The Salafi Conflict… The Post-Arab Spring Transitions
Despite the wide spread of Salafism – scholarly, political and educational, the political elites deal with all of its trends as if they came from another planet without delving into its diversification and political participation after the Arab revolutions, which have changed the key players in the region.
The
Arab revolutions have allowed some Islamist groups to rule in some countries or
take part in the ruling of others.
The
Salafists have joined the political race in a number of countries like the
Gulf, Iraq, Yemen, Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, Palestine and Egypt. The Salafi rise
has urged Jordanian author Mohammad Abu Rumman to write his book titled
"Struggle for Salafism: A reading into Ideology, Disagreements and Spread.
The
author delved into the different trends of Salafism and disagreements about a
number of topics such as democracy, elections and many others. Abu Rumman
pinpointed a number of transitions that hit the Salafi entity in the wake of
political changes, which have turned them from isolation into the heat of the
political scene.
The
five-chapter book outlined the inter-Salafi conflict. In the first chapter, Abu
Rumman talked about the Salafi presence in four Arab Gulf countries: Saudi
Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain and Yemen. He overviewed Salafism in Syria, Iraq,
Lebanon and Jordan.
In
the second chapter, he analyzed the Salafi presence in Egypt following the Arab
Spring.
Salafists
consider themselves people of Hadith who lived in the second and third Hijri
centuries, according to the author.
The
book, published by the Beirut-based Arab Network for Research and Publishing, has
argued that the Salafi movements are divided over two main questions: the
definition of the present Arab political status quo and the reform strategy.
The
author divided the Salafi movements into four trends: traditional, Jamia (some
Saudi Sufism), radical and jihadism. Inside each of the aforementioned Salafi
movements conflict about the legitimacy of representation in Saudi Arabia,
Kuwait, Egypt, Jordan, Bahrain, Yemen, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq and Palestine.
The
second chapter delves into the Salafi conflict in Syria, where Jihadi Salafism
expanded due to sectarian chaos which nourishes this trend of Salafism,
especially in the rural and suburban areas. The author has stressed it is
difficult to predict the future of Salafism in Syria. The very same applies to
Iraq, the author said, citing ISIS, which adopts an ideology of the Jihadi
Salafism.
As
for Lebanon, Abu Rumman said Salafism cannot be united in one entity due to its
static ideology and changing from being loyal to the regime to opposition.
The
author allocated the third chapter for Salafism in Egypt. He delved into what
he described as the Salafi isolated islands in Egypt, especially after January
25, 2011. Some of them headed towards democracy in a way that raises a question
if this transition is tactical or strategic.
This
chapter has exposed the differences among Egypt's Salafi groups. These
differences have emerged after the January 25 revolution. Some Safalfists
joined in the political scene. This trend is represented by Qutbi Salafism and
led by takfiri Mohamed Abdel Maqsood, who fled Egypt.
A
second Salafi trend disdained from the political scene according to Shaykh
Al-Albani saying "It is political to leave politics alone". This
trend is led by a number of shaykhs like Mohamed Saeed Raslan, Hisham El-Bialy
and Mahmoud El-Radwany.
Other
Salafis remained silent considering what took place was a sort of sedition that
should be avoided. The conflict about the constitution was the chariot that moved
the Salafis from rejection of political engagement to the heart of the
political race using the pretext of safeguarding the Islamic identity and to
exploit democracy to reach power and dominate the parliament.
The
fourth chapter delves into the political role of Salafis in the Arab world. It
proposes two opposing suppositions. The first supposition is that the Salafi
political parties will upgrade its ideology and discourse to be more pragmatic
and realistic.
The
second assumption predicts that Salafis will disdain from political engagement and
that Salafis won't be committed to the principles of democracy. Abu Rumman has
not advocated any of the two assumptions as the experience is still in the
making.