Ghana's Secessionist Conflict Has Its Genesis in Colonialism - It's Time to Reflect

Ghana's secessionist conflict is rooted in a system that was meant to promote peace. Since the advent of decolonisation after World War II, secessionist conflicts have been the main cause of civil wars worldwide. An historical example is the Biafra War (1967-1970). A current one is Cameroon's Anglophone crisis around the calls for the secession of "Ambazonia".
Over
the past couple of years, Ghana has also been kept on tenterhooks by calls for
secession. In November 2019, the Homeland Study Group Foundation declared the
independence of "Western Togoland". Its call was for the secession of
Ghana's Volta region and parts of the Northern and Upper East regions. At first
peaceful, this demand led to violence in September 2020 with the emergence of
the Western Togoland Restoration Front.
The
antecedents of this claim go back over 60 years, and the role played by the
United Nations (UN). Prior to Ghana's independence in 1957, the United Nations
oversaw British (Western) Togoland through the International Trusteeship
System. This system was created to administer and supervise certain
territories. Its aim was to promote development towards independence and to
maintain international peace and security.
In
a study we conducted, we argue that the UN trusteeship system after World War
II had the unintended effect of perpetuating secessionist conflicts. Colonial
powers framed secessionism as a threat to state-building - not as an expression
of self-determination. We looked specifically at the Ewe/Togoland unification
conflict in the bordering regions of the British Gold Coast and the trusteeship
territories of Togoland.
Our
analysis leads us to caution against a rhetoric that polarises the issue in
terms of "threats".
A
history of distrust
International
intervention by the UN is generally supposed to provide a peaceful solution -
not the perpetuation of conflicts. But historical research using colonial
archives and UN documents points to precisely such a pattern. A significant
number of the former 11 UN trust territories in various parts of the world
experienced some form of secessionist conflict.
The
UN trusteeship system was by no means a venue of tranquil diplomacy. Rather, it
involved a politically heated negotiation process between the UN, its trustees
and national elites.
The
Western Togoland secessionism fits this pattern too. Many of the actors
involved in the system attempted to escalate, de-escalate or ignore conflicts
around the separation of Western Togoland from the erstwhile Gold Coast. They
used a mode of conflict communication called "securitisation". This
involves reframing an issue as a security problem to gain room for manoeuvre
and push through more far-reaching, controversial measures politically.
When
France and Britain divided up German Togoland after World War I, the new
colonial demarcation separated the Ewe-speaking population into three
territories. These were the British Gold Coast Colony, British Togoland and French
Togoland. A movement then formed to campaign at the UN for the political
unification of the Ewes.
Unwilling
to cede territory, France and Britain pointed out the dangers of
balkanisation" to the UN. Allowing the Ewes to decide on unification would
implicitly give them the right to secession. It would create an incalculable
domino effect by setting a precedent for numerous other dependent territories
whose borders had been drawn arbitrarily.
The
UN itself reported in 1949 that in the interest of peace and stability a
solution should be sought with urgency. In view of France's and Britain's
reluctance to consider the Ewes' demands, representatives of the anti-colonial
UN member states cautioned that their nationalistic clamour was a danger to
peace in West Africa.
Faced
with the apparent futility of Ewe unification, the movement shifted in the
early 1950s to the more promising reunification of French and British Togoland.
Its supporters pursued a strategy of pointing to human rights violations, which
discredited the French in particular. While anti‑imperial UN member states
acknowledged the problem, the permanent members of the Trusteeship Council did
not seriously consider Ewe or Togoland reunification.
In
1956 the UN-supervised referendum sealed the incorporation of British Togoland
into the Gold Coast. Those in support of unification then asked the UN as the
"world peace organisation" to revise the result, or at least consider
the electoral districts separately on the grounds that there could be "serious
unrest" or an "ultimate war".
Overruling
the request, the UN followed the wishes of the colonial authorities. It framed
secessionism as a "threat" to state-building rather than an
expression of self-determination.
By
curbing secessionism during the period of decolonisation, the UN laid the
foundation for it to escalate again later. The issue of Western Togoland
fortunately never turned into a full civil war. Nevertheless low-level violence
and political conflicts remained. The 1957 Avoidance of Discrimination Act and
1958 Preventive Detention Act practically outlawed Togoland secessionism
overnight. It revived only briefly in the mid-1970s, and seemed to have
disappeared until recently.
Changing
legacies
The
long history of the conflict around "Western Togoland" illustrates
two points.
First,
the vocabulary of international law and the UN implies a clear meaning of terms
such as self-determination or decolonisation. In reality, the specific meanings
in the decolonisation period were shaped by the perception of whose
self-determination was seen as a threat to the international order.
Secessionist movements and territorial changes could easily be portrayed as an
overriding threat to the state and regional order and therefore considered
illegitimate.
Secondly,
the introduction of the right to self-determination by the UN in 1952 led to
new conflicts over secession, a very real legacy of colonialism and the UN
trusteeship system. The UN, with no genuine answer as to who could claim
independence and how, adhered to colonial borders.
Both
points led to the fact that in Ghana, almost 60 years after independence, the
conflict over "Western Togoland" does not seem to have been resolved.
Politicians
and security analysts have joined the securitisation of the secessionists and
called for heavy-handed solutions. But the past shows that this kind of
rhetoric might solve the issue in the short term but not in the longer term.
A
public dialogue that avoids portraying the other side as a threat would be more
likely to succeed in settling the conflict once and for all.