At five in the afternoon, Cairo time (34).. America and the Muslim Brotherhood (6)
But the hardline Islamists of the
Jihad Organization and al-Gama‘a al-Islamiyya held a different view. Their
priorities required transferring the battle to their own countries to wage
jihad against what they termed infidel ruling regimes that did not govern by
what God had revealed. The Americans supported this vision in an attempt to
keep Islamist extremists away from areas of American influence and activity,
and to weaken those regimes in Arab and Islamic countries so that they would
fall more deeply into Washington’s embrace.
An open conflict then began
between the two trends: the Egyptian jihadist groups on one side, and Azzam and
the Muslim Brotherhood on the other. It ended with the killing of Abdullah
Azzam in 1989 by an explosive device planted on the road between his home and
the mosque where he delivered the Friday sermon.
The situation had stabilized
considerably in the United States, and the elections of 1979 took place,
followed by the emergence of a new Shura Council in 1980. Work began on
unifying the ranks of the group and on building a sound organizational
framework. The Muslim Students Association also developed in 1980 into the
Islamic Society of North America (ISNA), which brought together Muslims from
among immigrants and citizens, becoming the nucleus of the Islamic movement in
North America. The Islamic Society developed markedly during the 1980s, but the
leadership and guidance of the Brotherhood over it began to decline gradually
due to their limited presence within it.
Accordingly, the second five-year
plan adopted by the group focused on self-construction and localizing the call.
This included attempts to increase the Brotherhood’s influence within
organizations targeting young Muslim immigrants, as affirmed by the Brotherhood’s
summary on America, which stated: “Beginning to focus on localizing the call
and finding permanent foundations in the cities where the Brotherhood currently
lives, so that they become meeting points for incoming Brotherhood members.”
A State or a Host Haven
The principal problem facing the
group’s leadership was defining the nature of the goal and the mode of action
for the organization’s cadres in America. Was the objective there to establish
an Islamic state, or to create a fortress to shelter newcomers?
This was the question that the
report by Mahdi Akef, previously referenced, attempted to answer. In this
context, the report stated: “There is also confusion regarding the objective
and purpose of the Brotherhood’s presence in America: is the goal to establish
the Islamic state in America, or merely to create a fortress that tends to
incoming migrants? There is also a lack of clarity among the Brotherhood in
America regarding methodological foundations—whether the intellectual framework
laid down by Imam Hasan al-Banna should be followed, or whether other writings
may be adopted, and whether the group has broad lines that define its
intellectual framework, or whether it opens itself to other frameworks. It has
also been observed that the multiplicity of intellectual, educational, social,
and organizational backgrounds has had a significant impact on intellectual and
educational harmony, leading to instability in bylaws and weakness in the
mechanisms by which leadership is selected.”
Western Modernity
Alongside the question of the
objective—whether establishing a state or creating a haven for arrivals from
the East—another no less serious issue arose: how Brotherhood members coming
from the East should deal with Western modernity. Akef explained in his report
that a number of critically important issues for organizational construction
emerged from the manner of dealing with the new reality. These included the
question of work within the organization versus public work, and the role of
each in achieving the group’s objectives; the issue of women and their role,
the group’s conception of their organizational status, and how to deal with
them in a society that elevates the status of women and equates them with men,
at a time when the women’s section of the group was headed by a man (al-Hajj
Jum‘a at the time).
There was also the issue of
shura—what are the limits of the general supervisor’s authority, the scope of
permissible and constructive criticism, and the impact of trade-union style
dealings on fraternal relations; as well as security issues, secrecy and
openness in organizational work—whether the group should be publicly declared
in America or only a part of it, what matters should be disclosed, and what
should be kept secret.
Educational levels were also
among the issues Mahdi Akef addressed in his report, calling for careful
consideration. He observed that educational prerequisites required of those in
leadership were being bypassed in favor of those best accepted at the general
level. This led him as well to discuss the jurisprudence of public work and the
consequent determination of relations with various institutions, the lack of
clarity regarding mixing, leniency, financial dealings with different states,
women’s participation, and other matters that remain subject to divergent
viewpoints with respect to the group’s organic formation.
Mahdi Akef concluded in his
report that the organization in America is characterized by points of
instability, wide geographical dispersion, and the presence of an Arab
majority.
Akef also noted in his report,
which included the problems facing the organization in America, that the
presence of many Islamic groups active on the American scene must be taken into
account, given the resulting dispersion of the efforts of many brothers across
different regions of America. He added that these groups or formations are
divided into two types:
First: groups exported from the
East, such as the Salafis, Hizb al-Tahrir, the Jihad Organization, and Tabligh
and Da‘wa, among others—meaning that for every group existing in the East,
there is a branch in America, with differences among them according to their
weight in the Mashriq.
Second: groups or formations that
arose within the American environment, such as the Rashad Khalifa group and the
Islamic Center group in Los Angeles, among others. These groups represent no
real weight beyond their influence within the city or state in which they are
present, which nonetheless affects the activities of the brothers in those
areas.
Akef observed in his report,
submitted to the Guidance Bureau in 1991, that many of these groups and
formations spread across U.S. states lure the Brotherhood in those states into
disputes and provoke tensions, to the point that some cases escalated into
physical altercations, as occurred with brothers from Tabligh and Da‘wa in
certain states. Akef added that these groups aim thereby to demonstrate their
importance and to disrupt Brotherhood work in forming and absorbing
individuals. Rarely do we go to any area with a Brotherhood branch and find, in
the same area, a branch of one of these groups engaging it, without most of the
questions and inquiries of the brothers in the branch amounting to complaints
and requests for advice on how to deal with that group and its members—an issue
that consistently overshadows the more important and higher objective, namely
absorbing individuals arriving from the East and spreading the Islamic call in
the West.
Secrecy and Openness
It is clear that the
Brotherhood’s branch in America at that time was experiencing intense and
controversial debate over the issue of “secrecy versus openness,” and which was
preferable for Brotherhood work in America.
Mahdi Akef says in his report
regarding this highly sensitive issue:
“We have previously addressed the
point of security and secrecy and its impact on Brotherhood activity in
America. Given the importance of this point, and the confusion it continually
raises among group members of diverse inclinations, we will present this issue
in some detail.”
First: Openness
(a) Reasons for calling for
openness:
The expansion of Islamic work and
the absence of an appropriate formula for accommodating communities.
Long-term planning and its need
for permanent leadership and fixed bylaws and regulations.
American customs that guarantee
freedom of expression and organization.
(b) The need for an official
spokesperson for the group in America:
Leadership appearing before the
public to fill the current vacuum and silence voices claiming the absence of
Islamic leadership.
Our public presence improves the
image of the Brotherhood in American public opinion.
(c) Risks of moving toward
openness:
Harm to the security of the
organization, its leadership, and its members, especially those arriving from
and returning to the East.
A decline in the level of
organizational, intellectual, or educational commitment.
Embarrassing Eastern
organizations.
How to combine brothers working
secretly with others working openly within a single organization.
• The scarcity of clandestine
cadres capable of leading an open organization.
After reviewing the positive and
negative aspects of open work, Akef emphasized that each of the aforementioned
elements, reasons, or risks has its justification. Therefore, a number of
alternatives were presented briefly:
That ISNA, the Islamic Society of
North America, be the public form of da‘wa work, with some modifications to its
system and bylaws.
That there be two organizations,
one public and one private, completely separate and with separate leaderships.
That there be a single
organization and a single leadership, with two branches—one public and the
other secret.
That matters remain as they are
for a period of time, since any hasty action is not required at present.
However, it was necessary to
review the views of the branch leaders in America on this serious issue, who
were divided according to their affiliations and countries of origin, as we
shall see tomorrow, God willing.
To the next installment.
Paris: five in the evening, Cairo
time.
