Developments and future of crisis between Islamists and authorities in Algeria

The relations between Algerian authorities under President Abdelaziz Bouteflika and Islamists have taken a different trend, compared with former regimes. The relations have been intertwined and interactive since Bouteflika's first term in office until his third term, which coincide with the "Arab Spring". In 2011, the Islamists were separated from the regime, but have remained part of Bouteflika's government and under his umbrella.

This study answers a key question: What is the outlook of the relations between Islamists and the Algerian regime, and where would the crisis between the sides lead to? However, it is noteworthy to mention that Islamist powers have returned to the parent movements of HMS and El Nahda after May 2017. That may widen the gap, especially after the Islamists refused Bouteflika's invitation to take part in the Abdelmalek Sellal-led cabinet and the presidential coalition after the parliamentary polls in May 2017.

This study shed light on the relationship between Islamism and the authorities in Algeria. It answers a key question: Why has been a crisis between Islamism and the Algerian authorities? What would that lead to?

The study is divided into three divisions: the chart of Islamist political powers in Algeria after 2011, the perspectives of the crisis between Islamists and the authorities, and the outlook of the crisis and possible scenarios of the relations between the two sides.

1-    The chart of Islamism in Algeria

In a bid to identify the change of the relations between the Algerian regime and Islamists, the study sheds light on the political chart of Islamist movements which have been a political ally to the presidential coalition led by Bouteflika until 2011.   

Old Islamist movements

The Islamist parties emerged after late president Chadli Bendjedid introduced political pluralism. These parties drew on dialogue to reach power.

Key parties include:

1.     The Movement for the Society of Peace (HMS)

The party was established in 1991. It was legalized in 1988 after a period of clandestine activities since 1963.

2.     El Nahda or Renaissance Movement

The movement was led by Abdallah Djaballah and based its principles on the approach of global Muslim Brotherhood until the mid-1980s, when Djaballah introduced the term "local Brotherhood".  By the end of 1990, it turned into a political party. Its name was changed to El Nahda Movement in compliance with the 1996 Constitution.

New Islamist powers

Six Islamist parties, which seceded from HMS and El Nahda movements, were founded on the back of constitutional amendments initiated by President Bouteflika in 2011. The parties include Freedom and Justice Party, Justice and Development Party, Front of Change, Algeria's Hope Rally and National Building Party.

2. The relations between Islamists and Algerian authorities prior to 2012

A coalition between the regime and Islamists has been in effect since Bouteflika assumed power until early 2012 as follows:

1.     Coalition

Society for Peace and El Nahda took part in all of the cabinets formed, elections and policies. However, there was no real Islamist opposition. Islamists gained personal advantages.

-         Presidential elections

We should understand the nature of alliance between Islamists and the regime in two presidential elections: April 8, 2004, and April 9, 2009.

-         The 2004 presidential elections

This was the beginning of the coalition, in which Society for Peace and El Nahda took part.

Table showing final results of presidential elections in 2004

As shown in the table, Society for Peace and El Nahda supported President Bouteflika, who got 84.99% of votes.  

-         The 2009 presidential elections

Society for Peace, El Nahda and Movement for National Reform approved amending the Constitution on November 12, 2008, particularly Article 74, which paved the way for new term.

Table showing final results of presidential elections in 2009

As shown in the table, Bouteflika took the lead. Although the Islamist parties were weaker he got 90.2% of votes.

Parliamentary elections

The alliance between the regime and Islamists may be traced in the parliamentary elections prior to 2011.

The parliamentary elections on May 30, 2002

It was the first parliamentary elections held during the rule of President Bouteflika. 

Table showing results of parliamentary elections in 2002

As shown in the table, Islamist parties took 82 seats, down from 102 in the previous polls. Most of the Islamist parties were interested in personal gains, and approved all of the bills proposed by the cabinet.

 The parliamentary elections on May 17, 2007

The coalition of National Liberation Front and Society of Peace continued.  

Table showing results of parliamentary elections in 2007

As shown in the table, the Islamist parties weakened and won fewer seats.

Crisis development

After 2011, the Islamists and the regime clashed. Society of Peace and El Nahda split from the coalition with the regime for the following reasons:

-         The Arab and regional reality has changed after 2011.

-         Abderrazak Mokri took the helm of Movement of Society for Peace in 2013. The movement's leaders opted for opposition.

-         Bouteflika's reforms doubled the number of Islamist parties, which split from the Movement of Society for Peace.   

The parliamentary elections in May 2012

This marked the beginning of a political clash between Bouteflika's regime and Islamists. The clash resulted in the formation of an opposition coalition against the regime and a parliamentary bloc to challenge the regime's parties. The National Liberation Front won 220 seats, or 48% of total seats. The Islamist parties won 48 seats.

The presidential elections in April 2014

The Islamists escalated the situation with the regime, rejecting Bouteflika's running for a fourth term.    

After Bouteflika's victory, the Islamists call for sacking him.

The parliamentary elections in May 2017

The Islamist parties won a total of 48 seats in the parliamentary elections which were held in May 2017. The Islamists ranked third after the National Liberation Front (164 seats) and the National Democratic Rally (97 seats).

In June 2017, former premier Abdelmalek Sellal offered Mokri, head of Movement of Society for Peace, to join the cabinet. However, the movement's shura council rejected the offer, claiming vote rigging and that the regime had not fulfilled its pledges.

 The future of the crisis in the wake of new developments

In the wake of crisis escalation between the Algerian regime and Islamist powers, the study seeks to forecast the outlook of the relations between the two sides in case of continuity of the present situation or change.

1.     Continuity

This scenario is based on the continuity of the present situation which is disagreement and crisis escalation between the Algerian regime and Islamists.

This scenario is also based on the persistence of the regime's attitude towards demands of Islamists and other civil parties. The role of Islamists will be confined to protests and demonstrations, pressuring the authorities to gain advantages, calling for early presidential elections, implementing Article 88 of the Constitution, and all-out constitutional amendments.

2.     Change 

This scenario depends on a change of the Islamist opposition towards the regime. It also depends on a change of the regime's attitude, i.e. brining about constitutional amendments agreed upon with civil powers. The army would interfere if Bouteflika didn't lay out the path after his death.

The army may open the way for civil powers, including all spectra, to rule. This may result in secession between the civil and Islamist parties.

-         The relations between the regime and Islamist parties will change. Algeria's Hope Rally (TAJ) will assume the role played by Society for Peace. The regime may support TAJ, which currently backs President Bouteflika.

-         Constitutional reforms. President Bouteflika may set up the scene for the regime that would take over after him. Constitutional reforms may entrust parliament with a greater role. This would give parties a greater role and would split the civil and Islamist powers, and consequently weaken the opposition. Such a situation would weaken the role of Islamist parties which would have to seek alliance with the regime.        

Conclusion

We may say the existence of Islamist powers in Algeria depends on a number of factors, especially as the Islamist parties are still under formation after the secession from the parent movements Society for Peace and El Nahda.

Despite their interaction with civil parties, which oppose the authorities, the outlook will be set by persistence and solidarity among the Islamist and civil parties as well.