Present situation of terrorist organizations in Africa
The Islamic State (IS/ISIS/Daesh) carried out more fatal attacks
worldwide in 2016. That year, attacks rose by 18.5 per cent, from 955 in 2015,
to 1132. Deaths rose in 2016 by 50 percent to 9332 people. The average toll of
each attack rose by 8.1 per cent in 2016, compared to 5.7 per cent in 2014. In
2016, Daesh attacks affected 308 cities around the globe. Up to 93 percent of
the group’s attacks hit Iraq and Syria, Daesh , strongholds, and were the most
destructive in both (1)
After the decline of Daesh in Africa, observers expected the
terrorist group’s operations would be more active in other areas across the
world, as part of Daesh global vision.
Africa was always a part of Daesh activities over the past years,
as the its cells were active in different parts on the continent and they stood
behind many of the bloody operations there. (2)
Daesh’s first affiliated group
in Africa was established when Algeria’s Jund al-Khalifa pledged allegiance to
“Daesh,” September 2014. A month later, the Islamic Youth Shura Council, Derna,
Libya followed suit. Then, over the period 2014-2016, Daesh cells emerged in
other parts on the continent, from Nigeria to Somalia, from Tunisia, to Egypt,
and from Algeria to the Sahara. The emergence of these cells in itself raised
fears, and they were received more attention after the collapse of the
“Caliphate” in Syria and Iraq, late in 2017, after the liberation of Mosul. (3)
Deash’s affiliate groups in Africa include Boko Haram, mainly in
Nigeria; Ansar Bait al-Maqdis (Wilayat
Sinai) in Egypt; Daesh in Libya, Al-Mourabitoun, and Daesh in Somalia, Kenya,
Uganda and Tunisia and Algeria. (4)
Following is a review of three of these affiliates:
1-
Daesh in Somalia (5)
There is small, yet growing presence, of Daesh militants in
Somalia. It was less than two years ago when Daesh militants in Libya issued a
video under “Message to brothers in Somalia.” The video carried a message by an
English militant and a Somali one, urging Somalia’s al-Shabab fighters to join
the new Daesh branch in the country.
On October 23, 2016, Abdul-Kader Muamen, a religious leader of
al-Shabab, was amid some of his followers, when he pledged obedience to Daesh
leader Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi. A UN report voiced concerns that the area of Bari,
in Puntland, was a potential safe refuge for Daesh foreign militants. It
explained that following the group’s defeats in Iraq and Syria, militants could
flow into Somalia. The same month, Somali Daesh seized Qandala, an ancient port
town in the northeastern Bari province. The Somali security forces that soon
retook the town found weak resistance from the militants, who fled to mountain
areas.
In December 2017, Daesh offered what was believed to be the first
video of affiliate militants in Somalia, calling for attacking blasphemes
during Christmas holidays.
Low wages among Daesh militants, 50 US dollar monthly for a married
one, and 10 US dollars for each child, led to repeated rebellions and
defections. Unmarried fighters received no payment. This problem took toll on
al-Shabab.
2- Daesh in the Great Desert (Al-Mourabitoun) (6)
“Daesh in the Great Desert” came into existence when Abu-Walid
Al-Sahrawi, a prominent leader in Al-Mourabitoun, announced the group’s pledge
of allegiance to Al-Baghdadi, after the general leader Mokhtar Belmokhtar broke
up with al-Qaeda, and thus the new Daesh
affiliate was established in Mali.
The new group launched a host of attacks in 2016, including one targeting
a prison in Niamey, and the ambush in the Niger’s village of Tongo Tongo, where
four Americans and five Nigerians were killed.
Fighters of “Daesh in the Great Desert” were estimated at 40 in May
2015, but according to the US Defense Department, April 2018, they rose to 300.
(7)
2- Boko Haram
Established in 2004 by Mohammed Yusuf, Boko Harama was based the village
of Kannamma in Nigeria’s north-eastern
state of Borno, near the borders with Niger. The group’s operations were
extended to neighboring Cameroon and Chad.
Boko Haram turned violent after the group’s leader died in 2009,
and in 2010 declared “Jihad” against the Nigerian government and the US
Boko Haram is considered one of the most active terrorist groups in
Nigeria. In March 2015, its leader Abubakar Shekau announced allegiance to
Daesh.
The group managed to attract many youth volunteers.
The ethnic side is essential for the growth and rise of Boko Haram
growth, as Nigeria is mainly formed of two main tribes, the Hausa-Fulani, in
the north, mostly armed; and the Igbo in the south, mostly Christians. Clashes usually
took part between the two tribes over religious and ethnic matters. Thus, Boko
Haram promoted itself as a defender of Islam. (8).
Size of Boko Haram
US military officials estimated Boko Haram militants at 1,500,
while other estimates put them at 3,500 (9). A third groups raised the figure to
4,000 to 6,000. (10)
It is believed that the group supports its operations financially through
its criminal activities, including bank robberies, assassinations, kidnappings
and blackmailing. Boko Haram reportedly received millions of dollars as a
ransom to release the hundreds of Chibok schoolgirls it had abducted. In
addition, it managed to seize military vehicles, weapons and ammunition from
the Nigerian and the Nigerien armies. (11)
Domain of operations
Boko Haram’s operations mainly focused on northeastern Nigeria.
However, the group claimed responsibility for several attacks in the northern
and central parts of the country. In 2014, it launched a host of attacks in
Lagos. But it had limited access to the south. Also in 2014, the group carried
out attacks in northern Cameroon, southern Niger and eastern Chad, and was
engaged in clashes with the security forces there.
The military in the three countries joined a regional campaign
against Boko haram in 2015. (12)
Boko Haram became the major terrorist threat for Chad after it
escalated operations against the country in retaliation for joining a
multi-national force against the group. In 2015, Chad had one of the highest
terrorist-linked deaths in the world. (13)
It
is estimated that Boki Haram killed more than 15,200 people since 2011, among
them 950 in 2017 alone. In addition, up to 2.4 million people in the region
became homeless (14). In 2014, it was classified as the bloodiest terror group.
(15)
Over the period mid-2014 to mid-2015, Boko Haram targeted Nigerian
militaryas well as civilians, killing about 10,000 people. (16)
Boko Haram recedes
Boko Haram’s terrorist operations were noticeably on the decline in
2016 and 2017. According to the Global Terrorism Index (2017), attacks were
down by 61 per cent, deaths cause by terrorist operations fell by 80 percent,
compared to 2015.
The Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED) stated
that Boko Haram’s terror attacks decreased in 2016, after they reached a peak a
year earlier with 456 attacks. A relative rise was noticed in 2017, with 423
attacks, but victims were decreased by 30.2 percent, compared to 2015. (17)
Reasons of decline
Boko Haram’s activities has been decreasing since 2015 due to
repeated defeats thanks to the efforts of the Multinational Joint Task Force
that included forces from Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Nigeria, with US
assistance, besides intelligence and training support from many other countries.
Boko Haram also suffered internal disintegration since it pledged allegiance
to Daesh. A huge number defected since leader Abubakar Shekau did not comply
with instruction from the umbrella group based in Iraq and Syria.
Change of tactics
Being repeatedly defeated, Boko Haram changed tactics, and came to
focus more on blasts and suicide attacks, as well as easy targets.
Second: Al-Qaeda
According to data compiled by FDD’s Long War Journal, al Qaeda and
its many allies and affiliates launched at least 276 attacks in Mali and the
wider the West Africa region in 2017. That means the al Qaeda has largely kept
its operational tempo in West Africa consistent when compared to last year.
That number is the combination of attacks claimed by, or attributed
to, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), AQIM’s Katibat Al-Mourabitoun, Ansar
Dine (a front group for AQIM), and Ansar Dine’s Katibat Macina (also known as
the Macina Liberation Front). Beginning in March, these groups merged together
to form the Group for Support of Islam and Muslims (JNIM) and pledged
allegiance to al Qaeda leader Ayman al Zawahiri. Aside from Mali, assaults claimed or
attributed to Ansaroul Islam in Burkina Faso, as well as attacks attributed to
jihadists in Niger, were also added. (18)
Changes since 2015
Despite changes of command and the decline in influence due to rise
of Daesh, al-Qaeda enjoyed flexibility and adaptability. Al-Qaeda and affiliate
groups were active in 13 countries, compared to 16 in 2011. In 2015, the groups
carried out 465 attacks in 12 countries killing 2,070 people. The following
year, it implemented 539 operations in 13 countries, only killing 349 people.
(19)
Tactics (20)
-Changing goals : a distinguished change of goals took place in
al-Qaeda attacks; less focus on goals of ideological motives, and more on ones
that could boots fears. This was substantiated by the fact that many of the
countries where al-Qaeda is operating, like Libya, Mali and Yemen, are
suffering restive and suffering deep conflicts.
-Changing preferred tactics for attacking: Al-Qaed’s major tactic in
2016 was explosions which counted for 50
percent of the total number of attacks, killing 766 people. Suicide attacks
killed 440 of these, 8.6 death in each attack, compared to 14.6 in 2015.
Of the 276 attacks in 2017, 71 came as a result of improvised
explosive devices. Another 24 were from mortar or rocket barrages aimed at
French, Malian, or UN military bases in northern Mali. There were also 11
kidnappings, with several occurring in both Mali and Burkina Faso. Two were
suicide bombings. The remaining 168 attacks were a variation of assaults,
ambushes, or assassinations (21).
The decentralized organizational structure of al-Qaeda allows
affiliates to operate independently to a great extent. Harakat al-Shabaab
al-Mujahideen, more commonly known as al-Shabaab, is the most active al-Qaeda
affiliate in Africa.
Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen
Al-Shabab first emerged in 2006 when the Islamic Courts Union
controlled the Somali capital Mogadish, and most of central and southern Somali
territories. Al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen had huge influence inside the Union, and
they led most of the its militias. At the beginning, the group attracted former
and in-service al-Qaeda elements in East Africa. Veteran militants returning
from Afghanistan had advantages thanks to their ties with al-Qaeda.
By 2005, al-Shabab had gained more power as an organization and
took part in campaigns to control the Somali capital.
In 2012, the group released a video in which it "pledged
obedience" to al-Qaeda head Ayman al-Zawahiri.
Since 2006, al-Shabab’s activities were not confined to its being
an extremist group destabilizing Somalia, but it also fueled the conflict
between Ethiopia’s Oromo people and Somalis. (22) Members of the group found
safe regue in Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania and Ethiopia, as well as other countries.
According to the “Global Terrorism Index 2017”, al-Shabab claimed
responsibility for more than 92 percent of the terrorism-related deaths in
2016. It was also believed to be behind the 61 rest death, as no other groups
claimed responsibility for them. Since
2008, al-Shabab was behind the average of 100 deaths in Somalia annually, and
at least 70 percent, of the terrorist attacks that hit Somalia since 2000.
Thanks to the group’s operations, 2016 was Somalia’s second bloodiest attack
since 2000. (23)
Phases of evolution of Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen
Source: Jones, Seth
G., Andrew Liepman, and Nathan Chandler, Counterterrorism and Counterinsurgency
in Somalia: Assessing the Campaign Against Al Shabaab. Santa Monica, CA: RAND
Corporation, 2016: https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR1500/RR1539/RAND_RR1539.pdf
Al Shabab’s strength varied over five phases of its existence. Its
territorial control peaked between 2009 and 2010 in the aftermath of the
Ethiopian invasion, and then declined over the next several years. By 2016, al
Shabaab had lost substantial territory and had suffered from a series of
leadership and organizational disputes.
It also suffered a significant decline in revenue following its
military defeats, since the group had derived much of its funding by taxing
individuals, businesses, and groups in areas it controlled. Al Shabab’s popular
support also dwindled in Somalia and neighboring countries, including Kenya. (24)
Despite these losses, however, al Shabab increased the number of
terrorist attacks, suggesting that it shifted from an insurgent group that
controlled territory and governed its inhabitants to a terrorist organization
that controlled little territory but increasingly relied on terrorist tactics.
Change of tactics
Al-Shabaab slightly shifted tactics in 2016 to increasingly target
private citizens with attacks rising from 28 per cent to 34 per cent. There was
a corresponding change in attacks on government employees where attacks dropped
by 8 per cent to 26 per cent.
However, these attacks resulted in many less deaths.
In 2015, the attacks resulted in 52 per cent of all deaths, yet
accounted for only 15 per cent in 2016. Suicide bombings and explosions were
the most common type of attack. As a consequence of this new tactic focusing on
private citizens, attacks increasingly became more deadly and accounted for 37
per cent of the total deaths. An example was seen with the bombing of a passenger
bus in Lafoole which killed 20 people.
Attacks against businesses also increased, largely in the form of
suicide bombings at hotels and cafes. Al-Shabaab conducted 28 suicide bombings
that killed on average eight people per attack. In contrast, armed assaults
killed nearly three people per attack. Other tactics used by al-Shabaab include
the planting of explosives, assassinations and kidnappings. Most attacks
continue to focus on the south with 69 per cent of attacks and 74 per cent of
deaths occurring in Banaadir, Bay, Lower Juba and Lower Shebelle. (25)
----------
1-The Institute for Economics & Peace, “Global Terrorism Index
2017”, Sydney, Australia, November 2017:
http://visionofhumanity.org/app/uploads/2017/11/Global-Terrorism-Index-2017.pdf
2-Daesh cells in Africa… estimated numbers of militants, Middle East
Online, September 17, 2018 :https://t2m.io/AOYBmqeE
3-Mohammed Gomaa, Daesh fate in Africa,
August 29, 2018:
https://is.gd/shpHet
4- Daesh cells in Africa… estimated numbers of
militants, Middle East Online, September 17, 2018 :https://t2m.io/AOYBmqeE
5- United States Department
of State, “Country Reports on Terrorism 2016”, United States Department of
State Publication, Washington DC, Released July 2017– Page 47-51: https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/272488.pdf
6- Daesh cells in Africa… estimated
numbers of militants, Middle East Online, September 17, 2018: https://t2m.io/AOYBmqeE
7- Ibid
8- Democratic Arabic Center, Boko Haram’s impact on public
security in Nigeria since 2011, October 15, 2016: https://democraticac.de/?p=38633
9-Congressional Research
Service. Boko Haram and the Islamic State’s West Africa Province, June 28, 2018:
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/IF10173.pdf
10- Democratic Arabic Center, Boko
Haram’s impact on public security in Nigeria since 2011, October 15, 2016: https://democraticac.de/?p=38633
11- Congressional
Research Service. Boko Haram and the Islamic State’s West Africa Province, June
28, 2018: https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/IF10173.pdf
12- Ibid
13- The Institute for Economics &
Peace, “Global Terrorism Index 2016”, Sydney, Australia, November 2016 : http://visionofhumanity.org/app/uploads/2017/11/Global-Terrorism-Index-2017.pdf
14- Congressional
Research Service. Boko Haram and the Islamic State’s West Africa Province, June
28, 2018: https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/IF10173.pdf
15- The Institute for Economics & Peace, “Global Terrorism Index
2017”, Sydney, Australia, November 2017:
http://visionofhumanity.org/app/uploads/2017/11/Global-Terrorism-Index-2017.pdf
16- Ibid
17- Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED), 1997-2018
18- Al Qaeda maintains operational tempo in West Africa in 2017. FDD’s Long War Journal, January 5, 2018: https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2018/01/al-qaeda-maintains-operational-tempo-in-west-africa-in-2017.php
19- The Institute for
Economics & Peace, “Global Terrorism Index 2017”, Sydney, Australia,
November 2017
http://visionofhumanity.org/app/uploads/2017/11/Global-Terrorism-Index-2017.pdf
20- Ibid
21- Al Qaeda maintains operational tempo in West Africa in 2017. FDD’s Long War Journal, January 5, 201:, https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2018/01/al-qaeda-maintains-operational-tempo-in-west-africa-in-2017.php
22- “Somali Harakat
al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen and errant compass, November 8, 2017: Cemter of
Strategic and Diplomatic Studies: http://www.csds-center.com/old/archives/10639
23- The Institute for Economics & Peace,
“Global Terrorism Index 2017”, Sydney, Australia, November 2017
http://visionofhumanity.org/app/uploads/2017/11/Global-Terrorism-Index-2017.pdf
24- Jones,
Seth G., Andrew Liepman, and Nathan Chandler, Counterterrorism and
Counterinsurgency in Somalia: Assessing the Campaign Against Al Shabaab. Santa
Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2016.
https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR1500/RR1539/RAND_RR1539.pdf
25- The Institute for Economics & Peace, “Global Terrorism
Index 2017”, Sydney, Australia, November 2017: http://visionofhumanity.org/app/uploads/2017/11/Global-Terrorism-Index-2017.pdf
