The Somali-Qatari rapprochement… Will it help Farmajo combat terrorism?

Hamed Al-Musalami

After the fall of Somali president Mohamed Siad Barre and his regime in 1991, Somalia suffered a fierce civil war, which was fueled by tribal differences that reaped the lives of thousands and displaced hundreds of thousands of Somalis.

Throughout the 1990s and the beginning of the third millennium, Somalia entered a state of war of all against all, led by warlords.

Moreover, the Islamic Courts Union, a group of Sharia courts that united themselves to form a rival administration to the Somali transitional federal government, extended its control over the country until the Ethiopian intervention, backed by the United States, to support interim president Abdullah Yusuf.

Al-Shabaab, an offshoot of the Islamic Courts Union, described itself as waging jihad against "enemies of Islam", and engaged in combat against the Federal Government of Somalia and the African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM). This brought down Somalia’s economy and state foundations, and due to the protracted lack of a permanent central authority, Somalia was characterized a "failed state".

Al-Shabaab militias then started drawing their weapons against Somali citizens, enforcing the group’s extremist ideology about Islam, and sought to forcefully apply Islamic laws, therefore, the group committed hundreds of terrorist operations against the Somali people, police and army.

During one of Al-Shabaab’s latest operations against AMISOM soldiers in early April, 59 Ugandan troops were killed.

In Feb. 2012, Al-Shabaab, under the leadership of Ayman al-Zawahiri, pledged allegiance to the militant Islamist organization Al-Qaeda; leader Mukhtar Abu Zubair announced then al-Shabaab would be joining the militant Islamist organization al-Qaeda, under the leadership of Zawahiri.

In 2015, a group of Al-Shabaab, led by former cleric Abdulkadir Mumin, switched their allegiance to Daesh leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.

The international community and successive Somali governments have adopted various strategies to encounter terrorism in Somalia; these efforts started with the U.S. initiative “Operation Restore Hope” in 1992-1994.

With the beginning of the Ethiopian intervention in Somalia, an African intervention began through AMISOM, which replaced the Ethiopian military forces in haunting Al-Shabaab and supporting Somalia’s legitimate government.

As Mohamed Abdullah Farmajo became the president of Somalia on Feb. 8, 2017, he made it a top priority to eradicate Al-Shabaab, especially after escalating its activities in the recent period; the group carried out a number of terrorist attacks, especially in the capital Mogadishu, clearly defying the new strategies that the government started implementing.

Events in Somalia indicate an upcoming escalation between the government and the movement; this is part of the regional developments of war against terrorism, especially after the defeat of Daesh in Iraq’s Mosul and Syria’s Raqqa[1].

Farmajo’s strategy against terrorism is based on several foundations:

The first foundation: The continuation of military confrontation and security pursuits against Al-Shabaab in cooperation with AMISOM troops and the national security forces.

The second foundation: The continuation of training forces of the Somali government; organizations and countries cooperating in this field include:

1-      U.S. Forces: Which began with direct intervention in Somalia, and as it failed to restore peace and security using force, it began adopting other strategies that are based on  presenting military consultant, intelligence services, targeting leaders and top members through decisive air strikes, which successfully eliminated Al-Shabaab leader Mukhtar Abu Zubair in 2015, and training Somali forces[2].

2-      The African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM): The African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) is an active, regional peacekeeping mission operated by the African Union with the approval of the United Nations. It was created by the African Union’s Peace and Security Council on Jan. 19, 2007 and has dispatched the first patch of troops on Mar. 6, 2007, it included four thousand Ugandan soldiers.

AMISOM’s total power has reached 20 thousand soldiers from Uganda, Burundi, Kenya, Ethiopia and Djibouti, in addition to hundreds of police personnel from Uganda, Kenya, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Ghana and Zambia. All of this force is assigned to track and eliminate Al-Shabaab militias, in addition to provide training for Somali soldiers[3].

Politicians and researchers believed at the beginning of the third millennium that the African military intervention would not encounter a public rejection, as it would not be considered an occupation, like in cases of western and UN interventions.

Military interventions of the African Union’s Peace and Security Council, however, contradicted the aforementioned beliefs, as these interventions encountered a public – and maybe an official – rejection, as many Somali governments deemed these interventions a breach to its sovereignty, even if they aimed at restoring stability in the country[4]. The state of popular discontent towards the interventions varied, with less resentment towards AMISOM[5].

3-      Regional initiatives to combat terrorist:

-          The Qatari military aids to Somalia: Qatar has provided the Somali government with many military aids allegedly for combating terrorism. According to a study conducted by Al Jazeera Center for Studies Qatar provided Somalia with an estimated $200 million, 30 SUVs, logistic equipment, and also hired Somalis as recruits in the Qatari army.

We must hereby take into consideration the Qatari role in Libya in regards to how it supported terrorism and led to the spread of terrorist movements, agitating the war in Libya. The estimated funds received by these groups since 2011 are around €750 million[6].

-          Turkey’s military aids to Somalia: As Somalia allowed Turkey to establish a Turkish military base, allegedly to train government forces to fight terrorism; there are growing concerns that Turkey would determine an alternative home for Daesh after its defeat in Iraq and Syria.

We must not overlook the role of Qatar and Turkey in supporting terrorism in Syria, either by providing safe havens and passages through Turkey or sending Qatari funds to armed terrorist organizations[7].

Chad’s president announced cutting ties with Qatar for funding terrorism; Abdoulaye Sounaye, a research fellow at the Centre for Modern Oriental Studies in Berlin, said, "We know for certain that jihadist movements in Libya are being supported by Qatar. Chad fears the Chadian rebels who are active in Libya.[8]"

The third foundation: Dismantling terrorist movements:

Since the first moment, the Somali President has been announcing that combating terrorism is a top priority; his strategy depends on infiltrating and dismantling terrorist groups by luring its members into dissidence by providing them guarantees and promises that they will be pardoned and merged into society in exchange for omitting violence and turning in their weapons.

This strategy has already began bearing its fruits as former deputy leader and spokesman of Al-Shabaab Mukhtar Robow surrendered to the Somali Government authorities in Aug. 2017. Militants who are loyal to Robow, moreover, fought against Al-Shabaab militias in the suburbs of Hudur town in Bakol region[9].

Conclusion:

In this context we should be wondering about Farmajo’s strategy, which depends on dismantling Al-Shabaab, and it is indeed a successful strategy, if it aims at the reintegration of dissent members of terrorist groups and cooperate with them to identify the movement’s pattern of thinking;

Are the dissent militias that the Somali government is currently arming and training to combat Al-Shabaab can lead to the eradication of the phenomenon of terrorism, or to more terrorism due to the fragmentation of the group into multiple movements?

The Somali government did not rehabilitate the dissent militias before recruiting them into the national army, the matter which would indicate a potential crisis through the involvement of new parties in the conflict. Here we can recall when the Sudanese government armed and coordinated with the Janjaweed militia to encounter the rebels of Darfur, bringing in a new player to the field.

In the end, we should not miss the Qatari and Turkish interventions in Syria and Libya, which led to the spread of terrorism with the support of various terrorist factions, all to serve purposes of seizing regional power and gaining influence over other countries, the matter that nominates Somalia for a scenario similar to Syria.