Why did Turkey transfer U.S.-made M60 battle tanks to Libya?

Recently released images confirmed what has been known for some time, that Turkey has transferred a small number of its M60 Patton main battle tanks (MBTs) to Libya.
Turkish Defence Ministry (MSB)
photographs released in late March showed Libyans training on a Turkish M60A1,
another indication that an undisclosed number of these tanks were delivered to
Libya by Turkey in direct violation of the United Nations arms embargo on the
North African state.
As Jane’s points out, other
MSB-released images show Turkish-allied Government of National Accord (GNA)
forces training on a Turkish-built T-155 Fırtına self-propelled artillery
system (of the kind frequently used in Turkish operations
in Syria) and a T-122 Sakarya multiple launch rocket system.
Since Turkey’s military
intervention in Libya decisively enabled the GNA to repel its adversary,
Khalifa Haftar’s eastern-based Libyan National Army (LNA), in mid-2020, the
Turkish military has retained a foothold in the North African country.
Turkey has established short to
medium-range air defence missile systems in Tripoli and other strategically
important areas and even prepared the major Al-Watiya airbase in western Libya
for potential future deployments of its air force’s F-16 jet fighter-bombers.
But where do the M60s fit into
this picture?
“Indeed, the Turkish Defence Ministry visually
confirmed on March 30 that it had deployed at least three M60A1 tanks to
Libya,” Oded Berkowitz, the deputy director of intelligence at MAX Security, an
Israel-based intelligence firm, said in an interview. “The publication wasn’t
an outright declaration but an indirect reference while emphasising training
and support provided to local forces.”
Unofficial photos previously
showing M60A1s in Libya date back to at least November 2020. Such U.S.-built
tanks were never part of the old Libyan arsenal.
The tanks are very old and have been in the Turkish Army’s inventory since the early 1990s, which is one reason Turkey might have decided to transfer at least a small number of them to the GNA. Ankara ultimately plans to replace its older M60s with the indigenous Altay MBT it is building.
“The M60A1 is very much obsolete for a modern
military such as Turkey, but Turkey deploying it to Libya is a clear case of
‘one man’s trash is another man’s treasure’, while increasing the GNA/GNU’s
dependency on Turkish supply lines for its military power and capabilities
ahead of a potential resumption of conflict with the LNA or any other potential
conflict,” Berkowitz said.
While Turkey no longer has much
use for these tanks, they can provide a significant boost to the GNA’s limited
armour capabilities, especially “considering that the overwhelming majority of
tanks they would face are very old and poorly maintained [Russian-built]
T-55/62s, with some small number of T-72s,” in the LNA arsenal, he said.
“This is all in the context of limitations of
MBTs in general, the type of warfare specifically in Libya, and of course that
there are still very small quantities of M60s deployed, as far as we know,”
Berkowitz said.
The M60s are certainly no game
changer since they are, like most armoured vehicles, vulnerable to anti-tank
guided missiles, which are common in Libya, and drone strikes, which played a
significant role in shaping the outcome of the last conflict.
“These are inherent limitations of MBTs on the
modern battlefield and not something that is necessarily unique to this type of
tank or these specific countries or armed groups,” Berkowitz said.
Jalel Harchaoui, a Libya
specialist and senior fellow at the Global Initiative, a Swiss-based institute,
estimates, based on testimonies collected from Libyans on the ground, that the
M60s were delivered in February-March 2020.
“It’s not a recent delivery,” he said in an
interview. “It happened basically at a moment when Turkey was making all kinds
of materiel deliveries via ship to Misrata and Tripoli.”
During this period, Turkey shipped
large quantities of military hardware, advisors, and Syrian militiamen to
bolster the GNA, enabling it to repel the LNA offensive.
“The M60s were part of that picture,” Harchaoui
said.
Transferring U.S.-built military
hardware to a third country or party usually requires U.S. authorisation to
avoid violations of any end-user agreement.
Harchaoui believes the transfer of
M60s was “part of something that Washington clearly approved”.
He also believes the fact the M60s
are old tanks might have factored into Ankara’s decision to transfer them to
the GNA. After all, Turkey was more likely to get at least a tacit green light
from the United States when it came to transferring such old hardware instead
of more advanced or modern equipment, which could have proven more provocative
in Washington’s view.
Turkey will most likely continue
to periodically violate the UN arms embargo on Libya by
transferring military equipment
needed for maintaining the bases it controls in Libya, especially Al-Watiya.
Berkowitz pointed out that Ankara
“never really abided by it” in the first place.
“There is already plenty of Turkish personnel,
tanks, armoured vehicles, artillery, drones, air defence systems, electronic
warfare systems, small arms, frigates and other naval vessels in the country,
so there is no reason to suspect they will suddenly change their minds,” he
said.
“Thus, we can expect to continue seeing Turkish
weapons and supplies flow into the country, alongside training and other
military activity.”
Harchaoui echoed this prediction
but doubts future violations of the embargo will include any additional
transfers of tanks since “there is no war happening” in Libya at present.
“In all likelihood, Libya will go through
several more months without a major war that would typically warrant sending
more tanks,” he said.
However, if conflict once again
flares up in the country, Turkey will undoubtedly send whatever hardware needed to protect its ally in Tripoli
and its bases in western Libya.
But the likelihood of any
additional transfer of M60 or other tanks remains unlikely.
Harchaoui said that there were two
distinct phases of arms transfers from Turkey to Libya. The first transpired
between January and May 2020, when Turkey transferred arms and forces to the
GNA to help it roll back Haftar’s offensive, which it accomplished on June 4.
“What’s absolutely remarkable is as soon as that
happened, Turkey began a series of arms transfers meant for solidifying,
refurbishing, and bolstering its own bases, the primary example being
Al-Watiya,” Harchaoui said.
Once the GNA was on the offensive
against the LNA, Turkey began the second phase of arms transfers. These
“voluminous transfers of materiel” started in June 2020 and, in many respects,
continue to the present day.
However, the second phase is
markedly different from the first. Unlike the first phase, which were for
conducting a counteroffensive against the LNA, the second phase has the clear
objective of entrenching Turkish control over a very robust set of bases.
“The transfers after the June victory indicates,
in very clear terms, that Turkey has no intention of leaving Libya,” Harchaoui
said. “We need to go through a very long period and set of efforts by countries
as powerful as the U.S. for Turkey to maybe consider leaving.”
“The M60s are not part of this second phase.
They were exclusively part of the first phase.”