It is high Time to Get Out of Afghanistan
The decision by President Trump to withdraw 7,000 of the
roughly 14,000 American troops left in Afghanistan, possibly by summer, has
raised new concerns about his impulsive behavior, especially given his nearly
simultaneous decision to pull out all American forces from Syria against the
advice of Defense Secretary Jim Mattis. But the downsizing of the Afghan
mission was probably inevitable. Indeed, it may soon be time for the United
States to get out of the country altogether.
No other country in the world symbolizes the decline of the
American empire as much as Afghanistan. There is virtually no possibility of a
military victory over the Taliban and little chance of leaving behind a
self-sustaining democracy — facts that Washington’s policy community has mostly
been unable to accept.
While many American troops stay behind steel-reinforced
concrete walls to protect themselves from the very population they are supposed
to help, it is striking how little discussion Afghanistan has generated in
government and media circles in Washington. When it comes to Afghanistan,
Washington has been a city hiding behind its own walls of shame and
frustration.
While the Chinese, Pakistanis, Indians and Iranians are all
developing competing energy and mining projects in and next door to
Afghanistan, the United States appears to have little commercial future in the
country, even though it spends about $45 billion there annually. The total cost
of the war could reach as high as $2 trillion when long-term costs are factored
in, according to Brown University's Cost of War Project. All that to prop up an
unstable government that would most likely disintegrate if aid were to end.
Indeed, Afghanistan represents the triumph of the
deterministic forces of geography, history, culture, and ethnic and sectarian
awareness, with Pashtuns, Tajiks, Uzbeks and Hazaras and other groups competing
for patches of ground. Tribes, warlords and mafia-style networks that control
the drug trade rule huge segments of the country. To show just how perverted
Western experts’ view of the situation has become, the British regional
specialist Anatol Lieven, writing in The National Interest, argues that “just
because the U.S. money was stolen does not mean that it was wasted,” since it
has gone to paying off tribal chiefs to keep them from joining the Taliban or
becoming feuding warlords.
It did not have to be like this. Had the United States not
become diverted from rebuilding the country by its invasion of Iraq in 2003
(which I mistakenly supported), or had different military and development
policies been tried, these forces of division might have been overcome.
According to the Pakistani journalist Ahmed Rashid, there was simply too much
emphasis on the electoral process in Kabul and not nearly enough on bread-and-butter
nation building — in particular, bringing basic infrastructure and agriculture
up to the standards that Afghans enjoyed from the 1950s until the Soviet
invasion of 1979.
Certainly, no place is hopeless. But that is not where we
are now. The heavily Pashtun Taliban, an accessory to the Sept. 11 hijackings,
continues to make battlefield gains and, if there are actual peace
negotiations, is poised to share power with the American-backed government of
President Ashraf Ghani, if not eventually replace it. The United States’
special adviser to Afghanistan, Zalmay Khalilzad, is trying to broker a
diplomatic solution that allows the United States draw down its forces without
the political foundation in Kabul disintegrating immediately.
That may be the real reason the United States keeps spending
so heavily in Afghanistan. The Pentagon is terrified of a repeat of 1975, when
panicked South Vietnamese fled Saigon as Americans pulled out and North
Vietnamese forces advanced on the city. The United States military did not
truly begin to recover from that humiliation until its victory in the Persian
Gulf war of 1991. An abrupt withdrawal from Afghanistan could conceivably
provide a new symbol of the decline in American hard power.
There is also the fear that an Afghanistan in chaos could
once again provide a haven for an international terrorist group determined to
perpetrate another Sept. 11-scale attack. Of course, Yemen, Somalia and a
number of other places could also provide the setting for that.
The point is, we remain in Afghanistan out of fear of even
worse outcomes, rather than in the expectation of better ones. Washington now
merely hopes that Mr. Khalilzad, an experienced diplomat born in Afghanistan,
can deliver a decent interval of stability.
The Chinese, Pakistanis, Russians, Indians and Iranians,
meanwhile, may all be benefiting more from America’s military operations in
Afghanistan than the United States is. Our presence may provide just enough
security to allow their energy and transport corridors to take shape, while
also helping the Russians guard against Islamic terrorism on their southern
border. Thus, our rivals build their own empires on the back of our declining
one.
One might argue that a collapse of the pro-American
government in Kabul would allow those countries to gain even greater footholds
in Afghanistan. But then stabilizing the unruly country would become their
problem.
An enterprising American diplomat, backed by a coherent
administration, could try to organize an international peace conference
involving Afghanistan and its neighbors, one focused on denying terrorist
groups a base in South-Central Asia.
It is the kind of project that Henry Kissinger, Richard
Holbrooke, James Baker III or George Shultz would have taken up in their day.
But it is not something anyone can reasonably expect this administration, as
chaotic, understaffed and incompetent as it is, to undertake, especially with
the departure of Mr. Mattis.
Do we owe it to the Afghan people to stay? Not if the ideals
that we claim to represent appear unachievable. Spending billions and
stationing thousands of troops there with no end in sight to stem a deepening
chaos is simply not sustainable policy. Even a small fraction of that money
could be better spent on smarter infrastructure investments in Asia, such as
liquid natural gas terminals and dual-use ports in Vietnam to compete with
China’s maritime Belt and Road Initiative.
Our withdrawal should not be sudden. It should reduce
outlays and give Ambassador Khalilzad time to work out an arrangement with our
allies, all without public timetables that enable our adversaries to wait us
out.
But let’s be honest with ourselves: Afghanistan is like the
huge and hugely expensive aircraft carriers we continue to build, increasingly
obsolete in an era of sophisticated missile technology and hypersonic warfare.
It is a vestigial limb of empire, and it is time to let it go.
Robert D. Kaplan, a senior fellow at the Center for a New
American Security and a senior adviser at Eurasia Group, is the author of, most
recently, “The Return of Marco Polo’s World: War, Strategy, and American
Interests in the Twenty-first Century.”