Terrorist organizations in Yemen: frequent clashes and conflicting interests

The establishment of the so-called Salafist jihadist movement in Yemen dates back to the 1980s. Since then, there have been many divisions and differences in ideas. The tense situation in Yemen with the security and political vacuum since 2011 has affected the reality of the Salafi trend in general, in terms of visions and attitudes, and specifically the jihadist branch. This is especially true after the Yemen’s political climate created a fertile environment to attract generations of terrorist groups coming from areas of conflict in Syria and Iraq. The Houthi takeover of the capital Sanaa in 2014 took the Yemeni conflict in a sectarian direction after it had been political. Meanwhile, the recent developments in the Yemeni crisis and the outcome of the Stockholm peace talks have raised questions about the future of jihadist movements in Yemen, The nature and composition of terrorist organizations inside Yemen and the repercussions of its establishment and its expansion, through several axes.

History and roots of terrorism in Yemen

The collapse of the Soviet Union in the 1990s led to the return of most of the so-called "Arab Mujahideen" to their countries. Countries’ mechanisms in dealing with this phenomenon varied between attempts to reintegrate them into society or putting them in prisons. As for Yemen, former Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh dealt with those who returned as part of the country’s security precautions that intensified after the events of September 11, 2001. Yemen witnessed the establishment of the first organized jihadist organization in 1997 under the name of Aden-Abyan Islamic Army, led by Zein Al-Abideen Al-Mehdhar, after he announced his recognition of al-Qaeda.

Since 1992, jihadists have been involved in terrorist attacks in Yemen in an unorganized manner, mainly against tourist hotels. The most prominent terrorist attacks were the targeting of the USS Cole in October 2000, which resulted in 47 casualties. Then a variety of attacks on oil facilities took place in conjunction with the Yemeni presidential elections in September 2006. The year 2009 was a turning point after al-Qaeda announced the formation of a branch in Yemen under the name of Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP).

It is noteworthy that al-Qaeda had already been actively present in Yemen, but within the context of an agreement centered on turning a blind eye to the organization’s activities in return for the organization's failure to carry out any operations in Yemen. This agreement was due to the attempts of former President Saleh to contain elements of the organization and its leaders during the period after the return of the Afghan Mujahideen. However, this attempt failed to absorb the waves of these refugees after the collapse of the Soviet Union, as their beliefs had changed in a way contrary to before.

Al-Qaeda and ISIS: the most prominent jihadist organizations in Yemen

Yemen is considered a fertile environment for jihadist organizations and it was the first destination of extremist organizations. Perhaps the most important aspect attracting terrorists to Yemen is the ability to ignite a state of instability against the backdrop of tribal divisions that have taken root since Saleh was ousted from power. The conflict between the south and the central government has provided an environment conducive for expanding the activities of jihadist organizations, especially al-Qaeda. On the other hand, Yemen occupies a strategic and pivotal position that is flanked by regional and international forces, which led to financing these terrorist organizations in order to raise tensions and provide an opportunity to intervene to achieve their interests away from the stability of the Yemeni state.

In the same context, the failure of religious interests is the ultimate goal of the terrorist organizations, through blurring the moderate Islamic identity and replacing it with extremist ideas, just as these groups are keen to spoil the political and economic interests, based on the justification that Arab governments only serve as brokers for the agendas of the United States and other Western countries, which seek to seize the region’s resources.

The main motivations behind the proliferation of these organizations are due to one major factor: the presence of a tribal community incubating for extremist ideology, which the organization relies on to finance its operations, through smuggling oil along the eastern coast of Yemen and the imposition of taxes.

As for ISIS, it had little control in Yemen before the alliance between the Houthis and President Saleh in September 2014 and even the Houthis taking Sanaa in November of the same year. Despite carrying out suicide operations and targeting military facilities in Aden, the group’s presence remained unclear until 2015, when it exploited the security vacuum and unrest in southern Yemen’s liberated cities. However, the organization did not succeed in being a significant competitor in Yemen as compared to its status in Iraq and Syria. The weakness of ISIS in Yemen reinforces the idea of ​​divisions within the group that hit the organization in late 2014.

Frequent clashes and conflicting interests

The argument between al-Qaeda and ISIS dates back to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi’s announcement claiming himself as the caliph of his group’s alleged caliphate. In response, Al-Qaeda announced its rejection of Baghdadi’s declaration, stating that ISIS was merely a jihadist group and did not meet the necessary conditions of a caliphate. ISIS began to mushroom in Yemen in 2015, with new branches emerging from it, including the group that claimed responsibility for the Sanaa bombings, which al-Qaeda renounced. There have also been confrontations between al-Qaeda and ISIS in Yemen’s southern provinces, reflecting the fact that both organizations have different and even conflicting objectives that focus on the personal interests of the leaders within the two organizations.

By comparing both al-Qaeda and ISIS in Yemen, we find that the latter was less successful than al-Qaeda. Despite the divisions that effected al-Qaeda’s structure, ISIS was unable to exploit the situation and reach a level of competition with al-Qaeda. Rather the opposite happened, as the rise of ISIS led to diverting the attention of the international community from al-Qaeda, becoming focused on eliminating the leaders of ISIS. Instead, the barbaric reputation of of ISIS in Syria and Iraq made al-Qaeda seem to be a more rational organization.

One of the most important reasons for the failure of ISIS in Yemen is its lack of adopting a cultural and valuable narrative by which to attract Yemeni tribes like al-Qaeda did, in addition to not participating in development plans for the areas it took control of.  This weakness was compounded by the successive divisions in the group’s ranks and the criticism directed at it by these dissidents.

Arab coalition and reducing terrorist expansion in Yemen

Although the year 2015 marked a real surge in the rise of terrorist organizations and their spread in Yemen, the Arab coalition’s strategy to target the Houthis and other terrorists such as al-Qaeda and ISIS has had a significant impact on reducing the channels of funding for these groups. The Hadrami elite forces, supported by the Arab coalition, and the current battles against al-Qaeda demonstrate this. In April 2016, some 2,000 elite soldiers moved towards Mukalla and managed to eliminate al-Qaeda elements based in the city. They were able to take control of the harbor and airport. These elite forces subsequently intensified their troop movements at the city’s main entrances and carried out operations to sweep through and clear out the remaining elements of the organization there.

The peculiarity of the Mukalla battle lies in the fact that it did not just eliminate the threat of al-Qaeda in the city, but it was also a direct cause for the organization aborting its project of establishing a radical emirate there that could have been a center for launching a variety of terrorist operations.

In conclusion, in the light of recent Yemeni developments, especially after the Stockholm peace talks and the truce that came into force in December 2018, the general indicators reflect that the terrorist organizations in Yemen will gradually deteriorate during the coming period, especially with the American strikes on ISIS strongholds in Iraq and Syria. The sanctions hitting Iran also directly affect the effectiveness of the organization in Yemen, as the sources of funding directed to some of these organizations have deteriorated. Also strengthening the disappearance of these groups is the successive divisions in their ranks that have led to weakening the organizational structure.