Why terrorist groups survive decapitation strikes?

A study that appeared in the International Security journal can offer answers to many of the questions we ask today about the ability of terrorist organization to outlive the targeting of their leaders.

Titled, "Attacking the Leader, Missing the Mark: Why Terrorist Groups Survive Decapitation Strikes", the study says both the al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden and Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, leader of al-Qaeda in Iraq, were killed in raids by American special combat troops.

On October 5, 2012, U.S. forces, it says, captured Abu Anas al-Libi, an al-Qaeda leader, in a raid in Libya. The United States has also relied heavily on drone strikes to target al-Qaeda leaders and other militants in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Yemen, it adds.

The study notes that in June 2012, Abu Yahya al-Libi, then al-Qaeda’s deputy leader, was killed

in Pakistan in a drone strike coordinated by the Central Intelligence Agency. It adds that highly experienced, al-Libi served an important operational function within the organization.

Despite these and other instances of successful targeting, the study says, al-Qaeda remains a resilient terrorist organization. It notes that theories of charismatic leadership, for example, posit that the susceptibility of terrorist organizations to leadership targeting is a function of qualities inherent to the leader.

The study adds that these qualities not only sustain leaders’ legitimacy, but also foster the belief among followers that such leaders are irreplaceable.

It says theories of charismatic leadership, however, overpredict the success of leadership decapitation while overlooking both organizational variables and social context.

Organizations, it adds, in which the leader has both operational and inspirational roles are the most likely to collapse after decapitation.

It says organizations with charismatic leaders tend to be susceptible to leadership attacks, over time they can become more institutionalized and more resilient in the face of such attacks.

The study notes that "organizational resilience” refers to whether a group that has experienced degradation can still engage in terrorist activity.

Terrorist group resilience, it adds, is a function of two variables: bureaucracy and popular support.

"Leadership decapitation is unlikely to result in the dissolution of groups that are highly bureaucratized or that have high levels of popular support because leaders matter less in these circumstances," the study says. "Groups that are bureaucratic and have popular support are the hardest to destabilize through leadership targeting, and it in these cases that counterproductive outcomes are likely."

It adds that bureaucratized terrorist groups are diversified, have a clear division of administrative responsibilities and functions, follow rules and procedures, and are thus more likely to withstand the sudden removal of a leader or leaders.

Because smaller, younger, and more ideological organizations are less likely to be bureaucratized, they are more likely to succumb to attacks on their leadership, the study says.

It goes on to say that bureaucracies have universalistic rules that are critical when delegating responsibilities within an organization.

The study adds that highly bureaucratic terrorist organizations are more likely to experience smooth leadership transitions.

"Thus the violent or sudden removal of a leader should be less destabilizing in hierarchical groups, which have clear succession processes," the study says. "Moreover, the clear division of responsibilities found in such organizations allows them to continue functioning because each member has specific duties."

It says rules and procedures make the organization much less dependent on the leadership. The study adds that because the group’s operations are institutionalized, the sudden removal of a leader should not have lasting effects on the organizational capacity of a targeted group.