Al-Qaeda and Daesh … Paths and Mechanisms of Conflict on Leadership of Global Jihad

The dangers of Al-Qaeda caliphate are not less harmful than the dangers of Daesh deteriorating caliphate. Al Qaeda, which failed to defeat the West, is now seeking to acquire power through an extended caliphate to realize its old goals.

The defeats suffered by the Al-Qaeda organization, which sees itself as the origin of jihadist organizations, have pushed for its return as an undisputed leader of the global jihad movement.

The name of al-Qaeda, which gradually disappeared with the rise of the Islamic State (Daesh) since 2014, has returned to occupy the extended space sought by Daesh to join its caliphate headquarters in Iraq. Al-Qaeda is ushering into a new stage through which strategic features that seem to be well thought out had been crystallized. Such stage has benefited from the entire process of the organization, starting from the Afghan experience to the lessons learned from the experiences of the Salafist jihadist spectrum and political Islam. There are several indications that involve major changes in the global jihad movement scene, which should be treated with analysis and research in order to stand on the features necessary for reforming jihad in the world.

What are the features and bases of Al-Qaeda's strategy to restore his leadership at the top of the global jihad movement? What are the most important centers of influence? What distinguishes its leaders? What are the factors that distinguish it from Daesh? How have the policies of some countries supported their activities?

The study is keen to answer these questions and to solve many of the problems associated with the exchanged rise and fall of al-Qaeda and Daesh, while not forgetting the status of a general proposal that includes the main lines of the plan to confront al-Qaeda, which is preparing to return stronger than it was in the early days of its establishment.

Al-Qaeda: The Transformation of the Thirty Years

Al-Qaeda was founded on February 23, 1988 during a meeting to merge the two networks of "Bin Laden and Jihad" attended by jihadists from Kashmir, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Egypt.

The main feature of the establishment period is the shift from the bilateral conflict between al-Qaeda and America to a war between Muslims and infidels. This approach was crystallized during the golden period of al-Qaeda from 1996 to September 2001, which culminated in the operations of the major terrorist base in the depth of Europe and the United States, especially the bombings of September 11, 2001. During that period, the first methodical doctrine of al-Qaeda, primarily linked to the Afghan Taliban movement, was formed and supported the authority of the Afghan emirate by bringing loyalists and supporters from all over the world. This means making the Afghan emirate a model of the Islamic state system, especially after the pledge of allegiance by Osama bin Laden to its Emir el-Mullah Mohamed Omar.

This comes in line with inspiring foreign fighters to train so that they can replicate the model in their countries while maintaining organizational and methodological links with the center. Abu Musab al-Suri, one of the most important al-Qaeda thinkers, describes this stage by saying: "I am confident that the number of fighters who entered and exited Afghanistan from the period between 1996 and 2001 amounts to thousands."

The boom was followed by the US-led war on al-Qaeda after attacks against US targets in East Africa, off Yemen's coast in 2000, and finally in Washington and New York in 2001.

The invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 and the overthrow of the Taliban regime, coupled with the escape of al-Qaeda leaders and members, prompted the organization to change its strategy to be like guerilla war.

Then, the invasion of Iraq came in 2003 to serve as a rescue for Al Qaeda, whose leaders found a typical mobilization center in the heart of the Muslim and Arab world against US forces. Al-Qaeda's transformation to decentralization was affected by two factors: its loss of influence at its main hub, and developments in Iraq that have inspired its leaders to establish local branches.

A new phase has begun, with al-Qaeda becoming a mere inspiration, general reference, and an ideological umbrella that supports jihadists morally and intellectually throughout the world.

The new strategy has achieved some successes, provided effort and financial resources, and has given the organization some flexibility in dealing with security challenges.

This independence has led the leaders of the branches to the paths of rebellion and to seek independence from the organization. The unbridled tendencies of independence began with Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and did not end with him. He later caused the biggest problem facing al-Qaeda today, which is the Islamic State group.

The violation of the visions of the leaders of al-Qaeda planted the first seed for the establishment of the largest competitor to the rule of Al Qaeda in the heart of the leadership stronghold of the global jihad. The organization continued to try to exploit regional events to create local centers around the world to compensate for the loss of control of its stronghold in Afghanistan.

Daesh was inspired later by this strategy to deal with its losses in its strongholds in Syria and Iraq. The conflict between al-Qaeda and Daesh centered around the conflict over soft strategic centers all over the world.

The third shift coincided with al-Qaeda's march with the popular uprisings. The organization was careful to avoid the uprisings’ negative effects while trying to invest in favor of it. Al-Qaeda sought at this stage to use the anger of the people against the regimes to become at the forefront of the revolution and whoever the public pushes for to make a difference on the ground in the face of the security agencies.

Therefore, new expressions that were never used before in the literature of al-Qaeda appeared like “The Management of the Nation and Political Freedoms”. Ayman al-Zawahiri issued 11 speeches to the revolutionaries in Egypt entitled "The Message of Hope to our People in Egypt", which dealt in its entirety with linking the legitimacy of any political system that might replace the old regimes with the extent of how it goes in tandem with the will of the people and meets its demands.

Al-Qaeda's attention has been directed towards the local community through attempts to gain community and tribal blocs, as America's influence in the Middle East has declined since December 2010.

Zawahiri sent a letter to Atiyahtullah el-Libi, directing him not to use words suggestive of "bragging and monopoly of achievement", and to replace them with others that indicate "participation and concerted efforts of the nation." The leader of al-Qaeda Organization in the Islamic Maghreb, Abu Musab Abdel-Wadud, wrote to the leaders of the ruling group in northern Mali, stressing the need to involve political forces, such as the Azouad Arab movement and others.

He recommended the neutralization of opponents, the avoidance of provocation and keenness on winning the allies and being flexible in dealing with the reality, in addition to the need for gradual application of the Islamic Shari’a law, condemning the demolition of shrines and the establishment of religious rulings without taking into consideration the wrongdoings that result from them.

Abu Musab al-Suri explains the new strategy by saying, "Whoever gains the people wins the battle in the world of guerrilla, because if the Mujahideen were isolated from the people and the people were not convinced of their cause, nothing would happen." He added, "You have to convince people that you used violence for legitimate reasons, whether they were Muslims, or for rational, national, material or welfare reasons if the situation was not related to Islam You have to make the people feel that you are fighting for them.” Al Qaeda failed to try through revolutions that turned into a curse after its development into civil wars.

The competition then started to be with Daesh to find alternative centers of power that can compensate the losses suffered by Daesh and Al-Qaeda after the limited control they had in Syria and Iraq. Al-Qaeda has benefited from the international forces' focus on Daesh, and from Daesh’s practices that promote brutality against minorities and local populations, which has enabled al-Qaeda to consolidate its presence in the positions of Daesh.

This was clearly demonstrated in the methodology of al-Qaeda's branches, especially the model of Ansar al-Sharia and Ansar al-Islam in Yemen, Egypt and Libya before it declared itself dissolved in May 2017. This took place with the vacuum left by regimes and institutions on the one hand and Daesh’s bloody expansion approach on the other hand.

These branches have won the loyalty of the masses by engaging in service and relief activities and in providing assistance. This had led to al-Qaeda realizing during these transformations from its establishment until the present day, an expansion in the field of confrontation, after it was limited to Afghanistan and then Iraq.

Al Qaeda has turned from a small terrorist group into a global network inspiring tens of thousands, penetrating the Middle East and taking part in its events. The direct targeting of the West has passed with the last operation carried out by Maj. Gen. Nidal Hassan in the US Army at the instigation of the Yemeni-born base leader and US citizen Anwar al-Awlaki in Texas in November 2009, killing 13 soldiers and injuring 43 others.

Nigerian al-Qaeda member Omar al-Farouq failed to blow up the Northwest Airport flight from Amsterdam to Detroit in December 2009 as he failed to detonate the bomb. In the same year, the terrorist group failed to carry out the bombing of the New York subway as Najibullah Zazi, an American who has Afghani origin, was arrested before implementation.

This failure culminated in the death of Osama bin Laden in May 2011, which was the most powerful strike to make al-Qaeda miss the chances of exploiting a decline in US influence in the Middle East. This is the plan developed by Washington through targeting al-Qaeda’s effective leaders with planes without pilots.

Al-Qaeda resorted to marginalizing the enemy's long-term strategy and engaging in the strategy of the near enemy, colliding with Daesh which was building its caliphate on the ruins of the legacy of al-Qaeda and the Arab regimes. This is evident from the overall releases and nature of the organization's attitudes towards political events. Since 2011, it has been trying to align itself with the peoples and to show itself as a weighting factor in its struggle to overthrow regimes.

In response to a statement by Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, saying: "The goals of terrorism must not be allowed to be realized and to influence the morale of the people.", the organization presents itself as a rebellion against the regime by saying, “What does that have to do with the Egyptian people? Or do you mean the morale of your soldiers whose weakness and cowardliness are evident.”

Al Qaeda is therefore attempting to expand its influence by establishing a flexible caliphate stretching from Africa across the Middle East to Asia, losing its ability to target the West.

On the other hand, Daesh resorts to inspire many of its supporters to carry out attacks in the West and depict al-Qaeda as an organization that ended its role in the global jihad. Al Qaeda is keen to weaken its rival by containing dissidents and building itself amidst a population that pleads for its support with a less extreme rhetoric about civilians.

Al Qaeda leaders make the difference

Al-Qaeda's current leaders include the name of Mukhtar Belmokhtar, who took over the Salafist region of the Sahara in the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC), the leader of the al-Qaeda terrorist group in the Islamic Maghreb, and the founder of al-Mua’qi’oon Biddam (Those who Sign with Blood) Brigade. He also enjoys wide field experience.

This comes in addition to the Egyptian officer who was separated from the army's rangers Hisham al-Ashmawi, and was one of the deputies in the Egyptian special forces with the testimony of who worked with him. After his dissidence from the army, Al-Ashmawi formed an armed organization, consisting of groups of fugitives, following the sit-in in Rabaa al-Adawyia which was in support of the Muslim Brotherhood group.

Al-Ashmawi joined Ansar Bait al-Maqdis and led the group's cells in the valley after the death of its leader, Muhammad al-Tukhi, on March 11, 2014. He decided to open a confrontation front in Western Sahara to ease pressure on the group in Sinai and Greater Cairo.

On June 1, 2014, his group clashed with an army patrol in Farafra, killing five officers and soldiers. He then set up a camp in the oases to start regular operations in Western Sahara. He attacked a border guard unit in Farafra and killed all its members in July 2014.

He also participated in the assassination attempt on former Interior Minister Major General Mohammed Ibrahim on September 5, 2013. After raiding his home which was near the site of the attack, the security agencies found data on his personal computer that indicate his involvement in the operation.

Among the most prominent current al-Qaeda leaders is Osama al-Hadawi, nicknamed Abu Muhammad al-Julani, the current leader of Hay’at Tahrir el-Sham and former commander of the al-Nasra Front.

He was arrested after returning to Iraq in Boca prison between 2006 and 2007 for his links with US forces during the occupation of Iraq. He was responsible for securing roads inside Syria for fighters who wanted to fight. After his release in 2008, he returned to the ranks of al-Qaeda in Iraq led by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, who commissioned him to establish el-Nusra Front in Syria in January 2012. Al-Julani rejected al-Baghdadi's adding al-Nasra to al-Qaeda, revealing at the time his loyalty to al-Qaeda and his pledge of allegiance to Al-Zawahiri.

Thus, the leaders of the Julani, Belmokhtar, and Ashmawi share the secret of al-Qaeda's steadfastness throughout the years of the rise of Daesh when the three of them led a path in opposition to Daesh’s ambitions in annexing the most important wings of al-Qaeda in the world.

What had contributed to this is their subtlety and ambition. Each of them wanted to become a pioneer of global jihad, not merely a follower of Baghdadi's orders.

The three leaders struggled to maintain a decentralized base that would allow the leaders of the factions to move independently, so that Al-Qaeda's centers of influence in Syria, Egypt, Libya and West Africa would not fall into the trap of the strict centralization of Daesh.

What Abu-Mohamed al-Julani achieved in the face of attempts by Daesh to annex Syria's branch was also achieved by Belmokhtar, who deprived al-Baghdadi of North Africa's strategic space when he stood against Abulayd al-Sahrawi's pledge of allegiance to Daesh.

That was also achieved by Hisham al-Ashmawi, when he prevented the largest wing inside al-Qaeda in the Sinai from joining Daesh after the pledge of allegiance by Ansar Bait al-Maqdis to Baghdadi in April 2014.

After the declaration of allegiance by the Ansar al-Bayt Al-Quds group to Daesh on November 3, 2014, it was divided on itself. The group’s Sinai wing was committed to a pledge of allegiance to Daesh while the valley's cells split into two wings, one led by Ashraf Gharabli committed to the allegiance to Daesh, and the second led by Hisham al-Ashmawi rejecting the allegiance.

Al-Ashmawi appeared later, announcing the establishment of a new organization called the "Almoravids", confirming his allegiance to Al Qaeda.

Al-Ashmawi's rejection of a pledge of allegiance to Daesh was not an appeal to al-Qaeda and Zawahiri, but to his ambition of independence from direct leadership.

He also sought to benefit from the Egyptian jihadi situation which is, of course, historically linked to Al-Zawahiri's experience in Egypt, which he was keen to hint at through the nature of the literature he used during his only audio release.

The conflict over the centers of influence

 Al-Qaeda seeks to recover what Daesh has acquired, or to consolidate its influence in the centers where Daesh has become a competitor, especially those that have represented a vital area along the map of its activity, from Central and West Africa to Southeast Asia.

The restoration of influence in Africa required the steps taken by the central command of the organization in the west of the continent; when pro-al-Qaeda organizations were incorporated under the title of “Supports of Islam and Muslims” in March 2017.

It bases its strongest strongholds in northwestern Syria, controlling much of Idlib province and the border crossing between Syria and Turkey, the largest area that ​​the organization has domination over since the events of September 2001.

Al-Qaeda in Syria ostensibly abandoned its ideological authority and its organizational affiliation with the parent organization to achieve this level of success on the ground for its theoretical theses by adopting a different approach from that of Daesh through betting on flexibility of stances and keenness on partnership and popular embracement.

There is no effective control of al-Qaeda by Hay’at Tahrir el-Sham on the strongholds, which is one of two wings of its strategy based on handing over liberated areas to an independent civilian administration at the same time when it is engaging in a guerrilla war against the regime.

The organization is facing challenges in the north of Syria, especially the positions of its volatile regional allies, particularly the Turkish ally, and the dissidence of elements of el-Nusra front after the announcement of the breakout from al-Qaeda. However, what remains is relatively fruitful.

Al-Qaeda is also keen to establish its footprints in Nigeria and Mali, especially after attempts by Daesh to provide its existence in these areas.

In January and February 2018, al-Qaeda also targeted the operations of Boko haram which organized camps for displaced persons, girls' schools or mosques, in conjunction with the announcement of Daesh organization in the Sahara led by Adnan Abulwalid Sahrawi in January 2018 about its responsibility for attacks against international forces and the Malian army barracks.

They are attacks that aimed at expanding the parallel influence to al-Qaeda's influence across the borders between Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso.

Libya is a central link between these strategic locations, which al-Qaeda has established as its command platform for global jihad, extending from the Levant to Egypt to central and western Africa.

In the south of Libya, there is an additional concentration under the supervision of the Tawarid leader Iyad Agha Ghali, leader of Ansar al-Din, with the help of Mokhtar Belmokhtar.

In the city of Derna, east of Libya, there are factions led by Hisham Ashmawi, and there are, in the vicinity of Benghazi east of the country on the Mediterranean coast, several training centers for al-Qaeda.

The activities of Iyad Agha, Hisham Ashmawi and Mukhtar Belmokhtar across these vast areas are akin to restoring al-Qaeda's dynamism and momentum in northern Africa, creating a balance with Daesh parallel expansion in these centers.

The two organizations are keen to control areas within Libya as the heart of terrorist activity in the Middle East, both in terms of pumping manpower, managing training, and supporting weapons and logistics.

Al-Qaeda in the Egyptian Sinai returned after a period of disappearance during the years of the revival of Daesh starting from 2014.

Under the title "Soldiers of Islam," Al-Qaeda consists of the remnants of the Army of Islam in Gaza and the remnants of the organization of Tawhid wel-Jihad, leading the competition against Daesh through a systematic propaganda campaign.

Al-Qaeda continued to operate independently and in coordination with other factions under the title of the "Free Islamic Army" in central Sinai, which was a stronghold of the organization before January 2011.

Al-Qaeda in Asia has been keen to maintain its strongholds in Indonesia, which are divided between Jakarta, Burakarta, Bandung and Central Java.

Al-Qaeda is trying to return to its glory in Indonesia by strengthening its relationship with the organization of Jundallah, a task that Omar al-Farouq tried to accomplish before being arrested.

The organization was linked to al-Qaeda in Spain by Barlindongan Siregar, a member of the Spanish base, as well as al-Qaeda's cell in Australia.

Al-Qaeda aims to reduce the impact of its setback after many followers of Abu Bakr Bashir, the leader of the al-Qaeda-affiliated Islamic Group, announced their allegiance to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.

Al-Qaeda also seeks to deprive Daesh of the success of its efforts to control the Asian front, which aims to support its activities in Pakistan and Afghanistan.

Al Qaeda has important strategic positions that Daesh tries to compete with whether in both East Asia and the Middle East, particularly those in the Maghreb and North Africa, or within traditional al-Qaeda areas of influence like Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Al-Qaeda is also expanding its network from Northwest Africa to South-East Asia following the defeat in Afghanistan, which led to its expulsion and deprivation of training camps that it established on its soil.

Daesh is, meanwhile, trying to "clone" Al Qaeda's strategy to escape defeat in the face of the Washington-led international coalition through competing with al-Qaeda over its strongholds and centers of influence around the world.

Factors beyond al-Qaeda

Al-Qaeda has given priority to empowering its branches throughout the world with a view to controlling its local strongholds, after realizing in an earlier stage the difficulty of targeting the interests of Western countries and the United States.

Al-Qaeda is reaping the losses of Daesh which is unable to formulate an alternative ideology that improves its relations with minorities and civilians. While al-Qaeda is keen to improve its relations with its societies, it presents itself as a force capable of unconventional change with the use of force.

It is betting on what the political trend of Islam is promoting regarding not trusting peaceful political practice and change through elections. It is also betting on gaining the sympathy of popular sectors that are angry at the political and economic turmoil, and therefore it becomes active in targeting the symbols of the existing political system, the security agencies and the army. Al-Qaeda targeted former Egyptian Interior Minister Major General Mohamed Ibrahim in an assassination attempt in September 2013.

It also targets ambushes of armies, such as the attack on the Nigerian army patrol on the Nigerian financial border on February 24, 2017, which killed 15 soldiers.

At the same time, al-Qaeda is keen on establishing good relations with the population, as evidenced by the statement of the organization that condemned Daesh attacks on worshipers at the mosque in Al-Rawda in the city of Beer el-Abd in el-Arish, northern Sinai on November 24, 2017.

Al-Qaeda is exploiting the state of decline of Daesh by expanding in a wide geographical scale, exploiting links with the components of the local community and with independent armed jihadist groups.

Daesh does not have what qualifies it for such relationships; since it imposed himself since the beginning of its establishment as an overarching coalition that does not accept partners or the independence of branches, and does not accept but the submission of everyone to the orders of all its leaders.

Al-Qaeda has a privilege on several levels. The first level is that it has a prudent foreign policy; it is inclined to send assurances to the outside, pretending not to adopt expansionist projects.

So its branches continued to take what it takes to prove that they are local movements that are biased towards the partnership, even if this means declaring independence from its original stream. This is evident in the practices of al-Qaeda branch in Syria, which sacrificed its linkage to Daesh first then to al-Qaeda later, reaching partnership with local trends under the name of “Hay’at Tahrir el-Sham”.

The second level is adopting flexible policies at home to contain local entities, with a view to gaining support for the jihadist project, and focusing on the course of confrontation with the regimes under the slogan “Ending Injustice for the Oppressed and Establishing Religion”.

The third level is establishing balanced relations with the other jihadist and Islamic factions, in order to benefit from the alliance with them against common opponents.

This approach has been confirmed through its application on many occasions. Abu Musab al-Sury has directed that the jihadist communities should not be dragged into battles with the Islamic communities on the backdrop of controversial doctrinal issues.

The fourth level is taking into account the reality and not fighting battles greater than the capabilities of the organization, as summarized by Atiyahtullah al-Libi’s directives, including “Avoid any Provocative Acts for the Enemies”.

The fifth level is al-Qaeda's keenness on not appearing as a seeker to have a monopoly of power and as an added attraction that allows the expansion of the formation of local alliances. Al-Suri stressed the need to enable the rest of the forces to participate in the management of control areas.

The amendments introduced by Al-Qaeda to its strategy in practice on the ground have given it the advantage of excelling over Daesh. It has contributed to shortening the path to its objectives by ignoring some of the adversaries, and focusing only on confronting the pillars of local government.

 Al-Qaeda, therefore, has succeeded in preventing Daesh from controlling its main centers of influence and preventing it from annexing its prominent leaders.

Policies that supported al-Qaeda

The terrorism practiced by Sunni armed groups has weakened the positions of Arab states against Iran and has become impotent in the face of Iran’s interference and the practices of Sunni militias.

The Iranian presence remained an obstacle for Arab forces to make counterterrorism a priority, especially with Iran being given a role in the fight against terrorism, which led to counterproductive results.

The absence of the traditional role of the Arab states, at the expense of Iran and Turkey, has provided opportunities for terrorist organizations to expand and recruit more fighters.

These forces planted the seeds of permanent conflicts of an ideological and sectarian nature because Iran and Turkey rely on proxies from the Sunni and Shia political Islam trend.

Regional powers are active in gaining influence by controlling strategic positions in the Arab world, in strategic areas in Africa, and on the Red Sea coast, giving extremist organizations presence and power.

Therefore, Al-Qaeda organization divided the target countries on two levels. The first is a cohesive state with a central authority that controls the edges. The second is a country that lacks control over the borders. This means the deterioration of the security and economic conditions of the edges. This represents the go-ahead signal to control it by elements of these organizations.

Along with political and geopolitical gains, Iran sought to civilizationally outstrip Sunni Islam by glorifying Sunni elements, in exchange for polishing its militias, to legitimize them, including the Iraqi militias, militias affiliated to the Revolutionary Guards, the Houthis in Yemen, and the Afghan and Pakistani Shia battalions.

Turkey and Qatar support the political and jihadist stream of Islam with its variations with the aim of controlling the Arab decision, through a caliphate run by the Muslim Brotherhood, backed by forces of Sunni insurgent groups.

Ankara and Doha are not cooperating seriously with the international community to form a united front to combat terrorism; their interests in the Arab region are in conflict with their influence in the regional environment.

Non-Arab regional states exploit the preoccupation of the Arab states with the restoration of the Arab order, following the post-Arab Spring chaos, to strengthen their influence in the African and Asian vital fields, giving al-Qaeda the opportunity to rebuild itself and strongly supporting the activities of these organizations in their current positions.

Suggested solutions

Armed groups are racing to gain the support of regional powers by demonstrating their presence in strategic positions of primary concern to these forces.

The ability of these organizations to recruit individuals is due to their financial resources, given the economic suffering of the targeted states along the map of the conflict.

Therefore, the advancement of the economies of these countries - without being subject to the interests of forces carrying expansionary projects with sectarian and ideological nature - remains the primary requirement.

These organizations, particularly al-Qaeda, have opportunities to exist in a climate of political instability, so the spring revolutions represented for al-Qaeda a stage of revival, and it built on them the strategy of their return.

Therefore, the main demand for hindering the new al-Qaeda caliphate project was to support governments that nurture diversity and are able to manage their differences without exploding to the point of civil strife. This should take place with the need to foster dialogue between existing, opponent, non-violent and unarmed regimes that do not adopt an extremist ideology.

Thus, the Gulf countries and Egypt succeeded in absorbing the developments that threatened the Arab presence by increasing the influence of the non-Arab regional powers, which enabled them to withstand the repercussions of the wars in the region. This served as an incentive to restore the Arab system by playing an effective role in confronting armed organizations.

The dangers of having an Al-Qaeda caliphate are not less harmful than the dangers of the deteriorating caliphate of Daesh. Al Qaeda, which failed to defeat the West, is now seeking to acquire power through an extended caliphate to realize its old goals.

As long as Daesh’s caliphate was dashed by security and intelligence coordination between the countries of the region and the world, security and intelligence cooperation can be the basis for undermining the new al-Qaeda project, in order to limit the movement of individuals and the transfer of funds and weapons.