Edgar Morin and the Third Path: The Possible Always Exists

 Last Friday, the global intellectual community lost one of its most prominent figures with the passing of the French philosopher and sociologist Edgar Morin at the age of 104. Morin was renowned as the architect of the theory of "complex thought," a vision that calls for understanding human, social, and scientific phenomena through their interconnectedness and complexity. This approach became a fundamental reference for interpreting human, social, and scientific phenomena throughout the second half of the twentieth century and continues to do so today.

This theory has been used to analyze developments since the beginning of the Middle East crisis and the outbreak of war between the United States and Israel on one side and Iran on the other.

I was convinced that this conflict would eventually end, whether through breaking the will of the regime in Iran or through the conclusion of a peace treaty and a permanent agreement between the parties. Yet the important question is not how this conflict—which continues to rage as these lines are being written—will end, but rather what that conflict will ultimately reveal. My conviction has been, and remains, that three projects are competing to establish their vision and logic in our region: the Iranian Safavid project, the Israeli Zionist project, and the national-state project led by Egypt and presented as a model for coexistence in a region crowded with conflicts, sects, and ethnicities.

When we examine the complex landscape that has taken shape since the outbreak of military confrontation between the United States and Iran in early 2026, we find ourselves facing a complexity that cannot be reduced to the traditional binaries of analysis: victor/defeated, ally/enemy, attack/defense. This very complexity makes invoking the thought of Edgar Morin (born in 1921) more relevant than ever.

As I have previously noted, Morin, in his major intellectual project La Méthode (The Method), offers an epistemological framework that rejects simplification and embraces "complex thought" (La pensée complexe) as a tool for understanding phenomena in their interconnections, contradictions, and sudden transformations. This framework intersects profoundly with the three-dimensional analytical framework we have adopted since the beginning of the crisis, from which the title of our forthcoming book, The National State Project, emerged.

For Morin, complex thought is not merely an academic tool but a method for understanding how the three regional projects interact through circular, non-linear chains of causality, where results become causes and opposing parties require one another to justify their existence.

In this preliminary reading, written as a tribute to the man who gave the world a century of intellectual enlightenment, we present part of our thesis in which we applied the late French philosopher’s theory to our central idea.

First: The Dialogical Principle (Le principe dialogique) and the Competing Projects

The dialogical principle is one of the three pillars of Morin’s complex thought. It means that two contradictory forces can simultaneously be complementary; neither eliminates the other, but rather depends on and feeds off it. This principle directly illuminates the relationship between the two expansionist projects: the Zionist and the Safavid.

The Zionist Project and the Safavid Project: Complementary Enemies

On the surface, the two projects appear locked in an existential conflict. Yet a Morinian analysis reveals a deeper dialogical structure: each project needs the other to justify its expansion. Israel uses the Iranian threat to justify expanding settlements, strategic depth, and control over occupied territories, while Iran uses the "Zionist danger" to justify building a network of militias stretching from Lebanon to Yemen.

This dialogical relationship explains a phenomenon that has puzzled many observers: why confrontations between Israel and Iran never evolved into a direct, all-out war before American intervention. Both sides understood—even if only subconsciously—that eliminating the other would also eliminate the justification for their own expansionist existence.

In Morin’s terms, the Zionist and Safavid projects exist in a "dialogical" relationship: contradiction and complementarity at the same time. The elimination of one would deprive the other of its rationale for expansion.

The Arab National State: The Third Pole That Breaks the Binary

Here emerges the analytical value of introducing the third dimension—the Arab national-state project centered in Cairo. Morin rejects closed binaries and argues that the "excluded third" (Le tiers exclu) is often the key to genuine understanding. The Arab national state, as a project seeking not expansion but stability and sovereignty, represents this third pole that breaks the closed dialogical loop between the two expansionist projects.

Egypt in particular, with its strategic control of the Suez Canal and its Arab and African depth, possesses the capacity to redefine the rules of the regional game. This has already begun to manifest itself in its mediating role during the current crisis.

Second: The Recursive Principle (Le principe de récursion) and Cycles of Escalation

Morin’s second principle is the principle of recursive organization, or the recursive loop (Boucle récursive), whereby results become causes in an ongoing circular process. Effects return to influence the causes that produced them. This principle sheds revealing light on the dynamics of escalation in the U.S.–Iran crisis.

The Strait of Hormuz–Bab el-Mandeb Loop: Recursive Causality in Strategic Geography

Iran’s strategy regarding the dual chokepoints of Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb perfectly embodies the recursive loop. American military pressure drives Iran to threaten maritime navigation; threats to navigation raise oil prices; rising prices place pressure on the American economy; economic pressure complicates the position of the U.S. administration domestically; this, in turn, opens additional room for Iranian maneuvering—and so the cycle continues indefinitely.

Yet the same recursive loop contains a paradox: the more successful Iran becomes at threatening navigation, the greater the international need for alternatives to the Strait of Hormuz. At that point, Saudi Arabia’s Yanbu pipeline, the Suez Canal, and alternative routes gain prominence, weakening Iran’s leverage over the long term.

The Morinian recursive loop can be expressed as follows:

Escalation → Threats to navigation → Rising prices → Economic pressure → Increased complexity of the American position → Further escalation.

Yet the same loop generates its opposite: the search for alternatives that gradually diminish Iran’s strategic card.

Assassinations of Leaders and the Recursive Loop of Violence

The assassination of leaders of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps provides another example of the recursive loop. Such assassinations aim to weaken Iran’s leadership structure, but they simultaneously produce shifts in internal succession dynamics—such as the rise of Mojtaba Khamenei and the reordering of power balances within the Guard. These transformations may generate leadership that is either more hardline or more pragmatic, thereby reshaping the equation once again.

Third: The Hologrammatic Principle (Le principe hologrammatique) and the Local–Global Dimension

Morin’s third principle is the hologrammatic principle: the part contains the whole, and the whole contains the part. Every point in a hologram carries information about the entire image. This principle allows each local conflict zone to be interpreted as a mirror of the broader regional system.

Kharg Island: The Strategic Hologram

Iran’s Kharg Island, through which roughly 90 percent of Iranian oil exports pass, represents a strategic hologram par excellence. This small geographical point encapsulates every dimension of the broader conflict: American naval power (USS Tripoli and expeditionary naval vessels), the global oil economy, the regional balance of power, and the future of the Iranian regime itself.

In Morin’s language, a strike on Kharg is not merely a limited military action; it is a reordering of the entire system. The whole system is present within this single point.

Egypt: The Arab Hologram

By the same logic, Egypt contains within itself the image of the Arab whole. It is the most populous Arab state, possesses the strongest Arab military, controls the world’s most important maritime passage, and inherits the region’s oldest experience in building a modern national state. What happens in Egypt reverberates throughout the Arab system, and what happens in the Arab system reverberates within Egypt.

The hologrammatic principle explains why the U.S.–Iran crisis cannot be understood in isolation from Egypt, nor Egypt’s position understood in isolation from the broader regional system. The part contains the whole.

Fourth: The Ecology of Action (Écologie de l'action) and Unintended Consequences

One of Morin’s most important concepts is the "ecology of action." Once any action enters a complex environment, it escapes the control of its initiator and produces unforeseen consequences—sometimes the exact opposite of what was intended. This concept sheds sharp light on the American approach to the crisis.

The Madman Theory and Its Paradoxes

The use of the "Madman Theory," devised by Richard Nixon and apparently echoed by Donald Trump in his pressure campaign against Iran, provides a textbook example of the ecology of action. Excessive pressure designed to force Iran into negotiations may produce the exact opposite effect: hardening the Iranian leadership’s stance or fragmenting the internal decision-making structure in ways that render negotiations impossible, even if some actors desire them.

Here Morin’s thought intersects with our analysis of the "earthquake" scenario among the four scenarios we have proposed. A decisive American military action, even if successful in achieving its immediate objectives, could unleash chaotic dynamics in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen that exceed any party’s capacity to control.

This synthesis reveals that the Arab national-state project is not merely a "third option" between two alternatives but, in Morin’s terms, the "organizer" (L'organisateur) capable of transforming the destructive dialogical relationship between the two expansionist projects into a productive one, where competition shifts from an existential struggle to a manageable contest of interests.

Fifth: Toward a "Strategy of Complexity" — Analytical Recommendations

Morin distinguishes between a "program" and a "strategy." A program is a sequence of predetermined actions operating in a stable environment, whereas a strategy is the capacity to adjust course according to emerging developments in an unstable environment. The U.S.–Iran war requires a strategy, not a program.

1. Reject Reductionism

Arab analysis must reject reducing the crisis to a single dimension—whether military, economic, or sectarian. The three projects are intertwined, and any one-dimensional analysis will generate flawed recommendations.

2. Harness Recursive Loops

Rather than attempting to stop recursive loops—which is impossible—Egypt and the Arab national state can redirect them, transforming cycles of escalation into cycles of negotiation by proposing tangible alternatives, such as the "New Vienna" scenario.

3. Respect the Ecology of Action

Any Arab initiative must recognize that its outcomes will not be identical to its intentions. Planning should incorporate multiple scenarios for unintended consequences, as we attempted to do through our four-scenario framework.

4. Awareness of the Hologrammatic Dimension

Every Egyptian position regarding the crisis—even silence—is a message read throughout the regional and international system. Intelligent strategic positioning requires awareness that Cairo carries within itself the image of the entire region.

Complexity Is Not Weakness but Strength

When Edgar Morin wrote that "complexity is not a recipe but a challenge," he meant that complex thought does not provide ready-made answers; it offers better tools for asking the right questions. The three-dimensional analytical framework we have adopted, when enriched by Morin’s tools, is transformed from a static map into a dynamic model capable of absorbing surprises and transformations.

Ultimately, what Morin teaches us is that true strength lies not in simplifying reality but in the ability to engage with its complexity. Egypt, as the third pole in the equation, possesses a unique strategic advantage: it is the only actor that does not require an "existential enemy" to justify its project. Its project is construction rather than expansion, stability rather than chaos. This is precisely what makes it, in the language of complex thought, the "organizer of the system," capable of transforming conflict from a closed loop into an open path.

"Complex thought teaches us to move beyond impossible alternatives: order or chaos, unity or fragmentation, resistance or surrender. Iran or Israel... the third path is always possible for those who possess the tools of complexity."