Xi plays tough, but can China afford to make an enemy of India?
The ambush set up by Chinese soldiers for an Indian
patrol was medieval. In the high-altitude Himalayan no man’s land claimed by
both countries, their forces have agreed not to carry guns, to diminish the
chance of the long-running territorial dispute flaring into open war.
So the People’s Liberation Army had dammed up
mountain streams, which they unblocked as the Indian troops approached. The
rush of water knocked many off their feet, and then the Chinese soldiers swept
down, brandishing sticks encrusted with nails, Indian media reported.
The units fought hand to hand for hours; several
Indians tumbled down the mountain to their death. When the battle was over, at
least 20 Indian soldiers were dead, dozens more injured and several taken
captive. China had losses too, although it has not revealed figures.
A fragile consensus that had held for nearly half a
century was also killed off. Before last week’s battle, no soldier from either
side had died in a border skirmish for 45 years.
China and India fought a war over the border in
1962, and clashed again in 1967, but both seemed keen to avoid incidents that
could spiral towards another.
Then there was Monday’s ambush, which left two
nuclear-armed nationalist strongmen – Indian prime minister Narendra Modi and
Chinese president Xi Jinping – facing off over the bodies of their troops. It
was a potentially explosive situation. Neither man’s politics allows much room
to look weak on issues of national sovereignty and territorial control.
On Saturday, China accused India of “deliberate
provocation”, and criticised its construction of infrastructure in the area.
But India’s construction has been well inside the territory it controls.
The mountainside battle came after a steady build-up
of Chinese forces and infrastructure, and an increase in reported patrols,
around the line of actual control (LAC), the de facto border – an area that
commanders know carries risks of escalation.
“This appears to be a far more concerted push on
China’s part to change the status quo,” said Andrew Small, senior fellow at the
German Marshall Fund. He cautioned that information about the border areas was
fragmentary, and mostly from Indian sources supplemented by satellite images,
but said there was a clear picture of a growing Chinese presence.
“The Chinese
military has been hardening its position in multiple locations, not simply
conducting patrols across the LAC but building infrastructure and maintaining
an ongoing presence.”
It also seems improbable that commanders on a
contested frontier, where there had been serious brawls a month earlier, would
plan such a deadly ambush without at least tacit approval from the highest
levels.
Yet it is not an obvious time for Beijing to be
stirring up trouble with its neighbour; the country is battling several crises.
Its economy has been shattered by coronavirus. Relations with the United States
are at one of their lowest points since diplomatic ties were re-established in
the 1970s. Hong Kong is in revolt and Beijing’s imposition of a security law
there has provoked international outrage.
Chinese authorities have also launched a trade war
with Australia over its demands for an investigation into the origins of
Covid-19, and are in a stand-off with Canada over the extradition of a senior
executive from the technology giant Huawei.
Some analysts believe that aggression on the Indian
border is a response to these domestic pressures, from a leader who has fumbled
the economy and relations with a top trading partner desperate not to look weak
on national sovereignty.
“I feel it’s generally a response to the pressure Xi
feels he is under,” said Taylor Fravel, director of the security studies
programme at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
“Because of Covid and the criticism China faced
internationally, the economic crisis at home, and the concomitant deterioration
of China-US relations, [Beijing] has taken a tough stance on a number of
sovereignty issues as a way of signalling that China will not be cowed.”
Othrs see a more opportunistic aggression from a
government which over the past decade has replaced a focus on economic
priorities and global stability in its foreign policy with aggressive
nationalism.
Forced to choose between acceptance and escalation,
no country has wanted to take on China. Comments from Modi on Friday suggested
that he too was willing to pay a political price to avoid further escalation.
He said in a televised statement that Chinese troops
had not intruded across the country’s borders, even though that directly
contradicted his own foreign minister’s previous position.
“From the Chinese point of view, why not push
forward?” said June Dreyer, professor of political science at the University of
Miami. China’s economy is five times the size of India’s, and its official
defence budget $100bn (£80bn) higher; the real difference is probably larger,
she pointed out.
But while protests in India’s streets and threats to
boycott Chinese goods are unlikely to have a major economic impact, and there
is little threat of military action, Beijing may have underestimated the damage
caused by this skirmish.
“One of the things this crisis has taught us is that
the Chinese understanding of India is quite poor and is often coloured by
cognitive biases of all kinds,” said Ashley Tellis, senior fellow at the
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and former senior adviser to the US
state department.
The deaths, and the end of the tacit agreement to
avoid fatalities, are likely to harden attitudes towards China, both in the
general population and among politicians. And that could have long-term
fallouts, both economically and diplomatically.
“I suspect China has lost another generation, in
India, many of whom had seen China as an opportunity. Basically, now they will
say we can’t trust them,” said Tanvi Madan, director of the India project at
the Brookings Institution in Washington.
“Even if there was already an internal debate, this
has strengthened the hands of those who have called for a rethinking,” she
said. “One thing this will put an end to is the idea that economic
interdependence is going to alleviate political strains.”




