Old truths remain capable of provoking astonishment
Exactly fifteen years have passed since the events of
January 25, 2011. And because the scourge of our quarter is forgetfulness, as
our great late uncle Naguib Mahfouz said in his immortal novel Children of the
Alley, it has become incumbent upon us—whenever some try to deceive us or test
our memory with new faces and old slogans to realize their dreams, which never
cease to prey upon our country and plunder its resources—to return to those
facts and republish them again and again. Perhaps we may awaken from our
heedlessness and grasp what is being plotted against us, for our enemy will not
rest and will not forget his vengeance against us and against the men of June
30—“those who were true to what they pledged to God; among them are those who
have fulfilled their vow, and among them are those who still await, and they
have not altered in the least.”
The events of January 25, 2011 were—and remain—the most
mysterious and fog-laden in the history of Egyptians. Even when we try to read
that vast mass of documents, cases, articles, books, studies, reports, and
research published about them by various, divergent, and conflicting parties,
we will not grasp what happened; indeed, we will not escape severe dizziness
that leads nowhere. Yet from the researcher’s platform, I can say to you, with
a clear conscience, that Egyptians were subjected to the greatest act of
deception in their history with regard to the truth of what occurred in those
days.
I followed the event closely and interacted with its
developments. From the very first moment, I knew that the regime in power at
the time would not withstand for long such surges of anger interacting with
meticulous planning by actors fully aware of what they were doing. The event
was preceded by, accompanied by, and followed with precise planning that lasted
many long years.
Over the past eleven years, I have engaged with those
events on two levels:
First: a political level grounded in total rejection of
betraying the الوطن under any pretext, or
offering it at international auctions to whoever pays more. In this context, I
waged a fierce battle against those who sought to convert the immense energy of
anger displayed by Egyptians in the squares into a destructive process aimed at
dismantling national institutions, paving the way to turn the country into a
soft zone easily molded according to the will of those who planned and paid the
price. I did not retreat from using every possible and impossible means to
defend a homeland that is a trust upon all our necks. I endured—and still
endure—accusations, defamation, judicial pursuits, intimidation, fearmongering,
and attempts at assault, all to make me retreat from what I see as right. But I
held to my position, and I still do.
Second: a scientific level of study. I realized that part
of that battle was unfolding on the ground, but its larger part was betting on
abducting the mind—the collective mind of Egyptians—which specific groups
planned to seize and control. I therefore continued my research work with
precision and objectivity. I did not proceed from preconceived assumptions;
rather, I entered the arena completely stripped of them. I tried to understand
what happened on the ground during the eighteen days the events lasted, but I
also examined what occurred before, during, and after the event, outside Egypt
and inside it. The events of January 25, 2011 were by no means isolated from
what was happening around the world with regard to Egypt.
I know that much of what these lines will contain will
not satisfy many parties, and I also know that it will surprise others. But in
the end, this is what I have reached, and I am satisfied with it.
The Western agenda
We cannot begin to talk about January 25 and what
happened in Egypt—and in a number of Arab countries thereafter—without
addressing the Western agenda toward the Middle East. This is not a secondary
matter that can be ignored or treated in isolation from what has happened and
continues to happen in the region since years preceding 2011, especially those
transformations and events that later drew the maps of what came to be known as
the “Arab Spring.” America and Western countries openly declared their desire
for further fragmentation of the Arab nation, based on two considerations:
First: their awareness of the capabilities and strength
of Arab armies, especially the Egyptian army, and the extent of the threat
surrounding Israel since the October War of 1973, and the unified Arab stance
at the time that confounded all the enemy’s plans.
Second: the Arab states’ use of the oil weapon to
pressure America and the West at the time in response to their support for
Israel—an issue that constituted an important impetus for Washington and
Western capitals to plan to control those resources.
The Bernard Lewis Project
During the Iran–Iraq War in 1980, statements were issued
by the U.S. National Security Adviser Brzezinski, in which he affirmed that the
dilemma the United States would face from then on was how to activate a second
Gulf war on the margins of the first Gulf war raging between Iraq and Iran,
through which America could “correct” the Sykes–Picot borders.
Following this statement—and at the Pentagon’s behest—the
British Jewish orientalist Bernard Lewis began in 1981 to formulate his famous
project to dismantle the constitutional unity of a group of Arab and Islamic
countries individually, including Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Egypt, Sudan, Iran,
Turkey, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, the Gulf states, and the countries
of North Africa, among others.
The goal was to fragment each of them into a collection
of cantons and ethnic, religious, doctrinal, and sectarian mini-states. Lewis
appended to his detailed project a set of maps drawn under his supervision
covering all Arab and Islamic countries slated for fragmentation. We published
that map in yesterday’s article, January 11, along with the proposed divisions.
The hidden reasons for partition
But why do Western global powers persistently strive to
divide Egypt? What harm would it cause them if Egypt remained united? Indeed,
what harm would it cause if other Arab states retained their unity and
strength?
The answer to this question places our hands on the
complete picture, and it necessarily takes us back to 1973, when the Egyptian
armed forces defeated Israel in the most honorable war in modern Egyptian
history. That day, the American administration became convinced that Israel was
not invulnerable, and that it could be erased from existence at any moment. The
victory achieved by the Egyptian army could be repeated, and in the event of
Arab armies’ unity, Israel could become merely a memory—something America would
never allow under any circumstances.
Thus began the plan premised on fragmenting Arab states
from within, so that there would be no large Arab state and, consequently, no
Arab army capable of standing tall in the region and causing Israel’s
disappearance.
The United States had reached the zenith of its dream
with what were called the Arab Spring revolutions—revolutions that the Muslim
Brotherhood rode and turned into a means to reach power. America reached an
agreement with the Muslim Brotherhood under which the partition plan would be
implemented. This was revealed by the American Global Research Center in a
research paper published on June 28, 2013, which indicated that the Obama
administration pursued a policy of secret support for the Muslim Brotherhood and
other insurgent movements in the Middle East since 2010.
The paper revealed an important document titled “Middle
East Partnership Initiative: An Overview,” which set out an advanced structure
of State Department programs aimed at building civil society
organizations—especially non-governmental organizations—to change the internal
policies of targeted countries in favor of U.S. foreign policy and U.S.
national security objectives.
The document also indicated that the Obama administration
launched a preemptive campaign to change systems of governance throughout the
Middle East and North Africa. It further revealed that the initiative worked
primarily with civil society through influential U.S.-based and regional NGOs,
and emphasized that early in 2010 priority was given to Yemen, Saudi Arabia,
Tunisia, Egypt, and Bahrain. Within a year of its establishment, Libya and
Syria were added to the list of highest-priority countries for intervention
under the initiative/conspiracy belt.
We were facing a grand scheme involving many parties,
sponsored by clear international actors for Israel’s sake—an endeavor in which
Israel itself contributed diligently, believing that its future lies not only
in politics but in existence itself. Joining the fray was the international
organization of the Muslim Brotherhood, which dreams of a state even if only
over a span of water, along with its allies and supporters.
Egypt and the road to January 25, 2011
In 2006—five years before the stirrings of what was
called the Arab Spring—the U.S. ambassador in Cairo, Francis Richard Donny,
sent a cable to the State Department in Washington dated March 16, 2006, under
the heading “Secret.” The cable was sent at a time when American leaders
classified Egypt as a “friendly state and strategic ally.”
The cable stated: “The Egyptian regime is preparing to
die, and its death should be hastened or it should be exhausted by inflicting a
thousand wounds—what was termed the policy of ‘a thousand wounds in Egypt.’” It
added: “It will most likely not be possible to achieve significant democratic
progress so long as President Mubarak remains in office. Nevertheless, his
harsh rule provides space and affords time to prepare civil society and some
Egyptian government institutions as a stage preceding his departure. We do not
have a successful solution for everything, but we can press for changes that
will inevitably lead to death by a thousand small wounds for Egypt’s
authoritarian despotic system, by adopting a policy of ‘mass deception.’”
The cable also indicated that the military institution
would be a burden on change, and it predicted that the popularity of the Muslim
Brotherhood would increase because they provide social services that the
Egyptian government itself does not provide, and that their self-confidence is
growing.
The 2005 deal under American sponsorship
That cable was preceded by a deal between the Muslim
Brotherhood and the Mubarak regime ahead of the 2005 presidential elections.
This was driven by the Egyptian government’s inability to curb the
Brotherhood’s street activity through the known security policy of “trimming
the nails,” amid strict foreign oversight and foreign plans that deemed the
time ripe for intervention in internal affairs. This prompted the government to
seek an agreement with the group that included releasing detained Brotherhood cadres
on the condition that the Brotherhood participate in the elections and not
boycott them, thereby lending them a measure of legitimacy.
The group’s backing of Ayman Nour in the presidential
elections—and its impact on the result by securing him more than half a million
votes—served several objectives at the time:
First: sending a message to the regime that the group
could influence any election and ensure the success of any candidate, even if
his popularity in the street was weak.
Second: sending a message to the West, especially the
United States, that it is a group that believes in liberal ideas, which does
not conflict with its Islamic program.
Third: toppling Noman Gomaa, head of the Wafd Party, who
opposed the Brotherhood’s right to establish a political party.
The beginnings of the clash
The beginnings of the deterioration in relations between
the regime and the Muslim Brotherhood came with the Azhar militias case, case
no. 963 of 2006 (Brotherhood financing), and military case no. 2 of 2007.
On December 10, 2006, Brotherhood students at Al-Azhar
University staged a display resembling military militia parades. They wore
black head coverings bearing the word “Steadfast,” and some covered their faces
to conceal their identities and evade security surveillance, against the
backdrop of the expulsion of seven Brotherhood students from the university.
Security monitoring teams discovered that the group’s leadership had formed
organizational committees comprising student members, assigning each committee
specific tasks to achieve horizontal spread among student sectors at Al-Azhar
University—something that had not been agreed upon between the two sides.
The 2010 Shura Council elections
After the failure of dialogue sessions between the group
and political parties and forces to form a front to confront the regime, the
Brotherhood decided to return to the regime’s fold and launch a trial balloon
to test the regime’s receptivity to dialogue once again. The group nominated
three of its members of parliament to contest the Shura Council elections held
in June 2010. The outcome, however, was disappointing for the group after all
three candidates failed to win any seat, despite their having served as members
of the People’s Assembly for five consecutive years.
The group felt the crisis and began responding to deep
dialogue with the Americans about toppling the regime. It initiated contact
with Washington’s envoys in Turkey to receive instructions. The instructions
were clear: boycott the 2010 parliamentary elections, ride the ElBaradei wave
around which many political forces rallied, and push January events to the peak
of confrontation.
Intelligence reports
Egyptian intelligence services monitored numerous
movements by a number of foreign intelligence agencies, particularly American
ones, and observed notable activity by their operatives in Tahrir Square during
the events. Security assessments confirmed that the country was preparing for a
major event akin to what happened in Tunisia. These assessments were presented
on January 8, 2011 to the political leadership by Field Marshal Hussein
Tantawi, who harbored concerns—according to Military Intelligence reports—that
the event could escalate from protest to civil disobedience. Accordingly,
directives were issued by the General Command of the Armed Forces to raise the
state of readiness starting January 20, 2011.
January 23, 2011
On that day, an Egyptian military delegation headed by
Lieutenant General Sami Anan, Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, departed to
visit the United States to attend the annual conference for Egyptian–American
military coordination and cooperation, which addresses all types of cooperation
across branches and weapons and focuses on identifying requirements and
assessing what has been achieved. The visit had been planned for October 2010
but was postponed because the scheduled date coincided with the Egyptian
parliamentary elections, which required security and protection duties
undertaken by the Armed Forces under the Chief of Staff’s supervision.
General Anan was surprised, upon bidding farewell at the
airport, to find the second-ranking officer in the U.S. Army’s General Command
waiting for him in the departure lounge at one of the military airports, ahead
of the trip to Washington, where Anan would board his aircraft back to Cairo.
General Anan says the man took him aside and said to him verbatim: “Keep the
army away from the youth movement in the street, and do not confront those
demonstrations. The fall of Mubarak’s rule has become a matter of time, and
what is happening in the square is the beginning of the end.”
Anan did not realize that everything had been prepared,
that the principal actors had already pressed the button to initiate the plan,
and that what remained was merely a matter of time.
Each participant among the major blocs had a precisely
drawn role: the Brotherhood, ElBaradei, April 6. Only those simple, kind
families of the great Egyptian people—who went out in the thousands supporting
slogans that carried their pains and aspirations—were not on the front line
with those planners and backers. Hence their shock was severe when we later
revealed to them, on the program The Black Box, the depth and gravity of what
had occurred. To be continued.
Paris: 5:00 p.m., Cairo time
