Zero Hour in Islamabad Six Files That Will Decide the Fate of Iran and the Region

  A calm reading of the Iran–US negotiations file, far removed from unrealistic nationalist fervor

By Abdel-Rahim Ali

Against the backdrop of the US naval blockade of Iranian ports, and the incendiary statements being exchanged between the Iranian and American leaderships, all eyes are now turning to Islamabad, where the stage is being set for a second round of negotiations between Tehran and Washington. The talks are being hosted under Pakistani sponsorship, with behind-the-scenes support from Egypt, Turkey, and China.

US President Donald Trump has described this round as “the last chance,” warning Iran that, should these talks fail, he will press ahead with the destruction of Iran's power plants, core infrastructure, and bridges, in line with a pre-prepared target list coordinated with the Israeli side.

The truth is that there are several substantive issues that must be resolved in this round of talks, or in the rounds to follow; otherwise, we are all heading toward a catastrophic outcome: a return to war — whether today, tomorrow, or one to two years from now.

The first of these issues concerns the fate of Iran's uranium stockpile enriched to 60 percent, which amounts to roughly 440 kilograms according to reports by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Washington is demanding that this stockpile be transferred out of Iran altogether, while the mediators are floating the option of shipping part of it to a third country and down-blending the remainder inside Iran, under strict international supervision, so as to render it suitable for peaceful uses.

Compounding the picture is the fact that Iran's total enriched-uranium holdings, across all enrichment levels combined, approach two thousand kilograms — a reality that is likely to keep this dossier in a tense tug-of-war until a root-and-branch solution is reached that satisfies all parties: Washington, Tehran, and the international community alike.

The second issue concerns Iran's three major nuclear facilities: Natanz, Fordow, and Isfahan — the sites responsible for the re-enrichment of uranium and which house the centrifuge cascades needed for that purpose.

Washington is insisting on the complete dismantlement of these capabilities and has gone even further in a recent proposal, calling for the establishment of a “Regional Nuclear Consortium” under which peaceful-use enrichment activities would take place in neighboring Gulf states (such as the United Arab Emirates or Saudi Arabia) under international supervision. The aim is to ensure that the crisis of covert enrichment inside Iranian territory — such as what followed the 2015 Vienna agreement — is not repeated.

The current debate revolves around the duration of any enrichment suspension: Washington is demanding twenty years, while Tehran is offering only five, and the mediators are working to bridge the gap. In my view, unless this matter is resolved at its roots, we will be like a circus performer walking a frayed tightrope with unsteady steps underfoot.

The third issue — no less significant than the first two — concerns the range of Iran's ballistic missiles. Washington and Tel Aviv, along with several European capitals and, today, the Gulf states as well, are insisting on a reasonable ceiling for missile range, one sufficient only for defending Iran's borders and international waters, without threatening regional capitals.

Tehran, for its part, clings to the principles of national security and sovereignty, and to the notion of deterrence. Amid this back-and-forth, the mediators are attempting to narrow the gap between the two positions. Any postponement of resolving this file will return us, one day, to square one.

The fourth issue — equally weighty — is that of Iran's regional arms and proxies. In the view of Europe, the Gulf, the United States, and a large number of other countries, it is simply unacceptable that Iran should hijack entire states: Lebanon through Hezbollah, Yemen through the Houthis, and Iraq through Shiite armed factions — and then deploy them as arms and proxies in its regional deterrence equation.

This has resulted in the ruin of sovereign Arab states' capacities and has undermined their ability to assert authority over their own territories — a situation the international community refuses to accept. The world is calling for a reduction of Iranian influence over these groups, an end to their financing and arming, and the consolidation of weapons in the hands of the state alone in those capitals. Tehran, however, continues to refuse, leaving us leaning against a wall that could collapse at any moment.

Amid the forty-day war, a new variable emerged that pushed in the direction of war and blockade against Iran: the Strait of Hormuz. This strait is an international maritime passage, and no single state has the right to control it. Consequently, Europe, China, Russia, the United States, the Gulf states — indeed, the entire world — will take a clear stance on the matter. The passage cannot be placed under anyone's unilateral control, whether by imposing transit fees (as Tehran attempted to do during the war, in what became known as the “Hormuz Toll Booth System”) or by blocking the movement of vessels.

Iran continues to insist on new arrangements for the strait — arrangements that the rest of the world flatly rejects. I would argue that this file may well be one of Iran's negotiating cards, held back for concessions on other issues. And yet I believe it will end up complicating the crisis far more than it will contribute to resolving it, precisely because it carries such a clear international consensus behind the principle of freedom of navigation. Add to this — according to reliable reports — the fact that Iran has lost track of some of the naval mines it had planted in the strait, meaning the crisis is no longer merely political, but a genuine maritime-security hazard.

Against the backdrop of the forty-day war, a new equation has emerged that did not previously exist, and it concerns Gulf security. The targeting of Gulf states — with roughly 2,800 missiles and drones fired over forty days toward Kuwait, the UAE, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and even Jordan — came as a shock that shook the region's foundations and deeply eroded the trust of Iran's neighbors in their Iranian neighbor.

Iran is now under an obligation to provide binding international guarantees that it will not hold the Gulf hostage in any future deterrence calculus or impending confrontation. The Gulf bears no responsibility for Iran's choices that collide with the American and Israeli vision of its regional role.

Several Gulf states have demanded compensation from Iran for the damage inflicted upon them during the war — foremost among them the UAE, which has formally demanded around six billion dollars in direct compensation. Iran, in turn, has demanded compensation from five Gulf states that host American bases, claiming — from Tehran's perspective — that they were complicit in the aggression waged against it.

In my judgment, any talks that proceed without a Gulf seat at the table — or, at the very least, without the Gulf vision being tabled before the negotiators — will not be able to yield a final and durable solution to the crisis.

This round, and the rounds that will follow in the Iran–US talks — under Pakistani sponsorship and with Egyptian, Turkish, and Chinese support — must inevitably lead to an unraveling of these files as a prelude to a root-and-branch solution. If, however, these issues are handled only partially — in response to domestic pressures on Trump inside America, or to mediator fatigue, or to the parties' desire to catch their breath — we will all be returned to square one within a year or two, perhaps even within just a few months.

For Iran would then return to covert enrichment, and to producing long-range missiles. Israel would uncover these steps, as has always been the case — given the frightening scale of Israeli intelligence penetration inside Iran — and the military strikes would of course return, if not this year, then the year after. And we would remain trapped in this vicious cycle until the day arrives when the region collapses beneath the drums of a mad war that will leave nothing green nor dry standing in its wake.

The only solution, in my view, is for Iran to fundamentally rethink its doctrine — a doctrine built on regional expansion, reliance on proxies, and the pursuit of the nuclear bomb — and to turn instead inward, toward economic and social development, political reform, healthcare, education, and nation-building. The goal is for Iran to become a pivotal state by virtue of the strength of its economy, rather than its military power.

Within this framework, Iran can emerge from this war as a victor if it achieves the following:

1. Demanding war reparations amounting to 270 billion dollars.

2. Demanding the release of its frozen assets — including the six billion dollars earmarked for humanitarian transactions.

3. Demanding the lifting of American and UN sanctions, and the resumption of oil exports.

4. Carrying out uranium enrichment for peaceful purposes only, under strict international supervision, in order to rebuild the trust that has been lost.

5. Concluding broad trade agreements with the Gulf states, so that Iran returns to being a cooperative and peaceful neighbor in the region, propelling its economy to the front ranks.

6. Reducing military spending on its nuclear-weapons program, its missiles, and its proxy network, and redirecting those surpluses to construction and development.

This is the path that can reshape Iran's face once and for all, and that can cast it as a pivotal regional state impossible to exclude from any equation in the Middle East.

Short of this, I fear the alternative will be its removal from geography and history itself — or at the very least, the removal of its current ruling system — forever.