At five in the afternoon, Cairo time (50).. Arab National Security (5–10)

Files Not Yet Closed…
From the Shock of 2011 to the Tests of 2026

In 2026, the question is no longer: How did Arab states fall?
Rather: Why did some states survive while others collapsed?
And why did all attempts to topple the national state fail in certain capitals, while succeeding—partially or fully—in others?

More than a decade ago, the Arab scene appeared to be moving toward a single end:
the dismantling of states, the hollowing out of armies, the injection of societies with the germ of sectarianism, and the reduction of national identity to a fragile shell floating atop a lake of deep divisions.

But time did not move in a straight line.

In 2026, we face a different map:
states that rebuilt themselves, states that stumbled,
and forces that believed toppling regimes would open the road to dominance—only to discover, belatedly, that the state is stronger than the organization, and that societies cannot be governed indefinitely through deception.

From “Security” to “State Resilience”

In the second decade of the millennium, the concept of Arab national security was often reduced to:
• borders
• armies
• direct military threats

But what has unfolded since 2011 exposed the flaw in this definition.

The danger did not come from invading armies, but from:
• groups speaking in the name of religion
• organizations cloaked in human-rights work
• states using the economy and media as instruments of war
• and chaos presented as revolution

Here, the real battle began:
the battle for the survival of the national state itself.

The target was not the overthrow of a particular political regime, but rather:
• the dismantling of institutions
• the breaking of trust between state and society
• the transformation of political disagreement into an existential conflict

Anyone who reviews what occurred in Iraq, Syria, Libya, and Yemen realizes that the final outcome was neither democracy nor freedom, but rather:
exhausted states,
fragmented societies,
and sovereignty diminished or absent.

2013: The Moment the Trajectory Was Broken

The year 2013 was a decisive turning point—not only in Egypt, but across the entire region.
At that moment, the “post-state” project collided with a solid wall: the resisting state.

What happened was not merely political change, but rather:
• the thwarting of a model intended for generalization
• the shattering of the illusion that the street could be steered indefinitely
• the collapse of the idea that transnational organizations are more capable than states

From here began an open confrontation that did not stop at the domestic sphere, but immediately expanded to:
• the external arena
• international forums
• media
• the economy

This is what we will examine in detail here, while posing the fundamental question:
Why did the plan to topple the state fail?

More than ten years on, it can be said clearly:
the schemes did not fail because they were not implemented, but because they were fully implemented—and did not succeed.

All tools were used:
• media incitement
• diplomatic isolation
• economic pressure
• investment in societal division
• the selective deployment of human-rights discourse

Yet the outcome was not as planned.

The core reason for this failure lies in a miscalculation of three decisive factors:

1.   The cohesion of the idea of the state among broad segments of the population

2.   The ability of institutions to adapt rather than collapse

3.   The limits of betting on chaos as a tool of governance

Chaos may topple, but it does not build.
It may unsettle the state, but it does not produce a viable alternative.

The Gulf: From Hesitation to Decisiveness

In 2026, Arab national security cannot be read without pausing at the profound shift in the Gulf states’ approach—particularly Saudi Arabia and the UAE.

In the years following 2011, a phase prevailed marked by:
• testing
• review
• divergent assessments

But the accumulation of experience led to a single conclusion:
political Islam is not a partner in stability,
but a permanent gateway to chaos—regardless of how it changes its language or appearance.

This realization did not come all at once, but through:
• shocks
• disappointments
• and direct and indirect confrontations

From here began the transition from a policy of containment to one of strategic decisiveness—not only through open confrontation, but also through:
• drying up the sources
• exposing double discourse
• building an alternative development model that pulls the rug out from under the advocates of chaos

2026: An Enemy Without a Banner

The fatal mistake is believing that the danger ended with the fall of organizations or the retreat of slogans.

In reality, what we face today is more dangerous:
the enemy no longer raises a clear banner,
no longer chants in the streets.

Instead, it operates through:
• soft networks
• digital platforms
• lobbying firms
• intelligent exploitation of economic and social crises

The threat in 2026 is not an “organization” in the old sense, but rather:
a state of fluidity
that allows chaos to be reproduced under new names.

Here, the battle becomes a battle of:
• awareness
• institutions
• the ability to read transformations early

Where Are We Headed?

This series of articles is not a retrieval of an old archive,
nor a repetition of warnings long since voiced and exhausted.

It is an attempt to reread what happened, because:
• what we do not understand well can be repeated
• and what we do not fortify can be breached again

“Darmashdat”… When They Gathered to Manage Chaos

The “Darmashdat” document—whose disclosure I uniquely revealed after 2013 on more than one media platform—was not merely the minutes of a routine security meeting, nor a theoretical scenario ignored by time. Rather, it was an early mental map of how the forces that viewed the collapse of the Arab national state as an entry point to redrawing the region were thinking.

Today, in 2026, the importance of this document lies not only in its secret details, but in its methodology—and in what it reveals about how conflict with states is managed not through armies, but through the dismantling of decision-making and will.

Where Did the Danger of “Darmashdat” Come From?

What was dangerous about the meeting—held inside a European military base and attended by representatives of Western and regional intelligence services—was that it did not discuss “regime change” or “supporting opposition,” but focused on a deeper question:
How do we keep the state in a permanent condition of paralysis, even if it does not fall?

Here lies the central idea:
• no rapid overthrow
• no direct confrontation
• but prolonged attrition

This explains why the plan was not military, but rather:
• political
• economic
• media-based
• and indirectly security-oriented

The Targeted State Was Not Egypt Alone

It is true that Egypt was the central target after 2013, but a careful reading of the document reveals that:
• the model was scalable
• and the plan was designed to be used against any state that deviated from the required path

The goal was not to punish a specific state, but to prevent the emergence of a strong state capable of regional influence.

Hence the focus on:
• disabling political decision-making
• tarnishing financial reputation
• undermining investor confidence
• creating a permanent, low-intensity security tension

In other words: a state that does not collapse—but does not rise.

Why Did the Plan Not Succeed as Intended?

Because its architects committed a fundamental error of judgment:
they treated the Arab state as a fragile entity with no memory and no capacity to learn.

What followed proved otherwise.

The state that confronted this plan:
• reordered its priorities
• expanded its alliance networks
• shifted the battle from reaction to action, thanks to strong institutions deeply rooted in history
• institutions that understood the real danger lay not in the blow itself, but in attrition

Here, cracks began to appear within the plan itself—by deliberate agency.

“Darmashdat” as Doctrine, Not Document

In 2026, the importance of “Darmashdat” no longer lies in its literal content, but in the fact that it represents:
a model for how new wars are waged against states—

wars without tanks,
without aircraft,
without official declarations,

but rather through:
• economic indicators
• politicized human-rights reports
• public-relations campaigns
• lobbying networks within Western parliaments

This is what we later saw repeated against Egypt after June 30, under different names and headings.

From the Street to the Economy

If the first phase after 2011 bet on:
• the street
• sit-ins
• open chaos

then the post-2013 phase witnessed a strategic shift:
the economy became the primary arena of confrontation, where:
• the currency
• credit ratings
• investment
• the state’s image in markets

all turned into pressure tools no less effective than weapons.

This makes reading “Darmashdat” today essential, because it reveals the moment when the transition occurred from noisy chaos to quiet chaos.

What Remains of the Plan in 2026?

The most important question is not: Has the plan ended?
But rather: Which parts of it are still in use?

The painful answer:
• many of its tools remain present
• but under new names
• and with softer facades

The difference is that:
• the state has become more aware
• societies less susceptible to deception
• and the economy has become part of the national security equation, not a separate file

The Lesson That Must Not Be Forgotten

The most dangerous aspect of the “Darmashdat” document is that it proves:
the battle was not over power,
but over the very meaning of the state itself.

This is why revisiting it today is not an excavation of the past, but a fortification of the future.

In the next installment, we move from the document to the organization:
How did the Muslim Brotherhood transform after the fall from a loud group into a silent network?
And how did the shape of the threat change—while its essence did not.

To be continued,
Paris: 5:00 p.m. Cairo time.