The way out of Somalia’s political impasse

Somalia is in a political crisis. For the first time in the country’s recent history, the four-year mandate of Parliament and the executive has expired without the selection – or election – of a new administration, or an alternative political agreement among stakeholders.
The crisis stemmed from the
deep-rooted trust deficit between the centrifugal and centripetal forces in
Somalia that has been exacerbated in recent years by incumbent President
Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed Farmaajo’s self-centred approach to governance, and
his administration’s failure to effectively manage the complex political
dispensation of the country.
Extreme political polarisation
Besides the Federal Government of
Somalia (FGS) and many opposition groups, there are several other political
forces that are influential over Somalia’s political scene.
Somaliland, one of the two
entities that formed the Somali Republic in 1960, is one such force. Somaliland
unilaterally declared its independence from Somalia in 1991. Since then, it
successfully built its own governmental institutions and held periodic
elections, but failed to gain international recognition. Despite its de-facto
independence, under the tribal-based formula, there are 57 seats in Somalia’s
two-chamber Parliament (17 percent) that are designated to some of the clans from
the region. The candidate who has the backing of these representatives stands a
good chance of being elected the president of Somalia.
Beyond the breakaway region of
Somaliland, Somalia is made out of five federal member states (FMSs) –
Galmudug, Hirshabelle, Jubbaland, Puntland and the South West. Despite
officially being part of the Federal Republic of Somalia and subject to the
authority of the FGS, every single one of these states has its own constitution
and political agenda. Just like Somaliland, these states have significant
influence over how federal elections are held, and how the country is governed.
Most importantly, they all envision Somalia’s future differently and at times
behave as independent states.
Today, besides civil society and
women’s groups, the numerous domestic political forces in Somalia can be
divided into two broad categories: Supporters of the central government
(including the South West, Hirshabelle and Galmudug), and the supporters of the
opposition coalition (including Puntland and Jubbaland ).
The situation is further
complicated by various external actors who actively support one side or the
other.
Populism, intolerance and failure
to compromise
The conflicting demands and
desires of FMSs, coupled with the political volatility of the wider region,
means political consensus in Somalia is always fragile and pragmatic leadership
is often needed to maintain stability in the country.
Rather than working to increase
collaboration and trust between different political actors in the country,
however, President Farmaajo has been pursuing populist policies aimed at
further centralising power since his inauguration in early 2017.
With the help of his former Prime
Minister Hassan Ali Kheyre, Farmaajo removed many of his rivals from power both
at regional and national levels in the last four years. Farmaajo and Kheyre
removed Mohamed Sheikh Osman Jawari, the speaker of the House of the People,
and Ibrahim Idle Suleyman, the chief justice of the Supreme Court, from their
posts. They also forced out the presidents of the South West, Hirshabeelle, and
Galmudug, and replaced them with their allies.
Moreover, rather than working
towards strengthening Somalia’s political consensus and implementing practical
policies to protect the state from future political turmoil, Kheyre and
Farmaajo focussed their efforts on widening their support base through
publicity stunts. They spent lots of energy and resources on image building,
photo-ops, slogans, symbolism and social media campaigns, but failed to take
any actual steps towards bringing the highly polarised nation together.
They also sidelined Somalia’s
decision-making institutions and tried to consolidate all political power at
the hands of a few individuals loyal to the administration. Under their rule,
the centralisation of power reached such levels that the Council of Ministers,
Parliament and all other governmental bodies have been reduced to rubber stamps.
The Farmaajo administration has
also weaponised its juridical sovereignty and used state institutions against
its opponents. For instance, the government used security forces against
politicians, denied flights to Kismayo, and cancelled special arrangements that
the international community employed in dealing with Somaliland.
Farmaajo and Kheyre have not been
open to criticism from the international community either. In January 2019, for
example, they expelled the UN secretary general’s special representative in
Somalia, Nicholas Haysom, after he raised questions about the alleged
extrajudicial killings of anti-government protesters in the South West.
Eventually, even Kheyre could not
stand in the way of Farmaajo’s desire to govern the country on his own. When
the two longtime allies clashed over how/when the next elections should be
held, and Kheyre’s own presidential ambitions became clear, members of
parliament loyal to Farmaajo held a no-confidence vote at the Lower House of
Parliament.
Electoral politics
Even though universal suffrage is
still a distant dream for Somalia, since the formation of the Third Republic in
2000, the country has held several indirect elections and had five different
presidents and governments.
While indirect elections made the
peaceful transfer of power possible on several occasions in Somalia’s recent
history, the lack of a functional, just and widely accepted electoral system is
still a major obstacle in the country’s arduous path towards democratic
governance.
During their time in power,
Farmaajo and Kheyre have repeatedly failed to come up with an electoral road
map that would be acceptable to a majority of power factions in the country.
Initially, they pushed for a
closed-list proportional representation model with one national district. Then,
they attempted to introduce a system where the leader of the party or the
coalition that wins the parliamentary election automatically becomes the
country’s president. Most FMSs, the parliament, and the opposition perceived
both proposals as gerrymandering efforts and swiftly rejected them.
As the end of his presidential
term drew nearer, Farmaajo announced his intention to stay in power until an
election is held. This further angered the administration’s rivals who have long
been convinced the president is intentionally hindering the national
negotiations on the electoral framework in an effort to illegally extend his
time in power.
Farmaajo and his government’s
populist politicking and self-centred approach to governance slowed Somalia’s
democratic progress and deepened its political divides. While many in Somalia
support the efforts to bring regional powers that repeatedly challenge the
authority of the central government under control, they do not support
Farmaajo’s apparent desire to further centralise power, silence all political
opposition, and bring one-man-rule to the country.
The president and his team
focussed so much on their own battles and political futures that they failed to
fulfil their core tasks – ensuring national security, increasing political
inclusion, developing the constitution, engaging in judiciary reform and, most
crucially, establishing a functioning electoral system.
As a result, Somalia is once again
in political turmoil and facing an uncertain future.
The way out of the impasse
It is, however, not too late to
reverse course. If all stakeholders return to the negotiating table,
acknowledge that no one can win all the time in Somali politics, and start
working towards finding a compromise, the country can return from the brink of
collapse.
After so much conflict and
polarisation, the parties will most likely not be able to negotiate in good
faith without mediation from a neutral third party from the international
community. But once a mediator is named and all stakeholders come together
under one roof to discuss their concerns, demands and grievances, there could
be two possible ways out of the current impasse.
First, the parties can focus on
making the agreement Farmaajo reached with the leaders of Somalia’s five FMSs
on September 17, 2020 work.
Under the deal, the central
government and the regional administrations would appoint electoral commissions
at the federal and regional level. Largely clan-based electoral colleges of 101
delegates from each state would elect Lower House members of Parliament, with
clan elders, the public and regional officials picking the delegates, while
local parliaments in the federal states would select the 54 senators.
Meanwhile, the election of the 57 legislators representing some of the clans
from Somaliland was decided to take place in Mogadishu.
The deal, which fell apart due to
disagreements between Farmaajo and his regional rivals over how to conduct the
process, can still be implemented after a revision that addresses the concerns
of the FMSs, the group that Speaker of the Upper House Abdi Hashi leads,
women’s rights groups that want to ascertain a 30 percent quota for female
legislators in Parliament, and the opposition.
The international community is
pushing for this solution, believing the deal has the core ingredients of a
final settlement that can pave the way for an election, and the formation of a
new administration, in the next few months. The short-coming of this quick-fix
approach is that the country can find itself in a similar impasse in the same
situation in 2025.
The more durable solution,
however, would be to introduce a one-term limit on the presidency and find a
way for the parliamentary elections and presidential elections to be held at
separate times. Somalia has had success with such a system in the 1960s –
people elected parliamentarians in 1959/1960, 1964 and 1969 while the members
of Parliament elected the executive in 1961 and 1967.
Somalia can return to this model
through a political agreement that extends the tenure of the sitting parliament
for two years. With such an extension, the current parliament can elect a new
president within weeks. Subsequently, the parliamentary election can be held in
2023, and that new parliament can elect a new president in 2025. With such a
system, Somalia will not find itself without a parliament and a president again
in the future.
It is not realistic to expect from a president who is seeking a second term to organise competitive and credible elections in the country. To maintain peace and keep alive Somalia’s fragile democracy, the leaders of the FGS, the opposition and the FMSs must be ready and willing to compromise. Only through dialogue and the establishment of carefully thought out power-sharing mechanisms can they keep the people of Somalia safe and the country’s democratic development on course. Only a pragmatic approach can lift Somalia out of its current crisis.