The problem with banishing Shamima Begum
It was,
former US chief justice Earl Warren remarked, “a form of punishment more
primitive than torture”. For Voltaire, it was not only irrational but the
height of bad neighbourliness; after all, what was banishment of a criminal but
“throwing into a neighbour’s field the stones that incommode us in our own”.
Lately,
however, banishment – or its modern equivalent, citizenship revocation – has
come back into fashion. Gulf states such as Bahrain, Kuwait and Qatar have
become enthusiastic passport-strippers, using the threat of statelessness to
suppress dissidents and human rights activists.
But it’s not
only despots who have acquired a taste for throwing their citizens into
involuntarily exile. In December, Minister for Justice Charlie Flanagan decided
to strip Ali Charaf Damache, a Algerian-born man convicted of providing support
to Islamist terrorists, of his citizenship on the grounds that he broke his
oath of “fidelity to the Irish nation and loyalty to the State”.
This week,
the British government moved to revoke the citizenship of Shamima Begum, the 19
year old from Bethnal Green in London who travelled to Syria to join Islamic
State in 2015.
The idea has
long pedigree. In ancient Greece, banishment was a moderate form of punishment
(it was better than death, after all) for those deemed to have threatened civic
virtue or broken the social contract, whether through failing to pay back
public loans or some other transgression.
Immanuel
Kant saw it as a legitimate tool against criminals. The rise of nationalism and
the nation state, which defined the national territory as a members’ club and
hardened the distinction between insiders and outsiders, meant states were less
willing to accept undesirables from elsewhere.
At the same time, the claim that the nation
state was made up of a particular, unique people seemed to imply a duty to take
responsibility for all compatriots, however troublesome they might be.
‘Enemy
within’
As a result,
banishment went largely into abeyance by the late 19th century, and states
instead focused their expulsion powers on non-citizen aliens. But a series of
events since then – from the first World War through the cold war and, most
recently, 9/11 and Islamist terrorism – have been used by governments to
reintroduce the idea that citizenship is conditional. Fear of the “enemy
within”, a common propaganda trope in the combatant countries during the Great
War, found an echo in the paranoia about communist infiltration in the US in
the middle of the century.
Both were
used to extend the state’s power to annul nationality. Similarly, concerns
about terrorism more recently have prompted many western governments to ease
their rules on excluding citizens.
The UK’s
attempt to wash its hands of Shamima Begum is a good example of why, legally
and morally, citizenship revocation is often a bad idea. In making the
decision, home secretary Sajid Javid relied on his power to deprive a dual
national of British citizenship if he believes this is conducive to the public
good and if it does not make the individual stateless. But legally the Begum
case is far from straightforward.
If she also
has Bangladeshi citizenship, as London claims, it appears that could be true
only because the children of Bangladeshi parents are automatically citizens at
birth (Begum’s family say she never sought or received a Bangladeshi passport,
and, to complicate matters, Dhaka says she is not a citizen).
If she is
not now legally stateless, then she is de facto stateless, living in a war zone
with no travel documents and both the UK and Bangladesh disowning her.
Tiers of
citizenship
The deeper
political problem with cancelling passports in this way is that it introduces
tiers of citizenship, and it just so happens that those occupying the lower
tier tend not to be white. Singling out naturalised or dual citizens, as the UK
law does, frames the discussion squarely around the supposed disloyalty of
those born outside the state.
If a white
London-born girl with no family ties to Bangladesh did what Begum did, the
government would not have the option of withdrawing her passport.
Javid’s
decision may be legally shaky, then, but it is even more of a cop-out on moral
grounds. There may not be much sympathy for Begum in the UK, but in this case a
power normally used against adults who commit serious crimes is being deployed
against a woman who was radicalised as a child in London and is now living in a
squalid camp in northern Syria with her vulnerable newborn baby (himself
presumably entitled to British citizenship). It’s not even clear what crime, if
any, she may have committed.
If Shamima
Begum is a problem, she is the UK’s problem. That’s where she was born and grew
up. That’s where she was radicalised. And it’s there – not in a Kurdish-run
camp in Syria or in Bangladesh, a place she has never even been – that she has
the best chance of being either punished or rehabilitated.
Revoking her
citizenship was quick, cheap, popular and painless for the British government.
Bringing her home would be expensive, controversial and potentially fraught
with difficulty. But it would also be the right thing to do.