What Does It Mean to Provide ‘Security Guarantees’ to Ukraine?

One day the war in Ukraine will be over. How and when remain
the field of prophecy. But one of the most important questions will be how to
ensure the future security of Ukraine — and by whom.
The possible answers are not easy and will depend on the
outcome of the war. But what seems clear is that short of a Russian collapse
and defeat, with Ukraine winning back all of its territory, any security
guarantees are likely to be both partial and fragile.
But without something, officials and analysts suggest, it is
hard to imagine investors pouring back into Ukraine to rebuild the country — or
that another war would not flare in the future.
Much pivots on the hesitancy of the West itself, which wants
to protect Ukraine but has shown that it does not want to fight for it, and
that it does not want a direct military confrontation with Russia. Instead it
has sought to thread a course between deterring Russia but not provoking it.
There will be “a lot of risks around the corner for European
and trans-Atlantic unity,” said Nathalie Tocci, director of the Institute for
International Affairs in Rome. If Ukraine manages to regain even the territory
lost since Russia’s invasion last year, she said, then there would be mounting
voices in Europe and Washington saying, “Look at the ongoing costs, civilian
and military — hey, compromise.”
But Ukraine will want solid security commitments in return,
she said, and that could divide the West — with Central and Eastern European
countries demanding NATO membership for Ukraine, and Western European allies
refusing.
While NATO and the European Union have promised Ukraine
membership, there is no deadline, and it is not certain those pledges will be
fulfilled. The West’s embrace of Ukraine was one reason cited by President
Vladimir V. Putin of Russia for his invasion in the first place.
As long as territorial disputes remain, there is little
likelihood that even a Ukraine in some sort of cease-fire agreement with Russia
would win the unanimous support needed to join either institution.
How the war ends will be crucial, said Thomas Kleine-Brockhoff,
who helped write a paper detailing the knotty issues involved in Ukraine’s
reconstruction.
Even before last year’s invasion, he noted, Ukraine’s
sovereignty was already compromised by Russia’s annexation of Crimea. The
neatest outcome now would be if Ukraine won back all of its lost territory,
though that is far from certain.
“If it’s a complete
Russian defeat, then you solve the Crimea problem and you have a different
Russia,” he said. NATO membership would then be easier to envision for Ukraine
and it would create a kind of untouchability, even by another revisionist
Russian leader, he said. “But the price to get to total victory is very high,
and then what?”
The prospect of a complete defeat of Russia, which could
undermine Mr. Putin and his circle, embodies risks of Russian escalation that
many NATO country leaders, including President Biden, seem unwilling to hazard.
Should Mr. Putin’s leadership collapse, key European states
like France and Germany worry about what a chaotic, nuclear-armed Russia could
portend, and even about a return to a “time of troubles,” the years of
lawlessness, infighting and anarchy that Russia experienced at the start of the
17th century.
But anything short of NATO membership would involve promises
that Kyiv already considers hollow. Those were tried before, in 1994, when the
United States, Britain and Russia itself promised Ukraine territorial integrity
and security “assurances” in return for giving up its Soviet-era nuclear
weapons under an agreement called the Budapest Memorandum.
Those assurances came with no commitments — from Russia, of
course, but also from Washington and London — and proved worthless.
Anders Fogh Rasmussen, a former NATO secretary-general, has
tried to square the circle in “The Kyiv Security Compact,” a proposal he and
his colleagues drafted in the autumn with Andriy Yermak, the chief of staff to
Ukraine’s president, Volodymyr Zelensky.
It aims to provide something workable between the hollow
assurances of 1994 and full NATO and E.U. membership. The core recommendation
is for Ukraine’s allies to turn the country into a kind of hedgehog or a
porcupine, one so well-armed that Russia would not try to swallow it again.
To get there, it urges a “strategic partnership” between
Ukraine and key Western countries, on a bilateral basis, for a “multi-decade
effort” to make Ukraine impregnable and capable of its own defense.
Mr. Rasmussen has compared his proposal to the relationship
between the United States and Israel, with lots of defense cooperation but no
formal defense treaty.
In essence, the proposal is alliance without membership,
less a security guarantee to Ukraine than a major disincentive to Moscow.
“The irony is that non-membership in NATO would require more
of the West than membership, and for longer,” said Mr. Kleine-Brockhoff.
Others suggest that individual allies, including the United
States, Britain, France, Germany and Poland, put their own troops into Ukraine
postwar, the way NATO has put forward-based multinational brigades into NATO
members states that border Russia.
But significant troop presence in a non-NATO member would be
seen in Moscow as a further provocation and more evidence to fit Russia’s narrative
that NATO is trying to rip Ukraine away from the Russian sphere.
As Ben Hodges, a retired general who commanded the U.S. Army
Europe points out, the United States, Canada and other countries had troops in
Ukraine, training the Ukrainian army, right up until Russia’s invasion, when
they were withdrawn to avoid a NATO-Russian confrontation. “What would be their
mission?” he asked.
Mr. Hodges believes that Ukraine, with the right
longer-range weapons from a currently reluctant Washington, can defeat Russia
and take back all occupied territory, including Crimea, by the end of August.
“There is no way Ukraine will be safe and secure so long as
Russia controls Crimea,” he said. Crimea allows Russia to block the Sea of
Azov, isolate Mariupol, hit Odesa and dominate the Black Sea, while claiming an
exclusive economic zone around Crimea, limiting fishing and gas exploration, he
said.
The only real security guarantee for Ukraine is eventual
NATO membership, Mr. Hodges argued. But whatever the outcome, he said, “it must
be based on the assumption that Russia won’t respect it unless they’re forced
to.”
“Russia cannot be rewarded and think that what they did has
paid off with territorial gain or leverage,” he said.
But for many, like Camille Grand, a former NATO assistant
secretary-general now with the European Council on Foreign Relations, it
remains likely the war will end with Russia having “achieved partial
objectives.” A full defeat of Russia and Ukraine joining NATO “is only one
scenario, and an optimistic one,” he said.
While anything short of NATO membership “would be difficult
to sell to the Ukrainians,” he said, Russia would assume in its war plans that
Ukraine would be effectively part of NATO, much as it has always done with
Sweden and Finland.
A post-conflict Ukraine “would provide NATO the
best-equipped, best-trained and most capable army in Europe — in a way
providing NATO security guarantees,” not the other way around, he said.
In a way, the whole idea of security guarantees is outdated,
said Stefano Stefanini, a former Italian diplomat in Russia and former
ambassador to NATO.
The only real guarantee of Ukrainian security is NATO
membership, he said, however complicated. Security guarantees from major
countries would be tantamount to NATO membership in any case, he said, and
would inevitably carry risks when put to the test.
Even now, individual NATO countries refuse to send troops to
aid Ukraine militarily, so why would they do so in the future? he asked.
One could imagine a settlement now where Ukraine loses part
of its territory, and a later Kyiv government provokes Russia in order to get
it back and then seeks to drag these guarantors into a conflict. What would
they do then?
“Even if Ukraine gains NATO membership, it’s a defensive
alliance and comes with restraints,” Mr. Stefanini said.
Still, he said, it would be a mistake to underestimate the
cynical creativity of diplomats. One could arrive at a point where negotiations
produce a commitment for Ukrainian neutrality, but not disarmament, with
language about security guarantees, “even if anyone not a politician would call
them unrealistic,” he said.
He made the comparison to the Dayton Accords that concluded
the Bosnian war, “an awkward acrobatic architecture that only served to end the
war.” Even this war will end, he said, and probably in negotiations.
“Total victory for
anyone seems unlikely,” he said. So at some point, the diplomats will have to
get creative, providing Ukraine some solid prospect of peace and security
somehow underwritten by its allies.