and diplomatic contacts to mend ties, something Erdoğan also insisted he
has “no problem with”.
The Turkish president
has extended similar sentiments to Israel. Hakan Fidan, Turkey’s intelligence
chief, reportedly met with Israeli officials in November, and other Turkish
officials insist they see normalisation with the Jewish state as desirable.
However, it is the
warming relationship between Qatar and Saudi Arabia that is most directly
affected by resolving the diplomatic crisis.
Giorgio Cafiero, the
CEO of geopolitical risk consultancy Gulf State Analytics in Washington D.C,
said that Qatar’s reintegration into the GCC bodes well for Turkey as it seeks
to improve ties with Riyadh.
“Saudi Arabia’s de facto abandonment of the 13 demands from 2017 serves
Turkey’s interests, especially considering that one of the demands was closure
of the Turkish-Qatari military base,” Cafiero said.
“With Turkey wanting
to improve its relationship with Saudi Arabia, the easing of friction in Saudi-Qatari
relations will enable Ankara to pursue a rapprochement with Riyadh without by
default harming the Turkish-Qatari alliance.”
Another reason why
reconciliation within the GCC is important for Turkey is the possibility of
weakening its main regional rival, the United Arab Emirates (UAE).
Although Riyadh and
its crown prince captured much of the blame for isolating Qatar, the embargo
was believed to be orchestrated by Abu Dhabi. Even as Saudi Arabia hinted at a
resolution, the Emiratis at times undercut Riyadh; but they appeared to have
been persuaded to accept the bid to rebuild bridges with Qatar. At the GCC
summit this week, UAE Foreign Minister Anwar Gargash accepted the move but
cautioned “more work needs to be done”.
Turkey and the UAE
have also locked horns in Libya, the eastern Mediterranean, East Africa and
over the Muslim Brotherhood. Hostility towards Ankara is part of what drove the
Emiratis to pursue the Abraham Accords with Israel in September and even seek
normalisation with Syria’s dictator Bashar Assad.
Turkey's support of
Qatar in its hour of need will ensure the partnership’s strength, which can
create complications that the UAE will be cautious of, said Samuel Ramani, a
researcher at Oxford University.
“The Qatari public will have deep distrust for Saudi Arabia and the UAE
for the foreseeable future, and will not forget Turkey’s loyalty to Qatar at a
moment of crisis,” Ramani told Ahval. Between the two however, Riyadh is more
likely to accept the Turkish-Qatari partnership than Abu Dhabi, he said.
“The UAE will continue to view Turkey-Qatar collaboration in Libya and
the Horn of Africa with suspicion.”
Improving relations
within the GCC may not be entirely in Turkey’s favour though. Caroline Rose, a
former Europe and Middle East analyst for the forecasting firm Geopolitical
Futures, warned that any rehabilitation for Qatar carries the risk of isolating
Turkey further, depending on how deeply its relations within the Gulf,
particularly on trade, are restored.
“One of the reasons
Qatar was able to avoid a major economic impact from the blockade was the fact
that Turkey was a willing and eager trade partner,” Rose said
Qatari investments
have helped cushion the Turkish economy in recent years from the contractions
it experienced with a weakening currency. In November, the two signed a raft of
new agreements that saw assets in water administration, defence production, and
the Istanbul stock exchange sold to Qatari investors. Bilateral trade short of
financial investment stands at $1.5 billion, still lower than the nearly $3
billion Doha had with Abu Dhabi before 2017.
Rose said that Qatar will not drift far away from Turkey in favour of renewed ties with its neighbours, but cautioned that it will increase the urgency for Ankara to continue its quest to find additional partners.
“I think that this essentially pressures Turkey to seek new ways around the emerging East Mediterranean Gas Forum-Gulf alliance, which has blossomed as an informal anti-Turkey political coalition,” she said.



